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I was like a boy playing on the sea-shore, and 
diverting myself now and then finding a smoother 
pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the 
great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me – 
Isaac Newton 
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THESIS ABSTRACT 
B A C K G R O U N D :  Hospitals consume a significant proportion of healthcare budgets and are 
a key avenue for the delivery of key interventions. Understanding how hospitals use resources is 
therefore an important question. Priority setting research has however focused on the macro 
(national) and micro (patient) level, and neglected the meso (organizational, hospital) level 
practices. There is also a dearth of literature on priority setting in developing country hospitals, 
although they are recognized to suffer severe resource scarcity. This thesis describes and 
evaluates priority setting practices in Kenyan hospitals and identifies strategies for improvement. 
M E T H O D O L O G Y :  A case study approach was used, where two public hospitals in 
coastal Kenya were selected as cases and three priority setting processes examined as nested 
cases. Data were collected over a seven month fieldwork period using in-depth interviews, 
document reviews, and non-participant observations.  A modified thematic approach was used for 
data analysis. 
F I N D I N G S :  Hospitals exhibit properties of complex adaptive systems (CASs) that exist in a 
dynamic state with multiple interacting agents. Weaknesses in the system hardware (resource 
scarcity) and software (tangible- guidelines and procedures and intangible- leadership and actor 
relationships) led to the emergence of undesired properties.  Both hospitals had comparable 
system hardware and tangible software, but differences in intangible software contributed to 
variations in priority setting practices. For example, good leadership and actor relations in one 
hospital lead to better inclusion of stakeholders and perceptions of fairness while weak 
leadership, heightened tensions among actors and less inclusive processes in the other hospital 
lead to distrust and perceptions of unfairness.
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S :  The capacity of hospitals to set priorities should be improved 
across the interacting aspects of organizational hardware, and tangible and intangible software. 
Interventions should however recognize that hospitals are CASs. Rather than rectifying isolated 
aspects of the system, they should endeavor to create conditions for productive emergence.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
riority setting is a term that is used in healthcare to refer to the distribution of resources among 
competing services, patients or patient groups (Mckneally et al. 1997). It has been identified as one 
of the major challenges facing health care decision makers worldwide given the reality of unlimited 
demand for healthcare against a background of resource scarcity (Gibson et al. 2004; Ham & Coulter 
2000; Singer 2000). It is particularly challenging in developing countries where the resource gap is wider 
(Kapiriri & Martin 2007). Priority setting occurs at different levels of the health system namely 1) the 
macro-level (national, provincial) 2) meso level (regional health authority, organizational) and 3) micro-
level (clinical programs, patient level) (Mcdonald & Ollerenshaw 2011). 
 
Research on priority setting in healthcare has mainly focused on the macro (health system) or micro 
(bedside) policy-making levels (Martin et al. 2003) and neglected the meso (organizational) level. 
Specifically in developing countries, there is a dearth of literature on priority setting at the hospital level. 
This is evident in a recent systematic review of priority setting practices in developing countries in which 
only one paper documented hospital level priority setting (Youngkong et al. 2009). This is surprising 
given the key role the public hospital plays in developing country health systems (1.3.2).  
 
The focus of this thesis is priority setting in public hospitals in Kenya. Using case study methodology, I 
set out to examine and evaluate the priority setting practices in county hospitals in Kenya to generate an 
understanding of the factors that come into play, so as to inform policy recommendations to improve 
priority setting in these hospitals.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH PURPOSE 
This research set out with a descriptive-explanatory purpose on the one hand, and a normative or 
evaluative purpose on the other (Gilson 2012).  Using case study approaches, the study describes priority 
setting practices in the case study hospitals and seeks to identify factors that influence this practice and 
explain these interactions. To do this, the study employs a conceptual framework that is developed from a 
synthesis of literature (3.3) and theories of organizational dynamics discussed in chapter four. This is the 
descriptive-explanatory element. The study also evaluates priority setting practices using a framework 
that is again developed from a synthesis of literature (3.3). This is the normative/evaluative element. The 
thesis is thus broadly guided by the approach proposed by Martin and Singer (2003) on improving 
priority setting in healthcare organizations (Figure 1.1). Martin and Singer‘s framework proposes that 
P 
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efforts should go into three critical steps namely: 1) critical description of priority setting processes using 
case study methods; 2) evaluating priority setting processes using an ethical framework; and 3) action 
research to improve priority setting based on the findings in the first two steps.  
Figure 1. 1: Framework for improving priority setting in healthcare organizations (Martin and 
Singer 2003) 
While the thesis will focus on step one and two, it is anticipated that findings from these two steps will 
form the basis for recommendations for potential policy interventions to improve priority setting practices 
in public hospitals in Kenya.  The next section will outline the study aim, objectives and research 
questions. 
1.3 THE STUDY AIM, OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
1.3.1 Research Focus 
This research focuses on how decisions about healthcare priorities and resource allocation to departments 
and service areas are made in county hospitals in Kenya. Specifically, this work critically examines and 
evaluates how the process and content of priority setting is influenced by the context and actors in these 
hospitals. Finally, this work identifies and proposes strategies for improving priority setting practices in 
county hospitals in Kenya.  
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1.3.2 Research Justification 
The performance of health systems is dependent to a significant extent on how well they use resources 
available to them (World Bank 1993). Because the demand for health services outstrips health care 
resources, priority setting is a key determinant of health system performance (Martin & Singer 2003). As 
pointed out in section 1.1, whereas priority setting occurs at all levels of the health system (macro, meso 
and micro), research has mainly focused on macro and micro level processes and hardly on meso level 
and specifically not in hospitals (Martin et al. 2003). This is perhaps surprising for three reasons:  
 
1. Health reforms in both developed and developing countries have included decentralization as a 
key component (Segall 2003); in developing countries, decentralization has focused on district 
health systems with the aim of gradually transferring the process of decision making and 
management of health resources from central ministries of health at the national level to districts 
(Oyaya & Rifkin 2003). District health systems are composed of primary health care and referral 
hospitals, with referral hospitals forming the focal point of administration of the entire district 
health system. 
 
2. Hospitals absorb a significant proportion of resources available in the health sector, with 
estimates in both developed and developing countries showing that they consume between 30% 
to 50% of funds allocated to the health ministry (Mills 1990; Martin et al. 2003). In Kenya for 
example, it is estimated that public hospitals consume over 50% of the healthcare budget 
(Glenngård & Maina 2007; Chuma et al. 2012).   
 
3. Hospitals form an important avenue for the delivery of key curative interventions and it has been 
suggested that if well-functioning, hospitals in developing countries have the potential to reduce 
the mortality in the areas they serve by between 3% and 30% (English et al. 2004). How these 
hospitals set their priorities and allocate resources to competing health needs is therefore of prime 
importance. 
 
There is however a dearth of literature on hospital priority setting in developing countries and specifically 
in Africa. The only documented case of hospital priority setting is that of a national referral hospital in 
Uganda (Kapiriri & Martin 2006). National referral hospitals and lower level (first referral) public 
hospitals are different in a number of ways given that the former are typically semi-autonomous 
institutions whose operations, management structures, resources and target users are very different from 
the latter. There is therefore no documented case of priority setting practice in a typical public hospital in 
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Africa and Kenya in particular. Priority setting in developing countries, rather than being explicit and 
systematic, is often ad hoc and based on historical allocation (Youngkong et al. 2009). Health system 
goals are hence achieved by chance rather than by design. There is therefore a need to improve priority 
setting processes in developing country institutions (Kapiriri & Martin 2007).  
 
To improve the priority setting in public hospitals in Kenya, it is therefore imperative to first gain an 
understanding of what goes on in these hospitals. This will involve describing the priority setting 
practices and evaluating them so as to identify strengths and weakness which can inform the design of 
interventions for improvement. Section 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 will outline the objectives and research questions 
of the study respectively.  
 
1.3.3 Research Objectives 
The aim of this work is to describe and evaluate the priority setting practices in county hospitals in 
Kenya. The specific objectives are: 
 
1. To explore and describe priority setting practices in county hospitals in Kenya 
2. To critically examine the influence of contextual factors and actor and power relations on the 
content and process of priority setting in county hospitals in Kenya 
3. To evaluate priority setting practices in county hospitals in Kenya 
4. To identify and propose strategies for improving priority setting practices in County hospitals in 
Kenya 
 
1.3.4 Research Questions 
Overarching Research Question 
The overarching research question is: How are healthcare priorities set in county hospitals in Kenya, what 
factors influence this practice and how can the process be improved? 
 
Sub-Questions 
The sub-questions for the study are: 
1. What are the current priority setting practices in county hospitals in Kenya? 
2. How are healthcare priorities set in county hospitals in Kenya? 
3. How do the hospital context, actors and practices of power influence the content and process of 
priority-setting in county hospitals in Kenya? 
4. How can priority setting practices in county hospitals in Kenya be improved? 
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The next section will provide a background of Kenya, the country that forms the setting of this research. 
1.4 BACKGROUND: KENYA 
1.4.1 Geographic, Demographic and Socio-Economic Information 
Kenya is an African country  situated on the eastern region of the continent with Uganda bordering it to 
the west, Ethiopia to the north, Tanzania to the south, Somalia to the northeast, Sudan to the northwest, 
and the Indian Ocean to the southeast (Figure 1.2). 
Figure 1. 2: Map of Africa showing the location of Kenya 
According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), the country has an estimated population of 
about 42 million (NCPD 2013). Table 1 outlines some relevant socio-economic and demographic 
indicators of the county. Until recently, and at the time of the research work that forms the basis of this 
thesis, the country operated under a centralized system of government and was divided into eight 
administrative provinces, and 254 districts. However, with the coming into effect of a new constitution 
after the March 2013 general election, Kenya adopted a devolved system of government (GOK 2010). In 
this new system, the country has two governance levels; the national government, and 47 devolved county 
governments. With a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $ 475 in 2013, Kenya is considered 
a low income country (Kenya National Bureau of statistics 2014). Table 1:1 summarizes key 
demographic and health indicators for Kenya.  
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Table 1. 1: Demographic, Socio-Economic and health indicators  
INDICATOR  VALUE OF INDICATOR/UNITS  
Demographics (National Council for Population and Development 2013) 
Population size (2014) 42 million 
Annual population growth rate 2.4% 
Population ages 0-14 (% of total) 42.8% 
Population ages above 65 (% of total) 3.5% 
Social and Economic indices (World Bank 2014) 
GDP USD 44.1 Billion 
GDP growth rate  4.7% 
Percent living below poverty line (below 1 US dollar a day) 45.9% 
Literacy rate  72.2% 
Health indices (Ministry of Health 2009) 
Under five mortality rate 73 per 1000 
Maternal mortality  448 per 100,000 
Life expectancy at birth  61.1 years 
 
While for a long time the leading causes of mortality and morbidity in Kenya have included 
communicable diseases such as malaria, HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis, diarrheal diseases and respiratory 
diseases, the recent past has seen increasing contribution of non-communicable diseases such as such as 
hypertension, heart disease, diabetes and cancer to the country‘s mortality and morbidity. The next 
section will present background information on the Kenyan health system. 
 
1.4.2 The Health System in Kenya and Basic Health Indicators 
The Kenyan health system is pluralistic with prominent roles played by both the public and private sector 
in the financing and provision of health services. At the time of doing the research work for this thesis, 
the health sector was overseen by the Ministry of Medical Services (MoMS) and the Ministry Public 
Health and Sanitation (MoPHS) which were responsible for all health system functions. The sector was 
however significantly decentralized with the district health system as the focal point. The district health 
system was managed by District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) (Ndavi et al. 2009). The core 
function of the DHMTs was to oversee all health sector activities within the districts and included the 
management and supervision of district hospitals and rural health facilities (sub-district hospitals, health 
centers, and dispensaries) (Ndavi et al. 2009). The DHMTs were expected to plan and coordinate health 
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activities, and ensure that health policies were implemented, resources were well utilized, quality 
standards were upheld, and performance was monitored and evaluated for better results (Ndavi et al. 
2009).  
 
At the time of writing this thesis, the country has transitioned into a devolved system of government with 
a central government and 47 semi-autonomous units called counties (GOK 2010; KPMG 2013). Under 
this new governance structure, the health system is structured such that the central Ministry of Health 
(MOH) has retained policy making and regulatory roles while responsibilities such as allocation and 
managing health care resources and service provision have been transferred to county health systems 
(KPMG 2013; Ministry of Health 2013a). Under this new dispensation, the previous two health ministries 
have been merged into one.    
 
The public healthcare delivery system is organized into four tiers, namely community, primary care, 
county referral and national referral (Figure 1.3). Community health services include all community based 
demand creation activities that are guided by the MOH community strategy (Ministry of Health 2013b; 
Ministry of Health 2011). Primary healthcare include services provided by public and private maternity 
homes, health centers and dispensaries. County referral services include first level referral hospitals that 
are managed by a given county. These are referred to as county hospitals and are the focus of this study. 
National referral services are comprised of (formerly) provincial and national level facilities, where 
tertiary referral services are provided. 
Figure 1. 3: Service provision structure in the Kenyan public health sector 
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1.4.3 Priority Setting in the Kenyan Health Sector 
Within the Kenyan health sector, the overall policy direction and health development agenda is outlined 
in the Comprehensive National Health Policy Framework which became operational in 2011 (Ministry of 
Health 2011). The implementation of this framework is guided by five year national health sector 
strategic plans (NHSSP). These strategic plans form the overall health sector medium term plans, 
outlining  the strategic objectives that all actors in the sector should work towards  (Ministry of Medical 
Services 2008). 
At the time of doing the research work that informs this thesis, the Kenyan Ministries of Health employed 
a combination of top down and bottom up approaches to planning in the sector (Ministry of Health 1994). 
At the central Ministries of Health (MOMS and MOPHS), two departments were responsible for 
planning: the department of technical planning and monitoring which was responsible for providing 
leadership and guidance on coordinating the identification of health service priorities, and the department 
of health policy and planning which coordinated with the Ministry of Finance (treasury) to provide 
guidance on budget allocations. To facilitate achievement of the priorities outlined by the national health 
sector strategic plans (NHSSP), annual operational plans (AOPs) and respective medium term 
expenditure frameworks (MTEFs) were put in place (Ministry of Medical Services 2008). The AOP 
formed the operational plans for the health sector outlining the key outputs the sector would focus on 
during a defined year (Ministry of Medical Services 2008). The MTEF was and still is the budgeting tool 
for the government and on-budget partners, and specifies how resources will be allocated across priority 
outputs (Ministry of Medical Services 2008).  
Every year, the central ministry was expected to provide the districts with information on the budget 
envelope that will be available to them in the next planning year and guidelines on allocations to 
activities/budget items (medium term expenditure framework - MTEF). This information was prepared by 
the department of health policy and planning and was to be transmitted to the districts through the 
department of technical planning and monitoring. Planning for the AOPs for the next year was to begin in 
February of each year (Ministry of Health & Health 2005). This was supposed to be a bottom-up process, 
starting with the district health plans (DHP) which included hospital plans, plans for rural facilities and 
the plans drafted by the divisions that manage and support various components of the Kenya Essential 
Package for Health (KEPH) (Ministry of Health & Health 2005). This process was to be coordinated by 
the provincial medical offices (PMO) and by department heads (for their respective divisions), using the 
planning guidelines and financial ceilings provided by central health ministries. Plans at these levels were 
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Variable Weight Variable Weight
Poverty rate 0.20 Infrastructure 0.15
Bed use 0.40 Under -5 population 0.20
Outpatient case load 0.20 Poverty rate 0.30
Accident area 0.05 AIDS case 0.05
Field cost 0.15 Female of reproductive age (15 to 49) 0.20
Area of district (sq.km) 0.10
Total 1.00 Total 1.00
District Hospitals Rural Health Facilities
to be forwarded to the central Ministries of Health to compile and present a comprehensive AOP for the 
entire health sector for endorsement by the stakeholders (Ministry of Health & Health 2005).  
However, allocation decisions at the central Ministries of Health have been argued to be based 
predominantly on political influence and lobbying (Briscombe et al. 2010). Only about 10 % of these 
resources were allocated using an objective resource allocation formula (Briscombe et al. 2010). This 
resource allocation formula used weighted variables to reflect the relative need of districts in the county. 
The formula (Figure 1.4 ) was only applied to the recurrent budget in allocating money to hospitals and 
primary healthcare facilities (Briscombe et al. 2010), while other allocations, such as capital expenditures 
were based on lobbying and persuasion.  
Figure 1. 4: Resource Allocation Formula for the Kenyan Public Health Sector (Briscombe 2010) 
There are no stated criteria for allocating resources among competing services and/or interventions. 
However, national health system priorities are laid out in the third national health sector strategic plan 
(NHSSP III) (Ministry of Health 2013b).  National priorities, according to this policy document, are 
based on the Kenya Essential Package for Health (KEPH) and international health priorities such as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These national priorities are translated into regional and district 
level targets and incorporated in AOPs to guide local priority setting and resource allocation (Ministry of 
Health & Health 2005).  
With the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, the sector is currently undergoing a transition to 
align itself with the devolved system of government. It remains to be seen how the structure and process 
of planning in the health sector will be organized given that these arrangements had not been agreed on at 
the time of writing this thesis.  
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Hospital Planning and Priority Setting 
At the time of conducting research for this thesis, public hospitals were required to develop AOPs which 
were incorporated in the district health plans to be forwarded to the provincial level and eventually to the 
central MOMS (Ministry of Health & Health 2005). Planning within the hospital was to be conducted by 
the hospital management team (HMT) and overseen by the hospital management committees (HMC) 
(Luoma et al. 2010; Ministry of Medical Services 2011). There were no official guidelines in place on 
how priority setting should be conducted in district hospitals (now called county hospitals). There is also 
no evidence/literature on how the priority setting process is actually carried out within hospitals in Kenya. 
While it is anticipated that the planning process in public hospitals, specifically the requirement to submit 
plans to the national government, will change to align with the devolved system of government, new 
guidelines had not been implemented at the time of writing this thesis. The next section will present the 
structure of the thesis. 
 
1.5 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is structured into ten chapters. The current chapter has introduced the thesis, presenting an 
overview of the focus of the work, research justification, objectives and questions. The chapter has also 
provided background information about the country (Kenya) where the research work has been conducted 
as well as what is known about priority setting in the Kenyan health system.  
 
Chapter two presents the theoretical foundations and approaches to priority setting in healthcare. In this 
chapter, it will be seen that priority setting approaches in healthcare draw from and are grounded in a 
range of theoretical ideas from a range of disciplines. This chapter also presents the evolution of priority 
setting thought over the years to current thinking on the topic.  
 
In chapter three, I present two literature reviews that summarize current knowledge on priority setting 
practices relevant to hospitals and develop a framework for describing and evaluating meso level priority 
setting practices.  
 
In chapter four, I present a summary of organizational theories and narrow down on those relevant to 
healthcare organizations. This is considered relevant given that the thesis sets out to understand the micro 
practices of priority setting in an organizational setting; the hospital. 
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Chapter five presents the methods used to carry out the research. Specifically, I introduce the case study 
approach, which I employed for this study, using 2 county hospitals as study cases.  
 
Chapter six is the first of 4 result chapters of this thesis. This chapter presents a description of priority 
setting practices in each of the case study hospitals, focusing both on the formal processes (what should 
happen) and what happens in practice. The second results chapter, chapter seven presents findings on the 
interactions between contextual factors and priority setting practices, while chapter eight explores the 
influence of power and actor dynamics on priority setting processes in the case study hospitals. Chapter 
nine, the last results chapter presents an evaluation of priority setting practices in the case study hospitals 
using the evaluative framework developed in chapter three (3.3). Finally, chapter ten presents a discussion 
of the findings as well as policy and research implications. 
 
1.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter is the first of ten chapters of this thesis. I have introduced the concept of priority setting and 
highlighted its significance in improving health systems delivery. It has emerged that, while priority 
setting occurs at all levels of the healthcare system, meso level priority setting, particularly for hospitals, 
has received little research attention. The overarching objective of this thesis is to describe and evaluate 
priority setting practices in county hospitals in Kenya. It is anticipated that findings of this work will add 
to the scant body of knowledge on priority setting practices in public hospitals in developing countries. 
More importantly, the findings will form the basis for policy recommendations to improve priority setting 
in public hospitals in Kenya. In the next chapter, I will present a review of available literature on priority 
setting practices in hospitals.    
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CHAPTER II: APPROACHES TO PRIORITY 
SETTING IN HEALTH CARE 
2. 1 INTRODUCTION  
n the previous chapter, I introduced the focus and purpose of this thesis, priority setting in hospitals. In 
this chapter, I will seek to unpack the concept of priority setting in healthcare by exploring and 
presenting the theoretical approaches to healthcare priority setting and paradigms that guide the practice. 
This chapter is structured into four sections. After the introduction, I will present the various theoretical 
approaches to priority setting in healthcare. This is then followed by a discussion of the evolution of 
priority setting thought (or paradigms) in healthcare. The last section provides a summary of the chapter.   
 
2. 2 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO PRIORITY SETTING 
An examination of theoretical approaches to priority setting reveals that they are derived from specific 
disciplines (Sibbald 2008; Maluka 2011). Each of these approaches proposes an alternative framework for 
priority setting, represented by a specific priority setting goal (Table 2.1). Even though the frameworks 
proposed by these disciplines can be complementary, their underlying values often conflict. This section 
will present and discuss each of these approaches, highlighting their assumptions and applicability in 
healthcare priority setting.  
 
Table 2. 1: Discipline specific approaches to priority setting and their goals 
  
2.2.1 Economic Approaches 
The economic approach focuses on achieving efficiency as an outcome of the priority setting process. An 
economic approach seeks to solve the problem of scarcity and choice by identifying alternatives that 
maximize outcomes subject to resource constraints (Gold et al. 1996; Drummond et al. 2005). The 
I 
APPROACH GOAL 
Economics Efficiency 
Evidence based medicine Effectiveness 
Legal approaches Reasonableness 
Political science Negotiation 
Philosophy Justice 
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fundamental feature of this approach to priority setting is that resources should be used in a manner that 
maximizes health benefits (Donaldson & Mooney 1991). Two economic methods that have been used 
extensively to guide resource allocation in health care are economic evaluation and programme budgeting 
and marginal analysis (PBMA) (Mitton & Donaldson 2003); these will be discussed in turn.  
Economic Evaluation 
Economic evaluation refers to the comparative analysis of alternative courses of action in terms of both 
costs and consequences (Drummond et al. 2005). It is a technique that was developed to provide a 
framework for decision making when choices have to be made between several courses of action 
(Drummond et al. 2005; Fox-Rushby & Cairns 2005). Economic evaluation compares competing health 
care interventions with the objective of choosing the alternative that is more efficient. Economic 
evaluation methods seek to maximize population health benefits within a budget constraint by comparing 
competing alternatives in terms of their costs and benefits.  Alternatives that yield the most benefits per 
unit cost, at the margin, are considered more cost-effective than those that yield lesser benefits per unit 
cost. There are different types of economic evaluation methodologies, characterized by the type of 
efficiency question (allocative or technical) they seek to answer and the measurement of consequences 
(Table 2.2). Whereas all forms of economic evaluation measure and present costs in monetary units, there 
are differences in the measurement of consequences (Table 2.2) (Drummond et al. 2005).  By analyzing 
the efficiency of interventions, and recommending the adoption of more efficient interventions, economic 
evaluation provides a framework for setting priorities within health care. 
Table 2. 2: Types of economic evaluation 
TYPE OF ECONOMIC 
EVALUATION 
UNITS USED TO MEASURE  BENEFITS 
EFFICIENCY QUESTION 
ADDRESSED 
Cost-effectiveness analysis Natural units e.g. number of infections Technical efficiency 
Cost-utility analysis 
Disability adjusted life years (DALYs) or 
Quality adjusted life years (QALYs) 
Allocative efficiency 
Cost-benefit analysis Monetary Allocative efficiency 
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), which in this review shall subsequently be used to refer to both cost-
utility and cost-effectiveness analyses as is common practice in literature, has been used as a tool to 
allocate resources in both developing and developed countries (Baltussen et al. 2005). The UK National 
Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) is an example of the institutionalization of economics 
in health care decision making (Walker et al. 2007). CEA has become an integral component of the 
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methods used by health technology assessments in most developed countries including Canada, Australia, 
France and Sweden (Baltussen et al. 2005).  
 
CEA has also found use in priority setting in developing countries (Shillcutt et al. 2009). Priority setting 
processes such as the World Bank Health Sector Priorities Review (HSPR) (World Bank 1993), the WHO 
Choosing Interventions that are Cost-Effective (WHO-CHOICE) initiative (World Health Organization 
2003) and the second edition of the Disease Control Priorities Project (DCP2)   (Jamison et al. 2006) have 
all employed CEA. CEA has however had very limited impact on decision making in practice 
(Drummond et al. 2007; Hoffmann & Graf von der Schulenburg 2000; Hoffman et al. 2012). This is 
because of a number of technical and conceptual problems associated with the use of CEA in decision 
making (Drummond et al. 2007; Hoffmann & Graf von der Schulenburg 2000).  
 
One of the technical barriers to the use of CEA is the perspective used in the analysis (Hauck et al. 2004). 
Analyses that use narrow perspectives (such as the perspective of the funder) limit the use of CEA to 
priority setting. Another practical challenge is the generalizability of the results (Hauck et al. 2004). 
Whereas decision makers in a particular setting may wish to use analyses from other settings to make 
decisions, available CEA are hardly generalizable. These studies may be based on economic data that are 
not transferable from one setting to another.  Further areas of concern are how parameter and model 
uncertainty can be incorporated into the estimated cost-effectiveness ratio, and how the consequences of 
these uncertainties can be communicated to the users of studies (Briggs 1999). 
 
In developing countries, resources hamper the conduct of CEA for all interventions under consideration. 
In these settings, it is problematic to obtain good quality data to use in the analysis and the technical 
capacity to conduct economic evaluations is limited.  Also, interventions may be found to be cost-
effective in one setting and not in another, and vice versa.  
 
There are also ethical objections to CEA. This approach does not give priority to the worst off (sickest) 
patients; benefits, including trivial ones, are aggregated such that curing toothaches for many people may 
be considered more cost-effective than saving a few lives. In failing to incorporate multiple criteria and 
other societal values, CEA have given results that are unacceptable to the society (Hadorn 1991). An 
example of this is the attempt by state of Oregon in the United States to develop a priority list of health 
care services to be covered by Medicaid in 1990 (Hadorn 1991). In this list, interventions were subjected 
to CEA and rank ordered based on their incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs).  The initial list was 
met with public outcry and eventually withdrawn due to the perception that it ranked ―less important‖ 
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interventions higher than ―more important‖ ones (Hadorn 1991). For example tooth capping was ranked 
above appendicectomy (Hadorn 1991).  This is explained by the basic mechanics of CEA (Hadorn 1991). 
Within a CEA framework, health benefits, however measured, and from different interventions are 
assumed to be of equal value (Nord et al. 2009). Alleviating pain in a number of patients could, in theory, 
be considered equivalent to saving one life; alleviating pain in more patients than the equivalent amount 
would yield more health gain than saving one life. This assumption is in direct conflict with the ―rule of 
rescue‖; a perceived duty to save endangered life wherever possible (McKie & Richardson 2003). The 
rule of rescue has been shown to be very compelling and to trump efficiency in decision making not just 
for life saving interventions but also whenever an identified patient is in need of medical treatment for a 
non-life-threatening condition such as a fractured arm (Hadorn 1991). 
 
Conceptually, CEA has been criticized for assuming that maximizing health is the only objective function 
in a health system (Griffin et al. 2008). It has been argued, and demonstrated, that often society expects 
things beyond health maximization from their health system (Mooney 1998). CEA, as currently practiced, 
does not recognize this in its analysis. There are also challenges associated with defining valid measures 
for health gain such as QALYs and DALYs which have been discussed extensively by others (Mooney 
1998; Robberstad 2005; Anand & Hanson 1997; Kapiriri et al. 2004; Birch & Gafni 1994; Birch & Gafni 
2007). 
 
Another fundamental conceptual challenge to CEA as currently practiced, is that the decision rules ignore 
affordability and opportunity cost (Birch & Gafni 1992; Cleary & McIntyre 2009). The use of either the 
cost-effectiveness league table or threshold values does not account for the fact that investing in an 
alternative judged to be ―cost-effective‖ implies that resources have to be shifted from other services with 
resultant losses in associated health benefits (opportunity cost) (Gafni & Birch 2006). An economic 
approach that takes into account the opportunity cost of the allocation decisions is programme budgeting 
and marginal analysis (PBMA), to which we shall now turn our attention to. 
 
Programme Budgeting and Marginal Analysis (PBMA) 
Programme budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA) is a systematic and explicit priority setting process 
that operationalizes the economic principles of opportunity cost and the margin (Donaldson & Mitton 
2004; Donaldson & Farrar 1993). PBMA is used to determine the optimal mix of a set of healthcare 
services from a given envelope of resources. The objective of PBMA is to enable decision makers to 
identify the most efficient use of resources such that health outcomes are maximized (Donaldson & Farrar 
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1993). The framework can be operationalized by asking five questions pertaining to the use of resources 
(Grocott 2009): 
 
1. What resources are available in total? 
2. In what ways are these resources currently spent? 
3. What are the main candidates for more resources and what would be their effectiveness? 
4. Are there any areas of care that could be provided to the same level of effectiveness but with 
fewer resources, so releasing those resources to fund candidates from (3) (i.e. addressing 
technical efficiency)? 
5. Are there areas of care which, despite being effective, should have fewer resources because a 
proposal from (3) is more effective (per dollar spent) (i.e. addressing allocative efficiency)?  
 
The first two questions fall under programme budgeting and seek to describe what resources are available 
and how they have been allocated across programmes of care (Mitton & Donaldson 2001). This 
information is important given that it highlights areas where resources have been allocated and yet they 
are not in line with identified priorities and also identifies areas that currently receive limited resources 
and yet have been identified as priority areas. The last three questions fall under marginal analysis, where 
the potential net marginal gains accruing to changes in resource levels are considered (Mitton & 
Donaldson 2001).  
 
One of the strengths of PBMA is that it recognizes the opportunity cost of resource allocation decisions 
(Tsourapas & Frew 2011). By analyzing the forgone benefits when disinvestments are made, decisions 
are made that, in theory, maximize the net benefits from resource allocations. Given that the process 
considers who gets the resources, in theory it can incorporate ethical considerations such as equity. 
Another advantage is that PBMA pragmatically weighs research evidence with local data and expert 
opinion (Mitton & Donaldson 2001). PBMA has also been advocated as a method that can help bridge the 
gap between health practitioners and managers on priority setting (Ruta et al. 2005). While managers are 
focused on achieving efficiency and overall organizational goals, front line practitioners are concerned 
with giving the best care to the patients in front of them regardless of the resources available. By 
providing a framework for collaborative and inclusive decision making PBMA potentially bridges this 
gap by harnessing both the perspectives of managers and frontline practitioners (Ruta et al. 2005).  Other 
advantages of PBMA are transparency and inclusivity (Ruta et al. 2005).  
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Drawbacks of PBMA include the fact that it is a data intensive process, requiring data on costs and 
outcomes of programmes that are sometimes unavailable (Donaldson & Mooney 1991). This problem is 
especially prevalent in developing countries (Tsourapas & Frew 2011).  Another key challenge of PBMA 
is the fit of the framework within different organizational contexts  (Tsourapas & Frew 2011). Whether 
and how a systematic priority setting process is implemented is influenced by factors such as resource 
availability, buy-in, and a culture that is supportive of proactive change (Tsourapas & Frew 2011). 
An economic approach to healthcare priority setting has a number of advantages. For example, this 
approach requires that decision makers explicitly define the objectives of the priority setting process 
(Hauck et al. 2004). It also allows the explicit modeling of  the conflicts that arise when priority setting is 
undertaken, and hence makes the trade-offs of decision making explicit (Hauck et al. 2004). The 
economic approach can also, in principle, incorporate both equity concerns as well as other practical 
constraints that influence decisions (Hauck et al. 2004). However, operationalizing these factors is harder 
in practice and hence economic analysis is unlikely to capture all of them neatly. The economic approach 
should hence be just one of the considerations in priority setting and should not be used in isolation from 
other key determinants of decision making (Hauck et al. 2004). Another disciplinary contribution to 
priority setting is evidence based medicine, which will be discussed next.   
2. 2.2 Evidence Based Medicine
Evidence based medicine (EBM) has been defined as ―the conscientious and judicious use of current best 
medicine from clinical care research in the management of individual patients‖ (Haynes et al. 1996). 
EBM focuses on selecting and implementing interventions with proven effectiveness (Baltussen & 
Niessen 2006). When resources are scarce, evidence on the clinical effectiveness of interventions can 
inform decision makers‘ allocation decisions such that waste is minimized by avoiding ineffective 
interventions and maximizing use of resources on what works. This approach was institutionalized by the 
Cochrane collaboration which produces and disseminates systematic reviews of healthcare interventions 
(Claridge & Fabian 2005).  
Clinical guidelines have been identified as an important avenue for promoting the use of effective care 
(Eccles & Mason 2001; Grimshaw et al. 2004). Clinical guidelines have found increasing use in both 
developed and developing countries and are advocated as a way to promote interventions of proven 
efficacy while discouraging ineffective care (Eccles & Mason 2001; Grimshaw et al. 2004).  While EBM 
has the advantage of focusing resources on what works and minimizing waste by avoiding ineffective 
interventions, its use alone ignores key considerations such as affordability, opportunity cost and 
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efficiency. For example, while a specific drug might be the most effective alternative for treating a 
specific condition, if it also happens to be very expensive, adopting it into the national treatment 
guidelines might mean denying a larger number of people access because the treatment is not affordable. 
Political science has also contributed to theories on decision making, and shall be discussed next. 
2.2.3 Political Science Approaches 
Priority setting processes involve a range of actors arbitrating between competing needs, often with 
varying and competing interests (Ham & Glenn 2003). The process of priority setting is hence complex, 
involving ―pluralistic bargaining between different lobbies, modified by shifting political judgments made 
in the light of changing pressures‖ (Klein 1993). Political scientists therefore see priority setting as a 
policy making process where political forces interact to produce negotiated policy (Sibbald 2008). It has 
been argued that the context of policy making and potential influences of theories of policy making are 
relevant to understating priority setting (Goddard et al. 2006). Goddard (2006) argues that analyzing 
priority setting using political theories is potentially valuable. A number of relevant political theories 
propose how policy making (and hence, priority setting) ought to be done.  
One of these theories is the rational choice theory of policy making (Scott 2000). This approach 
prescribes an extensive evaluation of alternatives and making choices that result in maximizing intended 
outcomes (Scott 2000). This theory is closely related to the economic approach of maximizing utility or 
wellbeing, and assumes that people are rational beings, who will comprehensively analyze information on 
available options and choose the option that maximizes their interests (the rational choice).  
Closely related to rational choice theory is the theory of bounded rationality. This theory holds that while 
people intend to make rational decisions, it is not always possible to do so. While rationality characterizes 
decision making generally, often at certain points rationality fails (Jones 1999). Like rational choice 
theory, bounded rationality assumes that decision makers are goal-oriented, but in addition, bounded 
rationality appreciates the decision makers cognitive limitations (Jones 1999). Under this theory, both 
knowledge and cognitive limitations of the decision maker are taken into account, and considered to 
impose limits on solving complex decision making problems (Simon 1972). Rather than aiming at 
maximizing outcomes therefore, decision makers instead settle for ―satisficing‖ –aiming at achieving at 
least some minimum of utility (Simon 1972).   
Another relevant political theory is incrementalism. This theory proposes that decision making should be 
in the form of many small (and often unplanned) steps rather than few (extensively planned) large steps 
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(Mintzberg et al. 1976). Incrementalism sees policy changes occurring as a result of a combination of 
small changes (Etzioni 1967).   
 
Lastly the theory of public choice also tries to explain decision making by policy makers. According to 
this theory, decision makers are guided by self-interest and rationality (Buchanan & Tollison 1972). 
Political outcomes are hence seen to be as a result of bargaining between governments (policy producers) 
and voters (policy consumers). Under this arrangement, all actors need to be at the decision making table 
in order to make informed decisions. Theories on democratic process are therefore emphasized under this 
model of decision making (Farrelly 2004). Next I will discuss philosophical approaches.  
 
2.2.4 Philosophical Approaches 
A number of philosophical theories have attempted to provide a normative basis for the allocation of 
resources in society. These theories have focused on justice, and have hence been called theories of 
justice (Beauchamp & Childress 1994). The three main theories of justice relevant to priority setting are 
utilitarianism, libertarianism, and egalitarianism. Each of these philosophical approaches, however, 
argues for different distributive principles for the allocation of health care resources. 
 
Utilitarianism is a philosophical theory of justice that aims at the attainment of the maximum possible 
happiness of a society as a whole (Bentham 1988). One of its earliest proponents, Jeremy Bentham, held 
that ―the highest principle of morality, whether personal or political, is to maximize the general welfare or 
collective happiness or the overall balance between pleasure and pain; in a phrase, to maximize utility‖ 
(Bentham 1988; Sandel 2009). From a utilitarian perspective healthcare resources should be allocated in a 
manner that maximizes the aggregate utility of the society. This resonates with the welfarist (or extra-
welfarist in healthcare) economic approach, where resources are to be allocated in a manner that 
maximizes aggregate utility (or health outcomes in health care) (Gold et al. 1996). 
 
Libertarianism on the other hand is founded on the principles of the right to personal freedom and private 
property (Sandel 2009). The absolute respect for individual property held by libertarians prevents coerced 
redistribution of private property (Nozick 1974). A healthcare system founded on libertarian ideologies is 
therefore based on free market principles. In such a system, every individual pays for his own individual 
medical needs and the redistribution of resources to contribute to the provision of services for the medical 
needs of those who are disadvantaged by the natural or social lottery is not justified (Nozick 1974). The 
libertarian model of justice proposes an individual oriented healthcare system where the individual 
medical need is the focus.  
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Lastly egalitarianism is based on the fundamental belief of equality of human beings and the creation of 
possibilities for people to become as equal to others as possible, including with regard to health and well-
being (Sandel 2009). The preferred solution is the one with the most equal distribution of resources. In 
healthcare, egalitarianism can be operationalized differently depending on the meaning given to equality 
in the sense that it can aim to achieve equal health status for all, equal well-being for all, equal use of 
health care services for individuals with equal medical needs, or equal access to health care services.   
 
Philosophical approaches however have been criticized for not providing practical approaches to priority 
setting; for being too abstract to be applied in concrete decision making (Williams et al. 1996). Also, it 
has been observed that given that different philosophical approaches emphasize different values and 
conclusions it is problematic to have consensus about which one is right (Sibbald 2008).  Legal 
approaches will be discussed next.  
 
2. 2.5 Legal Approaches 
Legal approaches focus on the reasonableness of allocation decisions within the framework of the law 
(Sibbald 2008). It entails specifying healthcare benefits that specified groups of the population are entitled 
to and enshrining this in the laws of a country. For example, in Ontario Canada, accountability 
agreements are legally binding agreements between the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, the local 
health integration networks (LHIN) and the hospital for delivery of services within a set budget (Reeleder 
et al. 2008). In Norway, the Norwegian Patients' Rights Act guarantees the population equal access to 
necessary specialized care (Kapiriri et al. 2007). In Kenya, the Kenyan constitution through the bill of 
rights guarantees every Kenyan the right to the highest attainable standards of health which must be 
progressively realized (GOK 2010). The constitution further prohibits the denial of emergency care to all 
citizens, in both public and private facilities, on account of lack of ability to pay  (GOK 2010). According 
to the legal approach therefore, priority involves meeting the minimum requirements specified by 
legislation within the jurisdiction where the priority setting is occurring.  
 
2. 2.6 Interdisciplinary Approaches 
The approaches discussed so far are grounded in specific disciplines and often focus on one specific goal 
of priority setting. In an attempt to incorporate more goals, multi-disciplinary approaches have evolved. 
One such approach is health technology assessment (HTA).  HTA has been defined as ―the systematic 
evaluation of properties, effects, and/or impacts of health-care technology. It may address the direct, 
intended consequences of technologies as well as their indirect, unintended consequences. Its main 
purpose is to inform technology-related  policy-making in health care‖ (World Health Organization 
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
36  
 
2011).  HTA is usually conducted by interdisciplinary groups using frameworks drawn from a variety of 
methods (World Health Organization 2011). These methods include EBM and CEA, as well as 
incorporating ethics and other social values (Sibbald 2008). HTA is used in a number of countries to 
make priority setting decisions in healthcare. Often the HTA role is conducted by an organization that is 
set up specifically for this purpose. For example, in the United Kingdom, the National Institute for health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE) conducts HTA for health interventions and advices the National Health 
Service (NHS) on decisions on their adoption (Walker et al. 2007).  The Canadian Agency for Drugs and 
Technologies in Health (CADTH) is a primary source of HTA in Canada (Sibbald 2008).  
 
There have also been approaches to develop multi-criteria approaches to decision making in healthcare. 
Multi-criteria decision analysis approaches have been proposed as a potential means to solve the priority 
setting problem while considering a range of relevant criteria (Baltussen & Niessen 2006). An example of 
multi-criteria approaches used in priority setting is the use of discrete choice experiments (DCE) to 
identify criteria for decision making (Baltussen & Niessen 2006). In a DCE, respondents select their 
preferred alternative (health service or intervention) from a set of hypothetical alternatives, each 
consisting of a range of criteria that describe them, with each criterion varying over a range of levels 
(Amaya-Amaya et al. 2008; Mangham et al. 2009). The criteria are similar for each scenario but the levels 
describing each criterion vary.  Analysis of the choices of respondents provides information of the 
importance of each criteria as well as levels (Amaya-Amaya et al. 2008). DCEs have been explored 
experimentally to identify criteria for priority setting and rank order interventions in Ghana (Baltussen et 
al. 2006), and to identify priorities in an HIV programme in Thailand (Youngkong et al. 2010) and a lung 
health programme in Nepal (Baltussen et al. 2007).  DCEs have also been used to elicit policy maker, 
public, and health professional preferences for different criteria for priority setting (Koopmanschap & 
Stolk 2010). Furthermore, the method has been used to elicit the priorities of the public for the service 
provided by the health system and their priorities for funding and reimbursing decisions for medicines 
(Mentzakis et al. 2011; Whitty et al. 2011; Diaby et al. 2011). 
 
This section has presented and discussed theoretical foundations of priority setting in healthcare. Thinking 
about how priority setting should be conducted has however evolved over time informed by attempts at 
the practical implementation of various approaches and learning from experiences accrued. The next 
section shall provide a summary of this evolution process of priority setting paradigms.  
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2. 3 THE EVOLUTION OF PRIORITY SETTING PARADIGMS
Thinking about priority setting has evolved through three fundamental phases (Holm 1998; Mcdonald & 
Ollerenshaw 2011; Ham & Glenn 2003). The first phase was premised on the notion that the use of a set 
of rational decision making rules or consequential principles such as CEA could precisely inform a policy 
maker‘s choice between competing alternatives and hence determine priorities (Holm 1998). Within this 
framework, often called consequentialism, decisions are deemed to be appropriate if they are consequent 
on following pre-defined rational rules.   Experience with these ―rational‖ systems exposed a number of 
challenges. Practically the amount of information required to operationalize such systems was enormous, 
and the impartiality of policy makers could not always be assured (Holm 1998). More fundamentally, 
there are conceptual problems associated with these ―rational‖ approaches. Key among them is the 
recognition that the function of the health system, rather than being single and universal, is a complex 
composite of multiple goals including health maximization, equity, health information and fulfilling a 
social function (Mooney 1998). It became apparent that balancing these goals against each other is 
complex and while it was possible for a goal to be identified as more important in specific situations, it 
was impossible to identify a goal that is more important in all situations  (Holm 1998). This rendered the 
use of simple maximizing formulas as the basis of priority setting unsatisfactory given that such 
approaches require either a single goal or a systematic way of balancing multiple goals  (Holm 1998). 
Furthermore, it was observed that priority setting is a highly complex, political and value –laden process 
(Klein 1998; Buse 1999; Bryant 2000). This made it problematic for people to agree on methods, 
principles or approaches to allocating resources (Mitton & Donaldson 2003).  
Arising from these challenges, priority setting thinking evolved into a second phase where focus was now 
placed on the priority setting process itself rather than the outcomes (Holm 1998; Mcdonald & 
Ollerenshaw 2011) . This is what is referred to as the proceduralist paradigm of priority setting (Jan 
2014). It was argued that if priority setting could not be legitimized by the use of specified rational rules, 
then perhaps an approach that involved the use of ―meta-rules‖ to govern the priority setting process 
would legitimize the decisions (Holm 1998). This realization lead to the development of 
multidimensional approaches which embraced ethical, social and political considerations in addition to 
economics (Patten et al. 2006; Mcdonald & Ollerenshaw 2011).  Ethical approaches which emphasize 
fairness in priority setting processes are a case in point (Daniels 2008) (Daniels and Sabin, 2008).  
Consequentialism and proceduralism have thus emerged as the main approaches to priority setting in 
healthcare. 
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The third (and arguably current) phase of priority setting entails efforts to combine these two approaches. 
While the distinction between consequential and procedural approaches to priority setting suggests that 
the two are incompatible, there is growing consensus on the need to combine them (Norheim et al. 2007; 
Ham & Glenn 2003). Fair procedures can provide a framework for decision making, while consequential 
principles can provide important inputs for the procedures (Norheim et al. 2007).  Norheim and 
colleagues observe that while people cannot agree on all criteria or principles, literature reveals that 
indeed there is considerable agreement on some principles, such as allocative efficiency and fairness, and 
some criteria such as severity of disease, effectiveness, costs, healthy life expectancy and the quality of 
the evidence used (Norheim et al. 2007).  There is therefore considerable scope for developing 
approaches that combine the use of consequential principles that are widely accepted, with fair processes 
(Norheim et al. 2007).  
 
2. 4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have presented and discussed approaches to priority setting in healthcare. It emerged 
from the discussion that theoretical approaches to priority setting are derived from a number of disciplines 
including economics, politics, philosophy, and law. Given that each of these approaches often propose 
narrow and single considerations in priority setting, interdisciplinary and multi-criteria approaches have 
been developed and used in some settings. It has also emerged that priority setting thinking has evolved 
over the years through three phases namely a consequential approach, a procedural approach and more 
recently, calls for combined approaches. This recent call has arisen from the realization that, far from 
being considered mutually exclusive approaches, both principles and procedures are important and that 
frameworks for priority setting in healthcare should endeavor to incorporate both. In the next chapter, I 
will present two literature reviews that seek to summarize the current evidence on 1) priority setting 
practice in hospitals and 2) evaluation of priority setting in healthcare. 
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CHAPTER III: PRIORITY SETTING IN 
HEALTHCARE: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE    
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
s outlined section 1.2, this thesis has set out to both describe and evaluate priority setting practices 
in county hospitals in Kenya. In this chapter, I will present two literature reviews on healthcare 
priority setting. The first review is a synthesis of empirical literature on priority setting at the hospital 
level with the aim of describing what is known about priority setting practices and exploring the factors 
that influence this practice. Based on this review, I develop a conceptual framework for describing and 
examining priority setting practices in hospitals. This review has already been published (Barasa et al. 
2014). The second review draws from theoretical and empirical works on and related to the evaluation of 
priority setting, with the aim of developing a framework for the evaluation of priority setting practice in 
healthcare organizations. This second review has been submitted for publication.  
 
3. 2 REVIEW 1: SETTING HEALTHCARE PRIORITIES IN HOSPITALS: A 
REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
3. 2.1 Review Methodology  
Literature Search 
I carried out a literature search in December 2012 in PubMed, EBSCOHOST, Econlit databases, Google 
scholar, and websites of the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, Management Science 
for Health (MSH), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Organization 
for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD). First, I performed a search using the following 
keywords: ‗hospital‘ and ‗priority setting‘ or ‗rationing‘ or ‗health care rationing‘ or ‗planning‘ or 
‗decision making‘ or ‗strategic planning‘ or ‗resource allocation‘ or ‗health technology assessment‘ or 
‗budgeting‘. I also manually searched reference lists of selected papers for relevant papers. The search 
was limited to studies published in the English language that were available from January 1990 to 
December 2012. Next, studies were only included in the review if they reported empirical data on priority 
setting practice in hospitals. In this step, I screened study abstracts using these criteria and subsequently 
obtained full-text formats for studies deemed relevant. The final inclusion of studies in the review was 
based on a detailed assessment of the full-text formats (studies for which no full-text format was available 
were excluded). I then classified the selected studies to five general characteristics: (i) country (ies) where 
the studies were conducted; (ii) study design; (iii) priority setting activity; and (iv) study objectives. 
A 
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Analysis of Selected Papers 
First, I read through the selected papers to familiarize myself with the studies and identify key ideas and 
themes. Given the difficulty in comparing and analyzing studies with different objectives, approaches and 
methods, I found it useful to apply an a priori, policy analysis framework to examine the selected studies. 
This made it easier to determine what to look for in the papers, organize the extracted data and structure 
the synthesis of findings. This choice of framework is justified by the fact that priority setting has been 
considered to be part of the policy process by a number of authors  (Goddard et al. 2006; Sibbald 2008; 
Coulter & Ham 2000).  Drawing on the Walt and Gilson policy analysis framework that focuses on four 
key domains (content, context, process and actors) (Figure 3. 1) (Gold et al. 1996; Drummond et al. 
2005), I identified themes and concepts that clustered around each of these main domains. I then imported 
each of the selected papers to NVIvo version 10 software (QSR International) and coded the text in the 
papers using this thematic framework. Data were then lifted from their original context and rearranged 
according to the appropriate thematic reference and summarized in charts.  Lastly, I conducted a synthesis 
and interpretation of each theme and interrelationships between themes.  
Figure 3. 1: Walt and Gilson Policy Analysis Framework (Walt &Gilson 1994) 
3. 2.2 Results
The first step in the literature search resulted in a total of 2659 papers. 2531 studies were excluded on the 
basis of their title. The abstracts of the remaining 136 studies were assessed, and a further 93 papers 
excluded. Three more papers were excluded because they were not available online. An assessment of the 
full text formats of the remaining 40 papers resulted in a further 16 exclusions.  A total of 24 studies were 
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finally included in the review (Appendix I). This sub-section will first present the characteristics of 
selected studies, their objectives and methodological approaches. In line with the policy analysis 
framework employed in the review, this will then be followed by findings on the content, context, process 
and actors of priority setting processes. Lastly, findings on how priority setting processes were evaluated 
in the studies are presented.   
Characteristics of Selected Studies 
Of the 24 papers, 20 were focused on developed country experiences, while only 5 included developing 
country contexts. One of the papers reported a multi-country study that compared priority setting 
practices in two developed country hospitals (Canada and Norway) and one developing country hospital 
(Uganda). Ten studies were conducted in Canada, 3 each in Australia and the United States of America, 2 
in Denmark and Uganda, and 1 each in Argentina, Chile, Norway, Israel, France, and South Africa.  
Of the selected papers, 15 included tertiary level hospitals, 13 of which were also teaching hospitals while 
1 study was conducted in a community hospital. The level and type of hospital in the remaining 8 studies 
was not clear. 14 studies were conducted in public hospitals, 2 in faith based hospitals and 1 in a network 
of private hospitals. 7 studies were not clear about the ownership of the hospitals where the study was 
conducted. 
Objectives and Methodological Approaches of Selected Papers 
Of the 24 papers, only 2 sought to introduce a priority setting method, while 22 sought to describe and/or 
evaluate the existing priority setting process. Of the latter, 13 sought to describe and evaluate the priority 
setting process, 7 sought only to describe the priority setting process, and 2 sought only to evaluate the 
priority setting process.  The allocation of hospital resources and budgets to departments and service areas 
within the hospital was examined in 11 of the selected studies, while the remaining 13 specifically 
examined health technology assessment in hospitals. Of these, 3 looked at the medicines formulary 
management process, 2 looked at acquisition of surgical technology while the remaining 8 looked at the 
technology acquisition process in general. 
Most papers (n=18) employed case study methodology, while 6 employed quantitative survey 
methodology. Two of the 18 case studies were interventional, while the rest were descriptive-explanatory, 
and all were qualitative, with the exception of one mixed method case study. 
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Content of Priority Setting 
Criteria Used in Priority Setting 
Formal and informal criteria were used to set priorities. Formal criteria are objective criteria that, at least 
on paper, hospitals claim to use in priority setting.  These could be classified as health criteria, economic 
criteria, and administrative criteria, as explained below. Informal criteria refer to subjective 
considerations that influence priority setting practices in hospitals.  
 
Formal Criteria 
In allocating budgets to departments and health services, the main health criteria used were the perceived 
medical need in the hospital‘s catchment area. For example, a study in a referral hospital in Uganda 
showed that disease prevalence in the hospital‘s catchment area was considered in making decisions about 
what services to offer (Donaldson & Mooney 1991). Burden of disease was also an important criteria in 
priority setting in hospitals in Canada (Mitton & Donaldson 2003), Norway (Drummond et al. 2005), 
Chile (Drummond et al. 2005; Fox-Rushby & Cairns 2005) and Argentina (Drummond et al. 2005). The 
rule of rescue also featured prominently whereby emergencies received high priority (Baltussen et al. 
2005). For health technology assessments and medicines selection, medical criteria included 
effectiveness, safety, ease of use and capacity of staff to employ the technology, patient benefits in terms 
of health outcomes and the nature of the technology/medicines. The latter was described in terms of 
whether it was a proven, new or investigational therapy. Proven therapies were often preferred. 
  
Administrative criteria included strategic alignment and alignment with regional/national priorities, 
policies and objectives. Examples were found in both developed (such us Canada, Norway, and Australia) 
and developing country (such as Uganda and Argentina) hospitals (Walker et al. 2007). Priority setting in 
hospitals in developed countries was also guided by organizational strategies, goals and vision (Baltussen 
et al. 2005). For example, a study of priority setting in three teaching hospitals in Canada showed that 
decisions were made based on local strategic fit, and academic commitment and research focus (Shillcutt 
et al. 2009). Hospitals also seemed to favor innovation in health technologies providing perceived 
competitive advantage over other hospitals.  
 
Economic criteria included historical budgeting, revenue generating potential, budget impact and costs to 
patients. Cost-effectiveness was a criterion considered in only 2 studies. Consideration was however 
given to whether the new interventions were affordable (World Bank 1993). 
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Informal Criteria 
Informally, personal relationships and mutual benefit, lobbying, level of ambition and bargaining ability 
of departmental heads, and political interests among actors often dominated priority setting decisions 
especially in developing countries (World Health Organization 2003). For example, in a hospital in 
Argentina, it was reported that allocations depended on whether the hospital managers and departmental 
heads enjoyed good relations and the potential for mutual benefit between them (Jamison et al. 2006). 
Also, given that decision making was centralized, priorities were aligned to meet the political goals of 
local politicians rather than the health needs of the population (Drummond et al. 2007). In Uganda, even 
though the formal criteria of need determined that the pediatric department, which received almost 40% 
of the hospital emergencies, is given higher priority, the surgical department was given greater priority 
because of its perceived prestige, and because it had managers who were better at ―lobbying, making 
noise and quickly use up their resources‖ (Drummond et al. 2005; Hoffmann & Graf von der Schulenburg 
2000).   
 
Context of Priority Setting 
Decision Space 
Decision space refers to the range of effective choices or discretion that local authorities or institutions are 
allowed by central authorities (Hauck et al. 2004). This space can be formal (as defined by policies and 
regulations) and informal (choices exercised in practice but not formally defined) (Hauck et al. 2004). 
The decision space for hospital level priority setting was influenced by the structure of the health system 
and the nature of the priority setting activity. For example, in countries such as Canada and Norway 
where the health system was significantly decentralized, hospitals had greater decision making latitude 
(Briggs 1999), while in Chile, a country with a less decentralized health system, priority setting at the 
hospital level was predominantly guided by national decisions with little discretion at the hospital level 
(Hadorn 1991). Hospitals generally had most discretion over decisions about medicines formularies and 
adopting new technologies compared to decisions about choice of programmes and allocations across 
programmes and departments.  
 
Resource Gap 
The reality of constrained resources compelled decision makers to tackle the issue of health care rationing 
(Hadorn 1991). In Australia for example, shrinking healthcare resources resulted in vigorous debate about 
the need for, ethics of, and possible methods for cost containment and rationing of health services 
(Hadorn 1991). Increasing demand and reduced revenues also influenced the financing arrangements in 
hospitals. In Uganda, for example, an increasing budget deficit led to the capping of budgets and 
introduction of line budgeting which reduced the flexibility of priority setting  (Hadorn 1991). Budget 
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caps for new medicines were also implemented in an Australian hospital to contain costs in the face of 
reducing resources (Hadorn 1991).   
 
Financing Arrangements 
Hospital financing arrangements also played a key role in determining priority setting practices in 
hospitals. This influence appeared to be in two forms 1) through the conditions associated with the 
financing sources and 2) through the incentives engendered by financing arrangements. For example, 
given that Chile has a mixed publicly and privately financed health care system, hospitals were required 
to employ guidelines that aligned their priorities to those prescribed by both systems (Nord et al. 2009).  
Funding arrangements also generated incentives that influenced priority setting practice. Hospitals which 
were funded by a global budget were less willing to fund incremental use of new technology compared to 
hospitals funded under different models, such as fee for service  (McKie & Richardson 2003). Operating 
under line budgets reduced the flexibility of hospitals in choosing priorities and allocating resources 
across them (Hadorn 1991). The introduction of budget caps also discouraged the adoption of new 
technologies since it required cutting allocations to hospital services (Griffin et al. 2008).  
 
 
Organizational Culture 
Two important aspects of culture seemed crucial enablers of systematic priority setting processes, namely 
the importance attached to the use of evidence and the openness to consultative and deliberative processes 
(Mooney 1998). For example in Chile, a country with a history of dictatorship and military rule, a 
government culture that discourages disagreement impeded the implementation of an appeals and 
revisions process (Mooney 1998; Robberstad 2005; Anand & Hanson 1997; Kapiriri et al. 2004; Birch & 
Gafni 1994; Birch & Gafni 2007). Specifically for technology adoption, cultural drivers for technology 
assessment and acquisition included a proactive approach to seeking new technology, having an 
organizational commitment to innovation, and placing high importance on integration of technology 
planning with the mission and strategic plan of the organization (Birch & Gafni 1992; Cleary & McIntyre 
2009). 
 
Leadership 
Within hospitals, leadership emerged as one of the key factors influencing the process of priority setting. 
A study on the role of leadership in priority setting reported that leaders are expected to foster goals and a 
vision for the hospital; create alignment between goals, vision, resources and skills, actors and processes; 
develop and maintain relationships among actors; embody and promote desired values; and establish an 
effective process for priority setting (Reeleder et al. 2006).The commitment of hospital leaders to 
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implementing a fair and legitimate process was considered crucial to meeting the conditions of the ethical 
priority setting framework, Accountability for reasonableness (AFR) (Donaldson & Mitton 2004; 
Donaldson & Farrar 1993). Within this framework the role of leadership seems to hinge on two points. 
First, the enforcement condition of AFR suggests that good leadership involves attention to the ethical 
aspects of priority setting. Second, leadership approaches describe a variety of values and behaviours 
which align with, and can be viewed as enablers, for AFR.   
Process of Priority Setting 
The process of priority setting in hospitals was dependent on the priority setting activity (Figure 3.2). For 
hospital budget allocations to departments and service areas, at least on paper, the priority setting process 
began with frontline staff (clinical and non-clinical staff within all the departments of the hospital) 
submitting their wish lists to their departmental heads (Donaldson & Farrar 1993). In practice, the 
departmental heads compiled departmental wish lists and submitted them to the hospital management 
without consulting frontline staff (Mitton & Donaldson 2001). Departmental priorities were compiled to 
form hospital priorities by a hospital management committee whose membership comprised of all or 
some of the departmental heads and the executive hospital management. These hospital priorities/budget 
allocations were thereafter submitted to a hospital management board, whose membership included 
external stakeholders such as the community, for approval (Mitton & Donaldson 2001). Thereafter, plans 
were submitted to the regional or national health authorities/ministries for final approval.  
Decision making for new technologies and medicines often began with clinician interest and initiative 
(Tsourapas & Frew 2011). Suggestions for new technologies and medicines were thereafter processed 
through three possible channels (Figure 3.2). For medicines, often these suggestions were presented to an 
assessment committee which employed selection criteria to make decisions about their selection and 
inclusion in the hospital formulary (Mitton & Donaldson 2001). This committee goes under different 
names such as the medicines and therapeutics committee, or pharmacy and therapeutics committee.  For 
other technology such as surgical technology, decision making depended on the level of capital 
investment required (Ruta et al. 2005). For technology that required a low capital investment, decision 
making for adoption was made by departmental heads. When a proposed technology was associated with 
significant capital investment, final adoption decisions were made by the hospital manager/chief 
executive officer (Ruta et al. 2005).  In some hospitals, technology assessment committees had the 
responsibility of evaluating and making decisions about the adoption of new technologies (Ruta et al. 
2005). 
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Figure 3. 2: Hospital Priority Setting Processes 
 
Availability and Use of Information 
The availability and quality of information for decision making had a significant influence on priority 
setting practice. Lack of information was the most frequent priority setting obstacle identified by the 
studies in the review. Hospital decision makers generally lacked sufficient and reliable information for 
decision making (Donaldson & Mooney 1991). The absence of quality data provided loopholes for the 
use of informal/subjective considerations in the priority setting process (Tsourapas & Frew 2011).  Lack 
of information also resulted in assessments being conducted after technologies had been adopted and 
widely used (Hauck et al. 2004). Decision makers felt that the availability of quality information would 
improve the priority setting process (Hauck et al. 2004). 
 
Actors, their Power and Interests 
Whereas the different actors and their influence permeate through all the other themes, we discuss here 
some specific observations. Actors (stakeholders) in the priority setting process included national and 
regional health policy makers and planners, local politicians, donor organizations, community members, 
patients, hospital administrators/executives, hospital department heads and frontline practitioners (non- 
managerial clinical and non-clinical staff working directly with clients). The involvement of national and 
regional health policy makers was dependent on where the policy making authority was vested. In high 
income countries like Canada, where regional health authorities made policy, hospitals aligned their 
priorities with those of the regional health authorities (Hauck et al. 2004). In low and middle income 
countries like Uganda and Chile, where policy making was done at the national level, the hospital 
priorities were aligned with national priorities (Hauck et al. 2004). Donor organizations influenced 
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decision making in Uganda, a developing country setting, where resource scarcity was extreme (Haynes 
et al. 1996).  
 
Community involvement was in theory effected through representation in hospital management boards. In 
one study, community and patient involvement was effected through surveys of community and patient  
views (Baltussen & Niessen 2006). The minimal involvement of the community and patients was 
attributed to, among others, the perception that the community and patients lack understanding of medical 
issues and would represent a biased opinion by solely arguing for the merit of the particular interventions 
for which they were concerned with (Claridge & Fabian 2005). Within the hospital, priority setting was 
dominated by hospital administrators/managers, with some settings reporting minimal involvement of 
frontline practitioners (Eccles & Mason 2001; Grimshaw et al. 2004). Reasons for the minimal 
involvement of practitioners included time constraints, and lack of interest (Kapiriri and Martin, 2006). 
Power struggles between practitioners and managers who were reluctant to share decision making power, 
and frustration by practitioners when their concerns were not addressed, also contributed to the non-
participation of practitioners (Eccles & Mason 2001; Grimshaw et al. 2004). 
  
Other than the range of stakeholders involved, the power differences between these stakeholders had a 
major influence in the priority setting process in hospitals (Ham & Glenn 2003). Power differences exist 
when some actors in the priority setting process have the capacity to influence priority setting outcomes 
more than others. This occurs because hospital decision making environments tend to be hierarchical and 
politically complex (Klein 1993). Power was derived from several sources. For example, actors with 
control over the budget had more power and hence influence over priority setting decisions (Sibbald 
2008). The senior hospital managers exercised more power over decisions compared to other hospital 
managers and frontline practitioners by virtue of their position as senior managers (Goddard et al. 2006). 
For example, the hospital executive in a hospital in Argentina indicated that they did not need to consult 
the hospital management committee when requesting additional staff allocations (Scott 2000). A study of 
a hospital in Uganda reported power struggles between management and frontline workers, with 
managers reluctant to share decision making responsibility. Actor power was also derived from 
possession of specialized skills and certain personal characteristics (Scott 2000). For example, a study of 
decision making for a new surgical technology in Canada reported conflict between surgeons and 
radiologists over leadership of the process.  There was also conflict between professional groups in 
hospitals (Jones 1999) leading to competitive and defensive rather than collaborative behavior. A study in 
Canada reported that actors with greater persuasive skills had greater power to influence the planning 
process  (Jones 1999). 
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Different actors often had varying values and hence depending on the power they possessed, influenced 
priority setting in line with their values. For example, two decision making systems were in conflict in 
hospitals namely the ―medical-individualistic‖ decision system and the ―fiscal-managerial‖ decision 
system (Simon 1972). While clinicians, who subscribe to the medical-individualistic decision system, 
were concerned with individual patient outcomes, administrators/managers, who subscribe to the fiscal-
managerial decision system, were concerned with the implications of decisions on the budget (Mintzberg 
et al. 1976). This conflict was more evident in scenarios where decisions affected identifiable patients 
such as medicines selection processes (Etzioni 1967).  
 
3. 2.3 Towards a Framework for Examining Priority Setting 
This review set out to synthesize empirical studies of meso level priority setting in hospitals. This review 
confirms that there is limited research attention given to priority setting at this level. Since hospitals 
consume a significant proportion of health system resources, and act as avenues for delivery of key health 
care interventions, understanding how and where they put their resources is an important research and 
practice question. Another key observation is that most studies of priority setting in hospitals focused on 
developed country settings with few being conducted in developing countries. Most of the studies were 
conducted in tertiary, often teaching hospitals. Such hospitals are relatively large and act as referral 
hospitals. These hospitals are often semi-autonomous institutions whose management structures, 
operations, resources and target users are very different from lower level hospitals. There is therefore a 
gap in understanding how smaller, non-referral hospitals set their priorities and allocate their resources.  
 
Most of studies were inspired by a framework proposed by Martin and Singer (2003) which recommends 
a strategy for improving priority setting that involves: 1) describing priority setting in the context where it 
occurs; 2) evaluating the description using an ethical framework; and 3) improving priority setting based 
on the evaluation.  In elaborating this approach, they argue that any sustainable strategy to improve 
priority setting must be built on a continuous learning platform that, at the very least, captures how 
priority setting decisions are actually made (Buchanan & Tollison 1972). This, they argue would 
necessitate a description of the priority setting contexts, processes and actors involved. This review 
highlights a range of factors influencing priority setting in these institutions regarding context (e.g. 
financing arrangements, leadership, organizational culture, level of resourcing and demand for 
healthcare), process (e.g. procedures and tools used) and content (e.g. guidelines and criteria of priority 
setting) as well as the importance of the interests and influence of the key actors involved in the process.  
However, some critical aspects of priority setting appear to have been neglected by the studies reviewed. 
For example, while contextual issues such as financing arrangements and decision making capacity of 
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managers are arguably important in priority setting processes, these were at best minimally explored. Also 
given that priority setting is a social process with a range of actors, the power relationships between these 
actors and how these influence the process warrant a more in-depth examination. There seems to be a gap 
in research therefore in 1) studies that examine priority setting processes in hospital in developing country 
settings and 2) studies that seek to critically unpack the influence of the four interrelated components of 
content, context, process and actor dynamics. Drawing from this review, I have developed a conceptual 
framework for examining priority setting practices in hospitals, which is presented in the methods chapter 
of this thesis (5.2.1).   
The next section will present a review of literature on evaluation of priority setting practices. 
3. 3 REVIEW 2: EVALUATING PRIORITY SETTING PRACTICE: A REVIEW
OF LITERATURE
3. 3.1 Review Methodology
Literature Search 
I searched for two sets of literature. The first set aimed to obtain empirical and theoretical papers that 
focused specifically on evaluation of priority setting in healthcare while the second set aimed to obtain 
theoretical literature on concepts related to evaluation of priority setting in healthcare. This second 
literature was necessitated by the observation that literature on evaluation of priority setting practices was 
scarce. 
For the first set of literature, I searched in PubMed, EBSCOHOST, Econlit databases, and Google scholar 
using the following key words: ‗evaluation‘ or ‗evaluate‘ or ‗success‘ or ‗successful‘ and ‗priority setting‘ 
or ‗rationing‘ or ‗health care rationing‘ or ‗planning‘ or ‗decision making‘ or ‗strategic planning‘ or 
‗resource allocation‘ or ‗health technology assessment‘ or ‗budgeting‘. Reference lists of selected papers 
were also manually searched for relevant papers. The titles and abstracts of papers meeting these search 
terms were reviewed and the full versions of potential papers were read to decide on final inclusion. I 
excluded non-English language papers. 
For the second set of literature I searched for theoretical literature on related concepts such as ethics, 
justice, deliberative democracy and procedural justice in healthcare. These concepts were identified from 
reading the papers identified in the first step. The following key words were used in the second step: 
‗ethics‘ or ‗ethical‘ or ‗accountability for reasonableness‘ or ‗justice‘ or ‗just‘ or ―procedural justice‖ or 
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‗deliberative democracy‘ and ‗priority setting‘ or ‗rationing‘ or ‗health care rationing‘ or ‗planning‘ or 
‗decision making‘ or ‗strategic planning‘ or ‗resource allocation‘ or ‗health technology assessment‘ or 
‗budgeting‘.  
 
The selection of papers to include in the review was purposive rather than exhaustive because my aim 
was conceptual interpretation rather than prediction. It was therefore not necessary to locate every 
available paper given that the interpretations of our conceptual synthesis would not change if for example 
ten rather than five papers containing the same concept were included, but rather would depend on the 
range of concepts found in the papers, their context, and whether they are in agreement or not. The 
number of papers reviewed was therefore dependent on 'conceptual saturation ' (Thomas & Harden 2008). 
 
Synthesis of Obtained Literature 
I read through the selected papers to familiarize myself with the studies and identify key ideas and themes 
on and/or related to the evaluation of priority setting in healthcare. These themes formed a framework that 
guided the in-depth reading, critical analysis, organization and synthesis of information obtained from the 
selected papers.  
 
3. 3.2 Results 
In this sub-section, I will present both the characteristics of the selected papers and findings of the review. 
Given that the search for the first set of literature was more ―systematic‖ and focused on evaluation of 
priority setting, characteristics will be presented only for these. The second set of literature was broader  
and will be referenced and integrated with the first set of literature in the results and discussion sections of 
this review. 
 
The first step in the literature search resulted in a total of 1451 papers. In total, 1358 papers were 
excluded on the basis of their title. The abstracts of the remaining 93 papers were assessed, and a further 
49 papers excluded. Two more papers were excluded because they were not available online.  An 
assessment of the full-text formats of the remaining 42 papers resulted in a further 11 exclusions. A total 
of 31 papers were finally included in the review (Appendix II). This section will first present the 
characteristics of selected studies, and their objectives. In line with the objective to review priority setting 
evaluative frameworks, this will then be followed by findings on the evaluation framework used or 
discussed in selected papers, with specific focus on the process and outcome indicators as well as the role 
of stakeholder values.  
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Characteristics of Selected Studies 
Of the 31 papers selected, 4 were conceptual papers, while the remaining 27 were based on empirical 
research. Of the 27 empirical papers, 8 were from developing country contexts while the remaining 19 
were from developed countries. One of the papers reported evaluation of priority setting practices in two 
developed countries (Canada and Norway) and one developing country (Uganda) while another study 
included respondents from a number of non-specified developing countries. Sixteen studies were 
conducted in Canada, 3 in Tanzania, 2 in Uganda and 1 each in Australia, Chile, Israel, United Kingdom 
and Argentina. Of the selected empirical papers, 18 focused on priority setting in hospitals, 6 on 
regional/district health systems, while 5 on national health systems.  
 
Of the 18 papers that focused on hospitals, 12 evaluated the allocation of resources between hospital 
departments and service areas, 2 evaluated the allocation of resources among specified patient groups and 
4 evaluated health technology acquisition decisions (Appendix II). Of the 6 studies that focused on 
regional/district health systems, 5 evaluated allocation of resources within the region/district while 1 
evaluated health technology assessment in a region/district. Of the 5 papers that focused on national 
health systems, 4 focused on allocation of resources at all levels of the healthcare system while 1 focused 
on health technology assessment. 
  
Evaluating Priority Setting 
There is no universally agreed upon framework for evaluating priority setting in healthcare and literature 
on this is scarce. Available literature mirrors the landscape of priority setting frameworks where two main 
schools of thought dominate: consequentialism and proceduralism (2.3). There is however increasing 
recognition of the need to adopt frameworks that draw from both these schools of thought (Norheim et al. 
2007; Coulter & Ham 2000). Of the 31 papers selected for this review, 24 proposed the use of 
frameworks based on procedural conditions only, 1 proposed the use of a framework focused on 
outcomes only while 6 proposed the use of frameworks based on a combination of the two (Appendix III). 
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature selected for this review a number of issues appear 
pertinent to priority setting process namely 1) the substantive principles used in priority setting processes 
2) the procedures of priority setting practices 3) the outcomes of priority setting practices and 4) the 
values that guide priority setting practices. These will be discussed in turn.  
 
Substantive Principles of Priority Setting 
Consequential approaches to priority setting prescribe the use of a set of rational rules or principles to set 
priorities and allocate resources in health care (2.3). Since priority setting is a complex value laden 
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
52  
 
process, consensus on principles has been problematic (Beauchamp & Childress 1994). Despite this, it is 
widely recognized that the two principles of allocative efficiency and equity are relevant in the 
distribution of scarce healthcare resources (Norheim et al. 2007; Hauck et al. 2004). CEA is one of the 
tools that has been used to allocate resources in both developing and developed countries with the aim of 
achieving allocative efficiency (2.2.1). Of the papers selected for this review, two were based on 
approaches to achieve efficiency in resource allocation (Mitton & Donaldson 2003; Gibson et al. 2004).  
 
It is generally recognized, however, that the employment of allocative efficiency as the sole principle for 
priority setting could result in undesired outcomes. These have been discussed in section 2.2.1. There is 
significant consensus therefore that while maximizing outcomes is an important concern in allocating 
resources, it is also important that scarce resources are distributed equitably (Norheim et al. 2007; Hauck 
et al. 2004). Priority setting decision making should therefore entail trade-offs between the two principles 
of efficiency and equity. There is no consensus in literature however on the concept of equity in allocation 
of healthcare resources. There is, however, general agreement that individuals or groups of individuals 
(patient groups) should contribute to health care funding according to their ability to pay and should 
benefit from health services according to their need for care (Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer 1993). Norheim 
and colleagues (2007) have also proposed that resource allocation practices in healthcare should have a 
special concern for the worst off and should not be based on simple aggregation rules.   
  
Procedural Measures of Priority Setting 
Based on the papers selected for this review, procedural conditions that have received significant attention 
both in theory and practice include wider stakeholder engagement, empowerment of stakeholders, 
provisions for revisions of decisions, transparency of procedures, the use of relevant criteria and use of 
good quality evidence/information. Other aspects of procedures that have been considered important 
include consistency in decision making and enforcement of decisions.  
 
Procedural approaches to priority setting have drawn significantly from principles of deliberative 
democracy and are aimed at achieving procedural fairness. Deliberative democracy is a type of 
democracy where deliberation is central to decision making. This differs from aggregative democracy 
where voting is key.  Deliberative democracy has been defined by John Elster as: 
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―Collective decision-making with the participation of all who will be affected by the decision or 
their representatives: this is the democratic part. Also, all [proponents of deliberative democracy] 
agree that it includes decision making by means of arguments offered by and to participants who 
are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality: this is the deliberative part‖  
(Elster 1998) 
A look at both theoretical and empirical literature on priority setting processes reveals an emphasis on 
deliberation and public argument in decision making. A framework for the evaluation of priority setting 
procedures would therefore, invariably, evaluate, among others, the extent to which the process espouses 
principles of deliberative democracy. Attempts at evaluating deliberative processes can be traced to 
Jürgen Habermas‘s concepts of ideal speech situation and communicative competence  (Habermas 1984). 
Habermas argues for free and un-coerced discussions among all stakeholders in collaborative decision-
making processes. Habermas specifies four conditions to be met for the ideal speech situation to be 
achieved namely: 
1. Each subject who is capable of speech and action is allowed to participate in discourse
2. Each subject is allowed to question any proposal
3. Each subject is allowed to introduce any proposal into the discourse
4. Each is allowed to express their attitudes, wishes and needs.
These conditions essentially emphasize the need for meaningful stakeholder engagement; stakeholders are 
not present as mere spectators in the process, but rather are empowered to participate and contribute in 
key decision making stages.  
Building on Habermas‘s concepts of ideal speech and communication competence (Habermas 1984), 
Renn and Webler developed an evaluative framework for deliberative processes that is based on a 
normative theory of public participation (Renn 1992; Webler 1995). In their evaluative framework, Renn 
and Webler propose that deliberative processes should be judged on two meta-principles namely fairness 
and competence  (Webler 1995). The fairness principle is met if opportunities to act meaningfully in all 
aspects of deliberation are distributed equally among stakeholders. These aspects include setting agenda, 
developing procedural rules and selecting the information that will be used in the process. The 
competence principle is met if the stakeholders have appropriate knowledge and understanding of the 
issue. The importance of access and use of quality information and evidence is therefore important.  The 
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
54  
Renn and Webler framework has been widely used and adapted in a number of settings (Petts 2001; Rowe 
& Frewer 2000; Pratchett 1999; Beierle & Cayford 2002; Crosby 1995; Mciver 1998). 
More recently, the Renn and Webler framework together with later work by Beierle (1999), was adopted 
by Abelson and colleagues (2003) to develop an evaluative framework for deliberative processes, that is 
comprised of three key procedural components namely: (1) representation; (2) the structure of the process 
or procedures (legitimate, reasonable, responsive and fair), and; (3) the information used in the process. 
The representation component emphasizes the extent to which different types of representation can be 
achieved (e.g. geographic, demographic or political). This component also emphasizes access to decision 
making processes by providing equal opportunities to those affected and the legitimacy of the process of 
selecting participants. The structure of process component focuses on the legitimacy, reasonableness, 
responsiveness and fairness of the decision making process  (Pratchett 1999; Crosby 1995). The 
information component emphasizes the selection, source, use and quality of information used in the 
decision making process. 
Related to these ideas, Gutmann and Thompson (2004) have proposed three principles as key in 
deliberative democratic process namely publicity, accountability and reciprocity. Publicity is said to be 
achieved when the reasons behind decisions are available and accessible publicly. Accountability is 
achieved when decision makers are held responsible for decisions in a way that discourage fraud and bias, 
while reciprocity is achieved when procedures are structured in a manner that ensures that everyone 
maintains respect for and listens to each other‘s ideas and views during decision making discussion. To 
allow this to happen, they argue, it is crucial to create an environment that allows for and fosters 
participation (Gutmann & Thompson 2004). 
Drawing from deliberative democratic principles, a framework that has gained prominence in evaluating 
the priority setting process is the ethical framework Accountability for reasonableness (AFR) (Martin & 
Singer 2003; Maluka et al. 2011; Maluka 2011). AFR was the framework of choice for 21 of the 31 
papers selected by this review (Appendix III). This framework was developed in recognition of both the 
difficulty to achieve consensus on distributive principles for healthcare and the need for legitimacy of 
allocation decisions (Daniels 2008; Daniels & Monkman 2000; Daniels & Sabin 2002). In order to reduce 
controversy and disagreements, accountability for reasonableness relies on ‗‗fair deliberative procedures 
that yield a range of acceptable answers‘‘ (Daniels & Sabin 2002). Accountability for reasonableness 
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proposes that a legitimate and fair priority setting process  should meet the following four conditions 
(Daniels & Sabin 2002); 1) relevance 2) publicity 3) revisions 4) enforcement.  
 
The relevance condition requires that priority setting decisions are based on ―reasonable‖ rationales. A 
rationale will be ―reasonable‖ if it ―appeals to evidence, reasons and principles that are accepted as 
relevant by ―fair minded‖ people who aim to find mutually justifiable terms of cooperation‖ (Daniels 
2008). The relevance of reasons should be vetted by stakeholders in these decisions. Stakeholder 
participation is therefore important. The publicity condition requires that limit setting decisions and their 
rationales are publicly accessible. Priority setting processes are therefore required to be explicit and 
transparent for them to be judged as fair and legitimate. The revisions and appeals condition requires that 
priority setting processes provide for a mechanism to challenge decisions and opportunities for revision 
and improvement of decisions in light of new evidence or arguments. The enforcement condition requires 
that there be a mechanism to ensure that conditions 1–3 are met. 
 
AFR has however received criticism from some quarters, who have called for either amendments or 
additions to the procedural conditions of priority setting processes. For example, Gibson et al (2005) has 
argued that to mitigate the power differences between stakeholders an empowerment condition should be 
added to AFR (Gibson et al. 2005). Rid (2009), in his critique, argues that the four conditions of AFR 
need to be better specified and amended to better achieve fairness, inclusiveness and representation in 
priority setting decision making. Further, he proposes that additional conditions be considered including 
public involvement, consistency of decision making and impartiality of decision makers (Rid 2009).  
 
Results of Priority Setting 
Based on the selected papers, the most commonly proposed results of healthcare priority setting are 
stakeholder satisfaction with the process, improvement in stakeholder understanding of the process, and 
that priority setting exercises result in reallocation (shifting) of resources (Gibson et al. 2004; Kapiriri & 
Martin 2010; Mitton & Donaldson 2003; Sibbald et al. 2009). The first two underline the recognition of 
the importance of stakeholders to not only accept or approve the adopted priority setting process but also 
understand it. The requirement for the shifting of resources in essence means that priority setting 
procedures should be responsive to the dynamic environment of changing healthcare needs rather than 
perpetrate historic considerations. It has also been proposed that priority setting procedures should reflect 
public values and/or gain public acceptance (Kapiriri & Martin 2010; Gibson et al. 2004). Other priority 
setting outcomes that have been used to assess healthcare priority setting practices include the extent to 
which they further the achievement of the goals of the healthcare organization (Peacock et al. 2006), the 
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extent to which decisions are implemented (Peacock et al. 2006), the extent to which decisions are based 
on evidence (Kapiriri & Martin 2010) and improvements in decision making quality and health outcomes 
(Gibson et al. 2004; Kapiriri & Martin 2010; Mitton & Donaldson 2003; Sibbald et al. 2009). 
 
Public Participation in Priority Setting Processes 
It is generally acknowledged that priority setting is made complex by the fact that different actors often 
have varying values (Coulter & Ham 2000). While the roles and participation of national and institutional 
level decision makers in priority setting processes are often recognized and are evidenced in literature, the 
participation of the public/community has not only been shown to be minimal but has also generated 
significant debate (Mitton et al. 2009). Debating points include when and how public engagement should 
be sought, or how it should be incorporated into decision making. 
 
Rowe and Frewer (2000) have proposed a framework to assess the degree of public participation in 
decision making which has three levels: communication, consultation, and participation. In 
communication, there is one-way transfer of information from the decision-maker to the public such as 
through newspaper advertisements or announcements on notice boards; in consultation, information is 
provided by the public to decision-makers, but without interaction or formal dialogue such as through 
client surveys or suggestion boxes. In participation, there is dialogue and negotiation between decision 
makers and the public (Rowe & Frewer 2000). Examples of participation methods include citizen juries 
and planning cells. 
 
Attempts at incorporating public participation methods in healthcare decision making have experienced a 
number of challenges. It has been argued that the public is unlikely to be objective especially on issues 
that directly affect them (Mitton et al. 2009). It has also been argued that the public might not be 
competent to contribute to technical debates on healthcare decision making (Martin, Hollenberg, et al. 
2003). The validity of these arguments however, depends on how public involvement is incorporated into 
decision making. If, as Mooney argued, the public deliberates and sets ―high level‖ principles and values 
that govern healthcare decision making, while the technocrats make the actual technical decisions, then 
these issues do not arise (Mooney 2009).  In his communitarian claims approach to priority setting, 
Mooney viewed health institutions as social organizations that exist to, among others, meet society‘s 
needs (Mooney 2005; Mooney 1998). The citizen is required to ―set the stage‖ for policy makers to 
allocate resources by determining the procedural rules that policy makers are expected to play by 
(Mooney 2009). The relationship between citizens and policy makers is here considered to be a principal-
agent relationship at a social level (Mooney 1998). Here citizens, who are assumed to have limited 
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capacity to make technical healthcare decisions entrust this responsibility to health care decision makers. 
It is argued, however, that citizens care about the principles used to make these decisions. Priority setting 
processes, Mooney argues, should therefore be based on the values of the very community that the health 
system or organization serves (Mooney 2005; Mooney 1998). 
 
A second issue of concern for public participation methods is the level of empowerment in decision 
making spaces. It has been shown that the empowerment of the public is not automatic and that a number 
of factors come into play. For example, it was shown in Tanzania that effective participation of the public 
in priority setting decisions was influenced by gender, wealth, ethnicity and education (Shayo et al. 2012). 
Members of the public who were male, more educated, wealthier or shared ethnicity with decision makers 
were more empowered in decision making spaces. This underlines the need to design public participation 
mechanisms in a manner that breaks down the barriers to participation and empowers participants to 
contribute to decision making. These challenges notwithstanding, what is clear is that given that the 
primary objective of a health system is to serve the needs of the public, it is imperative that decision 
making for healthcare resource allocation incorporates the views and values of the very public it seeks to 
serve. 
 
3.3.3 Towards a Framework for Evaluating Priority Setting in Healthcare 
Organizations 
It is unlikely that any one framework will incorporate an all-inclusive package of principles, procedural 
conditions or outcome measures, or that these measures will all be considered relevant in all settings. It is 
however clear from literature that a good number of measures are considered to be of value in most 
settings, and that principles, procedures and outcomes, far from being mutually exclusive, can and indeed 
should be used to complement each other in a comprehensive framework for the evaluation priority 
setting practice.  
 
A number of recurrent concepts that are considered critical in priority setting processes can be drawn 
from the general literature on priority setting and evaluative frameworks. First, priority setting is a highly 
political and value laden process (Klein 1998). The question of whose values should inform priority 
setting must therefore be answered. I am in favor of the communitarian claims argument that priority 
setting ―rules‖ should be based on values determined by the community and then applied by decision 
makers to set limits (Mooney 1998; Mooney 2005). Priority setting practices should therefore provide for 
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a process of obtaining citizen views about the principles of priority setting, which are then used by policy 
makers as social agents to guide decision making.  
While a range of community engagement mechanisms have been discussed and debated in the literature 
(Mitton et al. 2009; Molyneux et al. 2012; Cleary et al. 2013), there is no consensus on how public views 
should be obtained (Mitton et al. 2009).  It has also been argued that the suitability of public engagement 
mechanisms is highly context dependent and hence likely to vary across settings. For example, 
mechanisms that work in developed countries where individualism and equality are espoused are unlikely 
to work in developing countries where society is characterized by hierarchy and interdependence (Sepehri 
& Pettigrew 1996). Similarly, settings characterized by sharp divisions based on ethnicity, wealth, gender 
and power would also require different participation mechanisms compared to settings with less divisions. 
Whichever mechanism is adopted or developed, effective community engagement depends on, among 
others, the extent to which community members are empowered to participate in decision making. This 
empowerment, in turn, is influenced by the extent of power differentials between decision makers and 
community members. Power differentials result from a number of factors such as the roles of the actors, 
information asymmetries, knowledge and capacity and control over resources (Gaventa 2006). Often 
these power differentials result in reduced trust between community members and decision makers, which 
hinders effective community engagement. Community engagement mechanisms must therefore be 
designed in such a way that they minimize power differentials, promote trust among community members 
and decision makers and hence empower the community to effectively participate in decision making. 
Measures that can be taken include recognizing the sources of power differentials and seeking to reduce 
them. Examples of such measures are presented in discussions about empowerment of stakeholders later.  
This communitarian perspective has been adapted to varying extents in frameworks of priority setting 
(Lenaghan et al. 1996). Further, frameworks that argue for fair representation of relevant stakeholders 
often include the community as a key stakeholder who should be included in health policy making 
processes, including priority setting. While critics of community involvement in decision making point 
out that community members lack understanding of technical issues and are hence incapable of 
meaningful contribution (Martin, Hollenberg, et al. 2003), I have  argued (10.2.4) that the role of the 
community is not to directly contribute technical solutions, but rather to provide ―meta-rules‖ or generic 
principles that guide decision making (Mooney 2005; Mooney 1998; Mooney 2009). For example, lay 
community members are quite competent in expressing their views about whether age should be 
considered in decision making, and therefore whether children or old people should be given higher 
priority. The community is also capable of providing meaningful input in eliciting the relative importance 
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of principles such as severity of disease, efficiency and procedural conditions of priority setting. The fact 
that both the community and technocrats have a role to play also provides some checks and balances, 
where potentially perverse inclinations by one group are checked by the other. 
 
Second, priority setting is necessitated by, and is an attempt to solve, the fundamental economic problem 
of scarcity and choice  (Hauck et al. 2004; Mitton & Donaldson 2003). Frameworks for priority setting 
practice, and indeed their evaluation, must therefore consider how best to achieve health system goals, 
given scarce resources. This essentially entails making choices such that desired outputs are maximized 
within the available resources. Economic criteria must therefore be a key consideration of priority setting 
processes. Also making choices implies tradeoffs; choices come with attendant opportunity costs (the 
benefit foregone when resources are used for one option and not another) (Drummond et al. 2005). 
Priority setting should therefore be about maximizing outcomes while minimizing opportunity costs. A 
priority setting process must therefore demonstrate consideration of the effectiveness and costs of 
alternatives and the opportunity cost of decisions. An example of such a process is PBMA (2. 2.1). 
 
Third, that the goal of maximizing desired outcomes must be traded-off against equity. Priority setting 
exercises in health institutions should aim at achieving an appropriate balance between maximizing 
intended outcomes for a given resource level subject to the constraint of equitably distributing the health 
gains across competing groups. To achieve equity, the distribution of resources should be determined by 
needs rather than other factors such as ability to pay, favoritism or political consideration. For example, 
managers in a hospital should distribute resources across service areas based on the needs of these service 
areas, rather than based on the potential for the service area to generate income or the level of influence of 
managers representing these service areas. Further, resource allocation should demonstrate a special 
concern for the worse off. The worse off can either be patient groups in a worse medical condition right 
now (e.g. medical emergencies), or, alternatively, the ones whose complete life in terms of health will be 
worse if not treated now.  The worse off should also include vulnerable patient groups. Vulnerability is 
often context dependent but could include groups such as the disabled, the elderly, children and women. 
Also, allocation should not be based on simple aggregating rules.  
 
Fourth, given that priority setting entails adjudication over competing wants among groups of interested 
parties, procedural justice is a desired goal (Martin et al. 2002). While standard welfare economics 
evaluates decisions by their consequences, evidence suggest that the procedures by which decisions are 
made also affects the welfare of individuals (Wailoo & Anand 2005; Dolan et al. 2007).  It has been 
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suggested that procedures are important either for their own inherent value or for their instrumental value 
(i.e. as determinants of outcomes) (Wailoo & Anand 2005).  
 
It is evident from literature that a number of procedural conditions are desired in decision making for 
healthcare resource allocation. Drawing from this, I propose the following six procedural conditions as 
key in evaluating priority setting processes:  
 
Condition 1) Stakeholder involvement;  literature strongly suggests that policy making processes and 
specifically priority setting processes are deemed to be fair and legitimate partly when 
the relevant stakeholders are effectively involved in the process. Specifically for priority 
setting, these relevant ranges of stakeholders include administrators/health managers, 
front line practitioners, patients and the community.  
 
Condition 2) Empowerment; that the engagement of stakeholders should be such that they have the 
power to contribute to and influence decisions. Given the existence of power differences 
among actors in healthcare organizations (Gibson et al. 2005), mechanisms should be 
there to minimize the effect of this power difference. These include for example giving 
each stakeholder equal opportunities to participate at different stages of the decision 
making process such as setting agenda, developing procedural rules and selecting the 
information that will be considered in decision making, clearly defining and enshrining  
the role of the each stakeholder in priority setting rules and guidelines, ensuring 
accessibility of relevant information to each stakeholder to reduce information 
asymmetries and ongoing rather than one off or infrequent engagement of stakeholders 
since it has been shown that ongoing engagement builds trust over time.  
 
Condition 3) Transparency; given that priority setting is a political process that affects a wide range of 
actors, the accountability and legitimacy of the process is enhanced by transparency. 
The procedures, decisions and reasons for the decisions should ideally be accessible to 
all stakeholders and communicated to them as well.  
 
Condition 4) Revisions; the priority setting process should be dynamic enough to allow for revisions of 
decisions in the face of new information. To facilitate this, the process should have a 
provision for appeals to decisions.  
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Condition 5) Use of evidence; priority setting processes should endeavor to use quality 
information/evidence to inform decisions. 
Condition 6)  Enforcement; a legitimate priority setting process should provide mechanisms for an 
assurance that the other five conditions are met. 
Finally, the results of priority setting processes are also important. While it is generally desirable to assess 
outcomes, attributing them to priority setting practices, especially in the short term, is likely to be 
problematic given that priority setting is a highly complex social process. Measures such as the 
achievement of health system/organizational goals and improvement of health outcomes cannot be easily 
attributed to specified priority setting activities except perhaps over the long run. Such measures would 
pose significant measurement challenges when adopted as measures for priority setting success. There is 
therefore a need for intermediate outcome measures that can be easily attributed to specified priority 
setting activities. Based on this, and on the frequency of recommendation from literature, I propose the 
following outcomes to be considered in the evaluation of priority setting practices:  
1. Stakeholder satisfaction; the stakeholders should report their satisfaction with the priority setting
process adapted;
2. Stakeholder understanding; each stakeholder should demonstrate an understanding of the
structure, content and processes of priority setting;
3. Shifted (reallocation of) resources; priority setting practices should result in real movement of
resources and reflect change in priorities rather than historical allocations, and;
4. Implementation; priority setting processes should ultimately result in the accountable
implementation of decisions.
Drawing from this review, I have developed a conceptual framework for evaluating priority setting 
practices in hospitals, which is presented in the methods chapter of this thesis (5.2.3). 
3:4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented two literature reviews. The first review identified a range of factors that affect 
priority setting practice in hospitals. These factors provide potential policy levers that could be used to 
influence priority setting processes. Arising from the first review, I have proposed a framework that, in 
my view, could be useful in examining priority setting processes and potentially informing the design of 
system interventions to influence priority setting at the meso level in hospitals (5.2.1).  In the second 
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review, I have proposed a framework for the evaluation of priority setting practice in health care 
institutions that specifies both substantive principles and procedural conditional requirements for priority 
setting practices (5.2.3). This is in keeping with current thinking that the two paradigms of priority setting 
should be harnessed into a comprehensive framework for priority setting. As concerns principles, I have 
argued that priority setting is fundamentally an attempt to resolve the economic problem of scarcity and 
choice. Priority setting practice should therefore incorporate economic considerations to guide decision 
making. Equity should however also be a key consideration in allocating resources. In selecting 
intermediate results for priority setting, I have argued for measures that are easy to attribute and hence left 
out measures such as health outcomes. An overarching thesis of this framework is that priority setting 
practice should be guided by community values. I have anchored my proposed framework on this 
communitarian claims school of thought based on my agreement with the notion that health organizations 
are social institutions that exist to serve the citizens. 
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CHAPTER IV: HOSPITALS AS ORGANIZATIONS: 
A BRIEF LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL 
THEORIES  
4. 1 INTRODUCTION 
n the previous chapter, I presented two reviews of literature on priority setting in healthcare, with a 
focus on hospitals. It emerged that priority setting is a highly complex process that is heavily 
embedded in and influenced by organizational factors in the context in which it occurs. Given that this 
thesis focuses specifically on hospitals as healthcare organizations, understanding organizational theories 
is important to an examination of priority setting in hospitals. In this chapter, I will present a summary of 
organizational theories that are relevant to and potentially useful to understanding the functioning of 
healthcare organizations. The chapter is structured into three parts. The introduction is followed by a 
section presenting a discussion of organizational theories relevant to healthcare organizations and lastly 
by a chapter summary.   
 
4. 2 ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES AND BEHAVIOR 
Organizational theories can be grouped into 3 main categories, which represent the evolution of thinking 
about how organizations function (Walonick 1993; Ivanko 2013). These are classical theories, neo-
classical theories and systems theories (Walonick 1993; Ivanko 2013). These shall be discussed in turn.  
 
4. 2.1 Classical Organization Theory 
Classical organizational theories were developed in the early twentieth century and include three theories 
namely the scientific management theory, the bureaucratic theory, and the administrative theory 
(Walonick 1993; Sarker & Khan 2013). The scientific management theory, often referred to as Taylorism, 
was developed by Fredrick Taylor and focused on improving efficiency and output through scientific 
studies of worker‘ processes (Hatch & Cunlife 2013). This theory was popular in the 1880s and 1890s in 
manufacturing industries. Key components of the scientific management theory include synthesis, 
analysis, rationality, logic, work ethic, empiricism, elimination of waste, efficiency and standardized best 
practices (Taylor 1917; Walonick 1993; Hatch & Cunlife 2013). A common thread in all these 
components is the emphasis on efficiency of the worker rather than any specific behavioral qualities or 
variations among workers. A significant part of Taylorism was time studies. Taylor was concerned with 
reducing process time and worked with factory managers on scientific time studies. This theory proposed 
I 
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four basic principles to improve organizational productivity (Taylor 1917; Walonick 1993; Hatch & 
Cunlife 2013):  1) determine the best way to perform each task, 2) determine and match the right worker 
to each task, 3) Closely supervise the workers as they perform their tasks while providing motivation 
through reward and punishment and 4) planning and control by management. This theory thus focused on 
getting the best people and equipment, analyzing each component of the production process and 
determining the right combinations of factors that will improve productivity (Walonick 1993; Ivanko 
2013).  
The second classical theory is the bureaucratic theory, which was championed by Max Weber (1947). 
Weber aimed to expand on Taylor's theories, and emphasized the need to reduce ambiguity in 
organizations by putting in place clear lines of control and authority (Weber 1947). The bureaucratic 
theory stressed the need for a formal system of organization with clearly defined hierarchy and roles 
(Sarker & Khan 2013). This was thought necessary to remove ambiguity and ensure uniformity. Weber 
observed that organizations adopted the bureaucratic style since it represented the most technically 
efficient and rational form of organization (Grey 2012; Hatch & Cunlife 2013). He however identified a 
dichotomy in the forms of rationality that organizations could adapt namely formal and substantive 
rationality (Grey 2012; Hatch & Cunlife 2013).  Formal rationality refers as when the means adopted to 
achieve an objective are the most efficient for that purpose (Grey 2012). Formal rationality is not 
concerned with whether an objective is appropriate or not, but rather, with how to achieve the objective 
(Hatch & Cunlife 2013). Substantive rationality on the other hand is concerned with whether the end 
result is appropriate (Hatch & Cunlife 2013). It has been observed that while organizations might aspire 
to be formally bureaucratic, they are often not substantively bureaucratic (Grey 2012). Others, especially 
public organizations are often neither rational nor substantively bureaucratic and have been referred to as 
dysfunctional bureaucracies (Grey 2012).  
Another classical theory, the Administrative theory proposed the development of universal principles of 
management that could be applied to all organizations (Mooney & Reiley 1931). Administrative theory 
considers productivity improvements from ―top down‖ as opposed to the scientific theory which viewed 
productivity improvements as ―bottom up‖. Early developers of the administrative theory included Henri 
Fayol (1949), Mooney and Reiley (1939) and Gulick and Urwick (1937). Administrative theory 
developed general guidelines on how to formalize organizational structures and relationships and viewed 
the job as antecedent to the worker. These principles were primarily broad guidelines for decision making 
and included the following (Fayol 1949); 1) scalar principle which recommends and emphasizes the 
hierarchical structure of control relations, 2) exception principle which recommends that all routine 
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matters be handled by subordinates leaving superiors free to deal with exceptional issues where existing 
rules are inapplicable 3) span of control principle which specifies that superiors should have no more 
subordinates than they can effectively oversee 4) unity-of-command principle which emphasizes that no 
subordinates should receive orders from more than one superior 5) departmentalization principle which 
recommends that activities should be grouped to combine related activities in the same administrative 
unit. Related activities could be based on similarity of purpose, process, clientele, or place 6) line-staff 
principle which recommends that all activities directly related to organizational goals are line functions.  
All others are staff functions that advise, service, or support. Staff units are segregated from line functions 
and are ultimately subordinate to them. 
 
The classical theories have a number of limitations in the way they conceptualize organizations. First, 
these theories have been criticized for being too rigid and mechanistic (Walonick 1993). It is assumed that 
organizations always operate in a rational, systematic way as long as the right ―ingredients‖, in the right 
mix, are present.  Second, these theories focused more on production processes and less on the people 
involved in the processes. Workers were assumed to be motivated solely by economic reward and that as 
long as this was assured, they would perform in a rational, predictable manner (Walonick 1993). Third, 
classical approaches were thought to be more appropriate for stable and simple organization than for 
today‘s dynamic and complex organizations. These shortcomings led to the emergence of neoclassical 
theory, which will be presented next.  
 
4. 2.2 Neoclassical Organization Theory 
While classical approached focused on tasks and machines, over time there was realization that there was 
need to pay attention to the human side of organizational dynamics. Neoclassical theories had three main 
elements namely the Hawthorne experiment, the human relation movement, and the organizational 
behavior (Walonick 1993; Sarker & Khan 2013; Ivanko 2013). The development of neoclassical 
organizational theories began with the Hawthorne studies in the 1920s. While manipulating conditions in 
the work environment at the Western Electric plant in Hawthorne, Illinois, Mayo and Roethlisberger 
observed that paying attention to employees in a friendly and non-threatening way was sufficient to 
increase output (Mayo 1933). These findings suggested that workers have social and psychological needs 
in addition to economic needs impacting on their motivation (Walonick 1993). Arising from the 
Hawthorne experiments, a number of theorists carried out studies that focused on the social relationships 
between workers in organizations (Sarker & Khan 2013). A series of studies by Douglas Mc Gregor, 
Abraham H. Maslow, Keth Davis, Frederick Herzberg, Rensis Likert and others led to what is the human 
relation movement (Singh 1983). The human relation movement proposed that workers in an organization 
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responded to the social context and interpersonal dynamics in organizations (Sarker & Khan 2013; Singh 
1983). Further studies on group dynamics in organizations developed the field of organizational behavior 
(Sarker & Khan 2013). This focus on studying the behavior and performance of individuals and groups as 
well as worker attitudes in organizational settings came to be known as the behavioral science approach 
(Cole 1984). Neoclassical theories thus emphasize the affective and socio-psychological aspects of human 
behavior in organizations (Sapru 2008). These theories created awareness of the important role of human 
relations in organizations. 
  
4.2.3 Contingency Theory 
Until around the 1960s normative interests urged organization theorists to use science to discover the best 
way to organize for optimal performance. But the science was not working, and ambiguous answers 
regarding the one best way to design an organization caused some to realize that what works best is 
contingent upon factors like the environment, goals, technology, and the people involved (Hatch & 
Cunlife 2013; Walonick 1993). Their approach came to be known as contingency theory. The 
contingency theory was proposed by the Australian psychologist Fred Edward Felder and proposed that 
there is no best way to lead, organize or make decisions in an organization. Rather, the optimal course of 
action is contingent (dependent) upon the internal and external situation (Fedler 1967). These constrains 
may include the size of the organization, how it adapts to its environment, differences among resources 
and operations activities, managerial assumptions about employees, strategies and technologies used 
(Fedler 1967). Contingency theorists criticized the classical and neoclassical theories for failing to 
appreciate the role of the environment in organizational functioning. Contingency theory proposed that 
the best way to organize depends on the nature of the environment to which the organization must relate 
(Walonick 1993). For contingency theorists, effective organizations are those in which multiple 
subsystems are aligned to maximize performance in a particular situation (Fedler 1967; Hatch & Cunlife 
2013).Contingency theorists identify the key contingencies in each situation and try to determine the best 
fit between them (Fedler 1967; Hatch & Cunlife 2013). 
 
A major weakness of the organizational theories discussed so far was the view of the organization as 
composed of separate parts with specified functions acting independent of the other. In recent years, there 
has been the realization that organizations are indeed composed of component parts, but that these parts 
are interrelated and interact in a non-linear fashion. This thinking, termed systems thinking, is discussed 
next.  
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4. 2.4 Systems Theory 
Systems theory is an approach to organizations which likens the enterprise to an organism with 
interdependent parts, each with its own specific function and interrelated responsibilities (Walonick 1993; 
Hatch & Cunlife 2013).  The system may be the whole organization, a division, department or team. 
Organizations as systems, are considered to be open to, and interact with, their environments, and it is 
possible to acquire new properties through emergence, resulting in continual evolution (Tsoukas 1998). 
Rather than reducing an organization to the properties of its parts or elements, systems theory focuses on 
the arrangement of and relations between the parts which connect them into a whole (Tsoukas 1998; 
Plowman et al. 2007). Characteristics of organizations as systems include (Walonick 1993; Hatch & 
Cunlife 2013): 1) the organization is an open system, which interacts with the environment and is 
continually adapting and improving 2) the organization influences and is influenced by the environment 
in which it operates 3) if an organization is to be effective it must pay attention to the external 
environment, and take steps to adjust itself to accommodate the changes in order to remain relevant 4) all 
part of the organization are interconnected and interdependent; if one part of the system is affected, all 
parts are.   
 
In describing organizations, Bolman and Deal (2013) have observed that organizations as systems, have 
four defining characteristics. First, organizations are complex. They contain an array of people, 
departments, technologies and goals, whose interactions are difficult to predict (Bolman & Deal 2013). 
Moreover, organizations are open systems that deal with a changing and erratic environment. Second, 
organizations are unpredictable. It is difficult to predict the future outcome of present actions. They note 
that often the solutions for yesterday‘s problems create obstacles for the future (Bolman & Deal 2013). 
Third, organizations are deceptive. They camouflage mistakes and surprises (Bolman & Deal 2013).  
Fourth, organizations are ambiguous. Complexity, unpredictability and deception generate rampant 
ambiguity (Bolman & Deal 2013). Understanding what is really going on in an organization is 
problematic. Ambiguity has a number of sources. Often available information is incomplete or vague and 
different people may interpret the same information in a variety of ways depending on mind-sets and 
organizational doctrines (Bolman & Deal 2013).  
 
Systems thinking has been applied in healthcare to address a range of challenges including tobacco 
control (Best 2007), obesity (Butland 2007; Finegood et al. 2008; Shiell 2008), and tuberculosis (Atun & 
Menabde 2009). More recently, the proposal of using systems thinking in the health system has emerged 
(World Bank 2007), and emphasized by the WHO health systems framework (WHO 2007). Specifically, 
Complex Adaptive Systems Theory (CAS) has found utility in explaining and understanding complex 
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health system phenomena.  CAS is an approach that sees healthcare and other systems as dynamic 
processes where the interactions and relationships of different components simultaneously affect and are 
influenced by the system, rather than applying simple cause and effect assumptions (Health Foundation 
2010; Begun et al. 2003). Central to CAS is the role of actors or, to use the term used in CAS, ‗agents‘ in 
the system. Plsek and Greenhalgh (2001) have defined CAS as ―a collection of individual agents with 
freedom to act in ways that are not always totally predictable, and whose actions are interconnected so 
that one agent‘s action changes the context for other agents‖. CAS possess a number of defining 
characteristics, four of which are relevant to organizational theory applications (Eoyang & Berkas 1999; 
Marion & Bacon 2000; Begun et al. 2003).  
First, CAS exist in a dynamic state with multiple interacting agents and the influence of external forces 
(Schneider & Somers 2006; Rickles et al. 2007; Ellis et al. 2011). The large number of agents in the CAS, 
the connections among the agents, and the influence of external forces all combine to result in constant 
and discontinuous change in the CAS. Second, the relationships between these agents and also between 
components of the system are complicated and enmeshed (Schneider & Somers 2006; Rickles et al. 2007; 
Ellis et al. 2011). CAS are comprised of a number of interdependent parts and influenced by a number of 
interdependent forces (Begun et al. 2003). In addition to being numerous and interdependent, parts and 
variables, and their relationships, can be nonlinear and discontinuous. Small changes in variables can 
have small impacts at some times, and large impacts under other conditions (Schneider & Somers 2006; 
Rickles et al. 2007; Ellis et al. 2011). Conversely, the effects of large changes in variables can vary from 
negligible to large, depending on the state of other variables (Schneider & Somers 2006; Rickles et al. 
2007; Ellis et al. 2011). The agents of a CAS both alter other agents, and are altered by other agents, in 
their interactions. Feedback loops among agents can generate change or stability in the system, depending 
on the relationships among the agents (Schneider & Somers 2006; Rickles et al. 2007; Ellis et al. 2011). 
In the case of feedback loops that generate change, two systems that initially are quite similar may 
develop significant differences over time (Begun et al. 2003). Even the same system, after the passage of 
time, may bear little resemblance to its previous configuration (Schneider & Somers 2006; Rickles et al. 
2007; Ellis et al. 2011). Because the context for each CAS is unique, and each CAS is context-dependent, 
each CAS is unique (Schneider & Somers 2006; Rickles et al. 2007; Ellis et al. 2011). Third, CAS exhibit 
emergent, or self-organizing behavior (Schneider & Somers 2006; Rickles et al. 2007; Ellis et al. 2011). 
Complexly structured, non-additive behavior emerges out of the interactions between system components 
(Begun et al. 2003). These interactions result in ordered states such that the behavior of the resulting 
whole is more than the sum of individual behaviors (Begun et al. 2003). Ordered states arise when a 
system component adapts its individual behaviors to accommodate the behaviors of components with 
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which it interacts. For example, interacting people and organizations tend to adjust their behaviors and 
worldviews to accommodate others with whom they interact. Networks with complex chains of 
interaction allow large systems to correlate, or self-order (Marion & Bacon 2000).  Applied to social 
systems, actors adjust their interaction based on characteristics of the other parties to the interaction. 
Extensive communication among large networks of actors can spread norms and create self-ordering 
structures, such as norms. CAS are hence often sensitive to certain small changes in initial conditions. An 
apparently trivial difference in the beginning state of the system may result in enormously different 
outcomes. This phenomenon is sometimes called the ―butterfly effect‖. However, this sensitivity has to do 
with the exact path that the complex system follows into the future, rather than its general pattern. CASs, 
tend to maintain generally bounded behavior, sometimes called an ―attractor,‖ regardless of small changes 
in initial conditions. As a result, a fourth property of CAS is that they are robust (Marion & Bacon 2000). 
They exhibit the ability to alter themselves in response to feedback. Complex systems possess a range of 
coupling patterns, from tight to loose (Marion & Bacon 2000). These different patterns help organizations 
survive a variety of environmental conditions. Loosely coupled structures cushion and moderate the 
systems response to strong shock while more tightly coupled structures tend to ―lock-in‖ to a response 
(Marion & Bacon 2000). Although adaptive in the moment, such a response may turn maladaptive as the 
environment shifts (Marion & Bacon 2000). As a whole, the complex structures provide multiple and 
creative paths for action. If one pattern of interdependency in a network is disrupted, other units can 
respond due to their interdependence with the disrupted unit (Marion & Bacon 2000). Robust response 
means that the complex system can effectively adapt to a wide range of environmental change, giving the 
system ―amazing resilience‖ (Marion & Bacon 2000; Trinh & Begun 1999).  
 
CAS has found a variety of applications in healthcare. For example, Kwamie and colleagues used CAS 
theory to evaluate a leadership development programme for district managers in Ghana (Kwamie et al. 
2014). Gilson and colleagues applied CAS to examine the challenges that face initiatives to strengthen 
primary healthcare services in South Africa (Gilson et al. 2014).  Bishai and colleagues applied CAS to 
develop a computer simulation model to illustrate the unintended consequences of apparently rational 
allocations of healthcare resources to curative and preventive services (Bishai et al. 2014). Elloker and 
colleagues use CAS to examine the complexities of managing a sub-district health system in South Africa 
(Elloker et al. 2012). In applying CAS, Elloker and colleagues develop a framework of organizational 
capacity that draws on a framework proposed by Aragon (2010). In this framework, healthcare systems 
are seen to be composed of hardware and software components (Figure 4.1) (Elloker et al. 2012).  
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Hardware components include such factors as infrastructure, technology and resources. System software 
includes the tangible software of management knowledge and skills and organizational systems and 
procedures and intangible software of values and norms, relationships and power.  
Figure 4. 1: Framework for organizational capacity (Elloker et al 2012) 
 
An important aspect of this framework is that it recognizes and highlights the importance of software 
aspects of the health system. The emphasis on organizational software is important given that often 
systems analyses give more weight to hardware issues and neglect software issues. For example, The 
WHO health systems framework conceptualizes health systems as comprising of systems hardware— 
medical products, finance, human resources, information systems and service delivery (Sheikh et al. 
2011). However, Sheikh and colleagues argue that system software, which they define as ―the ideas and 
interests, values and norms, and affinities and power that guide actions and underpin the relationships 
among system actors and elements‖, is also critical to health system performance Sheikh et al 2011). 
Elloker et al (2012) have also observed that intangible features of health systems software are crucial in 
influencing the behaviours of actors in organizations and ―underpin its power to perform‖.  
 
As pointed out previously, a prominent feature of CAS is the role of agents and the dynamics of their 
interactions. Interactions among actors in a system are often influenced by their interests and power 
dynamics. As shown in the literature review (3.2) actor and power dynamics significantly influence 
priority setting practices in healthcare organizations. These are discussed next. 
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4. 2.5 Actors Dynamics and Micro-practices of Power 
Politics has been proposed as a key frame or lens through which organizations can be examined and 
understood (Bolman & Deal 2013). The political frame views organizations as roiling arenas, hosting 
ongoing contests of individual and group interests (Bolman & Deal 2013). As arenas, they house 
competition and offer a setting for the ongoing interplay of divergent interests and agendas. From this 
perspective, every significant organizational process is inherently political (Bolman & Deal 2013). 
Boleman and Deal (2013) provide five propositions that summarize the perspective. First, organizations 
are viewed as coalitions of different individuals and interest groups (Bolman & Deal 2013). Second, 
coalition members have enduring differences in values, beliefs, information, interests, and perceptions of 
reality (Bolman & Deal 2013). Third, the most important decisions in organizations involve allocating 
scarce resources (Bolman & Deal 2013). Fourth, scarce resources and enduring differences put conflict at 
the center of day-to-day dynamics and make power the most important asset (Bolman & Deal 2013). 
Fifth, goals and decisions emerge from bargaining and negotiation among competing stakeholders 
jockeying for their own interests (Bolman & Deal 2013). 
 
Given that the political frame views organizations as coalitions composed of individuals and groups with 
enduring differences, it puts power at the center of organizational decision making. Power has been 
described as the ability to influence others (Bolman & Deal 2013). In his seminal on work  power, Steven 
Lukes (1974) describes what he calls the three dimensions of power (Lukes 1974; Swartz 2005).  The one 
dimensional view of power involves a focus on behavior in the making of decisions on issues over which 
there is an observable conflict of interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political 
participation (Lukes 1974; Swartz 2005). This dimension is positivist in outlook and focused on empirical 
identification of actors who participated in decision-making where influence over others could be readily 
discerned (Lukes 1974; Swartz 2005). Power is seen as the ability of one actor to get another actor to do 
something they did not want to do.  Power in the first dimension is embodied in ―concrete decisions‖ 
(Lukes 1974; Swartz 2005). The second dimension considers ―what does not happen‖ in decision-making 
settings; namely, those issues that are unwittingly neglected or consciously excluded from the agenda. 
Power can be exercised through non-issues and non-decision making as well (Lukes 1974; Swartz 2005). 
For Lukes, this represented the second dimension of power: control of the agenda (Lukes 1974; Swartz 
2005). In the third dimension of power, Lukes argued that power is not exhausted by decision making 
(first dimension) and agenda construction (second dimension) but could operate at a deeper more invisible 
level (Lukes 1974; Swartz 2005). Lukes argued that the third dimension of power consists of deeply 
rooted forms of political socialization where actors unwittingly follow the dictates of power even against 
their best interests (Lukes 1974; Swartz 2005).  
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Power has been observed to have a key influence in health policy implementation (Walt 1994; Gibson et 
al. 2005; Erasmus & Gilson 2008). Actor power is typically derived from their position, political 
influence and connections, knowledge, technical expertise, resources and physical power (Pantazidou 
2012).  Different models of analyzing power relations have interpreted the concept differently. For 
example, top down models see power as the control exercised by those at the higher level of the 
organizational hierarchy over those in the lower levels in an effort to achieve defined organizational 
objectives (Erasmus & Gilson 2008). According to these models, policies are developed through political 
processes and the role of the implementer is restricted to implementation of policy objectives (Erasmus & 
Gilson 2008).   
Bottom-up models of power focus on the micro-practices of power within organizations. Power is seen to 
be manifested by consensus building to gain influence over others (Erasmus & Gilson 2008). Power is 
thought to be exercised to further each actors‘ interest rather than to achieve public policy goals. A feature 
of bottom –up models is the exercise of discretionary power by implementing actors (Erasmus & Gilson 
2008). Given that policy makers cannot foresee every aspect of how the implementation process will 
unravel, implementing actors exercise discretion to manage the day to day challenges of implementation 
(Erasmus & Gilson 2008). Sharp et al. (2000) look at power as not only the ways in which some actors 
exercise control over others but also the ways in which some actors resist such control. For example, 
Lipsky‘s street level bureaucrat model argues that policy implementation, and therefore outcomes, are 
significantly influenced by actors at the frontline of implementation who exercise discretionary power 
(Lipsky 1980). These ‗street level bureaucrats‘ shape the policy in line with their understanding of it and 
aligned to their working routines, values and interests (Buse 2007). A related model of power looks at 
policy as ―meaning making‖, where power is seen to also reside in the interpretation of policies by the 
implementers given that it shapes how  policy ideas are understood by others (Erasmus & Gilson 2008). 
The understanding of policy is hence not only influenced by senior policy makers but also by 
implementers, as well as by clients and the wider community (Erasmus & Gilson 2008).  
A framework that is perhaps useful in analyzing the power dynamics and interactions among actors in 
organizations is Norman Long‘s (1999) Actor interface analysis (Lehmann & Gilson 2013; Long 1999; 
Long & Jinlong 2009). Social interfaces occur at points where ―different, and often conflicting, life-
worlds or social fields intersect‖ (Long 1999). Interface analysis aims to explicate the types and sources 
of social discontinuity and to explore the cultural and organizational means of transforming or 
reproducing them (Long 1999). Interface analysis is particularly useful given that it provides a means 
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through which the platforms of interactions between actors and the power dynamics can be critically 
examined.   
This framework is particularly suitable for analyzing actor interactions within the framework of CAS 
given that it recognizes the key role of  ―human agency‖, self-organizing processes and the influence of 
both internal and external organizational factors and relationships (Long & Jinlong 2009).  Norman Long 
(1999) has suggested the following features for social interfaces: 
 Interactions between actors at the interface leads to the development of boundaries and shared
expectations so that over time the interface itself becomes ―an organized entity of interlocking
relationships and intentions‖
 Interface interactions often generate conflict given that actors at the interface have differing
interest levels of power
 Social interfaces often provide platforms for the generation of differences in values, worldviews
or cultural paradigms among actors
 Actor interpretations and meaning making are influenced by interactions at the interface.
Meaning making and interpretations of policies or organizational processes therefore emerge
from the interactions, dialogue, and contests of meaning at the actor interfaces
 Practices of power emerge as the result of complex negotiations and struggles over status,
authority, resources and reputation at the interface
 Interfaces are composed of multiple discourses; these discourses are often platforms for the
multiple values, interests, cultures and power differences among actors to play out.   Outcomes of
such interactions include the endorsement, transformation or rejection of the prevailing discourse
 Interactions at the interface shape and influence policy implementation and organizational
processes. These processes are hence seen as negotiated process rather than the simple execution
of a pre-specified plan with expected outcomes. It is therefore important to focus on how policy
or organizational processes are shaped by interactions among actors, rather than simply on
implementation models (Long 1999; Lehmann & Gilson 2013).
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Lehmann and Gilson‘s (2013) policy analysis of a community health worker programme in South Africa 
offers an example of the application of actor interface analysis in examining power dynamics among 
actors in the health system. The study identified 4 distinct interfaces in the community health worker 
programme namely (1) between competing directorates (2) between programme managers in the sub-
district office, (3) between community health workers and facility managers, and (4) between new and old 
cadres of community health workers (Lehmann & Gilson 2013). At each of these interfaces, it was 
reported that there was contestation over resources and negotiation to align the community health worker 
policy with the local context (Lehmann & Gilson 2013). Further, it was observed that the contestation 
played out overtly and actively in some cases, and was hidden and passive in others.  
 
Another framework that has been used to analyze power in social contexts and is relevant to health policy 
analysis is Gaventa‘s power cube that visualizes power as comprised of three dimensions namely 1) the 
forms of power 2) the spaces of power and 3) the levels of power (Figure 4.2) (Gaventa 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 2: The power cube – levels, spaces and forms of power (Gaventa, 2005) 
 
The spaces dimension refers to the platforms and opportunities for participation and action, including 
closed, invited and claimed spaces (Pantazidou 2012; Gaventa 2006). Closed spaces refer to situations 
 
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
75  
 
where decisions are made by a select group of actors with the open exclusion of others (Pantazidou 2012; 
Gaventa 2006). Closed spaces are where elites such as bureaucrats, politicians, experts, managers and 
leaders make decisions without consulting or involving others. In Invited spaces, there is wide 
involvement of actors (Pantazidou 2012; Gaventa 2006). Created/invented spaces refer to forums of 
participations created by powerless or excluded groups, from their own initiative (Pantazidou 2012; 
Gaventa 2006). Examples include social movements and community associations or simply natural places 
where people gather to debate and discuss issues that concern them. 
 
The forms dimension of the cube refers to how power is manifested and includes its visible, hidden and 
invisible forms (Pantazidou 2012; Gaventa 2006). Visible power is one that is exercised in public spaces 
or formal decision making bodies (Pantazidou 2012; Gaventa 2006). For example, within the health 
sector, the influence exerted by senior decision makers within formal decision making mechanisms such 
as budgeting committees is a visible form of power. Hidden forms of power on the other hand are 
exercised prevent other actors from participation while maintaining power among a few actors 
(Pantazidou 2012; Gaventa 2006). This is achieved ensuring that key issues are excluded from the public 
arena, or by manipulating decision making behind the scenes (Pantazidou 2012; Gaventa 2006).  Invisible 
power on the other hand involves ―the ways in which awareness of one‗s rights and interests are hidden 
through the adoption of dominating ideologies, values and forms of behavior by relatively powerless 
groups themselves‖ (Pantazidou 2012; Gaventa 2006). Sometimes this is also referred to as the 
internalization of powerlessness. 
 
Finally, the levels dimension of the cube refers to the different layers of decision-making and authority 
that includes global, national and local (Pantazidou 2012; Gaventa 2006). In the health sector decision 
making on health system issues by institutions such as the WHO or the World Bank, meetings associated 
with global agreements and treaties are examples of global levels were power is exercised. Decision 
making at the macro level by governments, the private sector and development partners constitute the 
national level.  In many countries, local governments play an important role in health policy 
implementation. This is especially so in decentralized systems where significant functions and authority 
have been transferred from national governments to local governments. This level is considered to be the 
local level where power can be exercised. 
 
Though visually presented as a cube, each side of the cube is a dimension of relationships rather than a 
static set of categories (Pantazidou 2012; Gaventa 2006). Further, the dimensions of the power cube 
constantly interact, shaping the synergies of power in organizations (Pantazidou 2012; Gaventa 2006). 
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For instance, what happens at national level can have an impact on the spaces available for participation 
and engagement at the local level.  
 
Another relevant framework in the analysis of power is the expressions of power proposed by 
VeneKlasen and Miller (2002) which postulates that power is expressed in four main forms namely:  1) 
power over; 2) power to; 3) power with, and; 4) power within (Table 4:1) (VeneKlasen & Miller 2002; 
Lehmann & Gilson 2013). An advantage that has been assigned to this framework is the fact that it 
recognizes positive attributes of power and allows actors to view power as something positive that they 
can possess (Pantazidou 2012).  
 
Table 4. 1: Four expressions and sources of power* 
FORMS OF POWER DEFINITION 
Power over 
Power over is exercised by taking it (power) from someone else, and then, 
using it to dominate and prevent others from gaining it 
Power with 
Power with is exercised by finding common ground among different interests 
and building collective strength 
Power to act 
Power to act refers to the capacity for individual and groups to shape their life 
and world and create more equitable relations and structures of power 
Power within 
Power within refers to  individuals sense of self-worth, values and self-
knowledge which is central to individual and group understanding of being 
citizens with rights and responsibilities‘ 
*Adapted from Lehmann and Gilson (2012) 
 
Power ‗over‘ refers to the ability of powerful actors to influence the thoughts and actions less powerful 
actors (VeneKlasen & Miller 2002; Lehmann & Gilson 2013). Power over often has negative 
connotations including repression and coercion. Having power means that it has to be taken from 
someone else and used to dominate others and prevent them from gaining it. For example, those who 
control decision making and resources have power over those without. The three other forms of power 
provide positive ways of expressing power. Power ‗to‘ refers to the unique potential of every person to 
influence their life and world (VeneKlasen & Miller 2002; Lehmann & Gilson 2013). Power to can 
provide an opportunity for joint action among actors, or power with. Power ‗with‘ refers to the synergy 
that results from collaboration with others, or through collective action (VeneKlasen & Miller 2002; 
Lehmann & Gilson 2013). Power ‗within‘ refers to gaining a sense of awareness, self-identity and 
confidence that is a precondition for action (VeneKlasen & Miller 2002; Lehmann & Gilson 2013). It has 
to do with a person‗s sense of self-knowledge and self-worth.  
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Rather than being contradictory, the three frameworks for examining power in organizational and policy 
settings are complementary given that each explores a different, but important, aspect of power. For 
example, actor interface analysis can be a useful framework for identifying and specifying the platforms 
of interactions between groups of actors, while the power cube and expressions of power framework can 
both be used to explore power dynamics within these interfaces more deeply. The analysis by Lehmann 
and Gilson (2013) is an example.  
4. 3 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, I have introduced and discussed relevant organizational theories. We see that 
organizational theories have evolved from theories that looked at organizations in a reductionist and 
mechanistic manner, where various components were considered in isolation, to the more recent 
perspective of organizations as dynamic systems. CAS theory, a brand of systems thinking, has been 
introduced with some examples of its applications in healthcare given. It has also emerged that in looking 
at healthcare organizations as dynamic systems, organizational software is at least as important as 
hardware aspects. A key component of CAS is the role of agents and their interactions. Power, which 
influences the interactions among organizational actors, is introduced and analytical approaches used to 
assess power relations among actors discussed. Understanding these theories that relate to organizational 
dynamics is important given that this thesis aims to examine an issue (priority setting) within an 
organizational context (hospitals). In the next chapter, I will outline the study methods that were 
employed in this thesis.  
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CHAPTER V: STUDY METHODS 
5. 1 INTRODUCTION 
he previous three chapters presented literature on, and related to, priority setting in hospitals. One of 
the primary observations from the synthesis and analysis of literature, particularly those presented in 
the reviews chapter (chapter three), is that there is a dearth of literature that examines and/or evaluates 
priority setting practices in hospitals, especially in developing countries.  There is therefore a need for 
further work in this area. This chapter now describes the methods used to examine and evaluate priority 
setting practices in county hospitals in Kenya.  The chapter begins by presenting the conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks that have guided and shaped the design and conduct of the study, and 
interpretation of findings. This is followed by a presentation of the study design, and a detailed 
description of the selection of cases and participants, data collection procedures, data management 
processes and analytical approach. The next sections present, in turn: the interpretive framework of the 
study; my positionality in the research process; the measures taken to ensure rigor in the study; the 
study‘s claims to generalizability; steps taken to ensure that the study adheres to principles of research 
ethics, and; the study limitations. Finally, a summary of the chapter is presented.  
 
5. 2 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
In chapter one of this thesis, I outlined the purpose of this thesis as descriptive-explanatory on the one 
hand, and normative or evaluative on the other. Each of these components of the study has been guided by 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks that will be outlined in this section.  
 
5. 2.1 Describing Priority Setting 
Literature suggests that healthcare priority setting should be considered as part of the policy process 
(Goddard et al. 2006; Sibbald 2008; Ham & Glenn 2003). This is corroborated by the literature review on 
hospital level priority setting practices carried out as part of this thesis (3.2), where it emerged that factors 
that influence or interact with hospital level priority setting seem to coalesce around the four interrelated 
components of the policy processes, namely process, content, context and actors (3.2). On the basis of this 
literature review, and drawing on policy analysis frameworks (Walt & Gilson 1994; Buse 2007; Gilson et 
al. 2008),  this study adopts a conceptual framework based on four interrelated areas (Figure 5.1): 
 
T 
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 Context: What contextual issues influence the priority setting processes, including financing 
arrangements, decision space, and leadership and management practices? 
 
 Content: What priority setting guidelines are in place, and what criteria are used to allocate 
resources? 
 
 Process: What are the procedures and tools hospitals should use to set priorities? Are these 
procedures and tools used? If not why not? 
 
 Actors: Who are the relevant internal and external actors involved in the priority setting process? 
What are their roles, interests, level of influence and power relations? How does this influence 
priority setting practice? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 1: Framework for Examining Priority Setting Practice in Hospitals 
 
This conceptual framework informed the design of the data collection tools, as well as the development of 
the coding themes in the analysis of the data.  
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5. 2.2 Explaining Relationships  
In explaining the findings of the thesis, I employed Complex Adaptive Systems Theory (CAS) (4.2.3). 
This theory was adopted given the observation that hospitals are complex systems with multiple agents 
and components. CAS metaphors have found relevance in explaining complex phenomena in healthcare 
organizations (Begun et al. 2003; Health Foundation 2010) and will be used here to explain the 
observations of the complex relationships between actors and components within the case study hospitals. 
To unpack further the hospital system, the framework proposed by Aragon (2010) and adapted by Elloker 
and colleagues (2012) on organizational capacity is relevant (4.2.3). In this framework, healthcare 
systems are seen to be composed of hardware and software components (Elloker et al. 2012). Hardware 
components include such factors as infrastructure, technology and resources. System software includes 
the tangible software of management knowledge and skills and organizational systems and procedures 
and intangible software of values and norms, relationships and power. 
 
5. 2.3 Evaluating Priority setting 
Section 3.3 of chapter three presented a review of literature on priority setting evaluation with the aim of 
developing a framework for the evaluation of priority setting in healthcare organizations. Arising from 
this review, I developed a framework that sees priority setting as being successful if (Figure 5.2):  
 
1. It is based on values drawn from the community  
2. Decisions are targeted at maximizing benefits while at the same time incorporating equity 
considerations 
3. The priority setting process meets the procedural conditions of:  
a. stakeholder engagement  
b. stakeholder empowerment  
c. transparency  
d. use of quality information  
e. revisions  
f. enforcement, and 
 
4. The priority setting process yields the following results:  
a. stakeholder satisfaction  
b. stakeholder Understanding  
c. shifted priorities (reallocation of resources) and  
d. implementation of decisions 
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Figure 5. 2: Framework for Evaluating Priority Setting in Healthcare Organizations 
This framework has been applied in this thesis to evaluate priority setting practices in the case study 
hospitals.  
5. 3 STUDY METHODS
5. 3.1 Study Design, Selection of Cases and Data Collection
Study Design  
This study employed a qualitative exploratory-explanatory case study design. A case study has been 
defined by Yin (1994) as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context". In a case study, a phenomenon is examined and analyzed in detail and depth using 
research tools that are most appropriate to the nature of the inquiry (de Lange & Flyvbjerg 2011). In the 
review chapter of this thesis, it is apparent that the qualitative case study methodology is the most used 
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methodology for analyzing priority setting practices in healthcare institutions (3.2). This is emphasized by 
Martin and Singer (2003) who recommend that an important initial step of a strategy to improve priority 
setting involves describing actual priority setting in context using qualitative case study methods. In this 
study, two county hospitals in the coastal region of Kenya formed the cases. The factors that informed the 
selection of these hospitals will be discussed in a later section. 
 
A number of features of the case study approach informed its adoption for this inquiry. First, the case 
study approach is considered suitable to inquiries into phenomena that are highly contextual and where 
the boundaries between what is being studied and the context are blurred. It has been observed by several 
authors that priority setting practices in hospitals are highly context dependent (Kapiriri & Martin 2010; 
Martin & Singer 2003; Gibson et al. 2004). In the review chapter of this thesis, it was demonstrated that 
priority setting practices in hospitals are often influenced by contextual factors such as resource gaps, 
financing arrangements, decision space, management decision making capacity and leadership 
approaches. The case study approach is useful in building an understanding of the contextual influences 
on the phenomena of interest (Yin 2003; de Lange & Flyvbjerg 2011).  Thus, case studies always involve 
relating particular events or actions to their contexts, which may be local or global, political, economic or 
social, and are useful in seeking to reach a deeper understanding of the ways in which wider forces are 
manifested at the local level.  
 
Second, the case study approach is considered appropriate for the study of complex social phenomena 
(Yin 2003; de Lange & Flyvbjerg 2011). Priority setting is considered a complex social process that 
confronts decision makers with significant theoretical, political, and practical obstacles (Hauck et al. 
2004; Shayo et al. 2013; Klein 1998). It often involves a range of actors with varied values that are 
brought to bear in decision making. As observed by Flyvbjerg (2001), social processes are complex and 
unlikely to yield universal truths or accurate predictions. An appropriate analysis should therefore aim to 
develop concrete, context dependent knowledge (Flyvbjerg 2001). Third, case study methodology is 
considered particularly suitable in examining and unpacking power dynamics as well as the role of values 
in social processes (Flyvbjerg 2001). This emphasizes the suitability of this approach to the study of 
priority setting processes given that actor power, interests and relations have been shown to significantly 
influence priority setting processes. Finally,  case studies are also suited to obtaining multiple 
perspectives and experiences of a wide range of different stakeholders (Yin 1999).  
 
This study had an initial exploratory phase and a subsequent explanatory phase. The exploratory phase 
was considered useful given that priority setting in hospitals in Kenya had not been previously studied 
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and hence there was limited information about the types, nature and forms of priority setting activities in 
Kenyan county hospitals. In the exploratory phase, I sought to map out the types of priority-setting 
activities that occur in two case study hospitals, the organization and structure of these activities, the key 
actors involved in the process, and the relevant decisions they make. I also used this phase to identify 
priority setting activities that I subsequently studied in greater depth in the subsequent explanatory phase 
of the study.  The explanatory phase focused on 3 priority setting decisions that I studied prospectively 
within each case study hospital. In essence therefore, this was a nested case study design, where the 
selected county hospital were cases, while the three priority setting activities in each hospital were sub-
cases, nested within the case study hospitals (Figure 5.3) .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 3: Study Cases 
 
In both phases, I collected data by a combination of key informant and in-depth interviews of hospital 
decision makers as well as other identified stakeholders, review of relevant documents including hospital 
plans, budgets, minutes of meetings, non-participant observation and a researcher diary method. I selected 
these data collection methods partly for their utility in achieving both breadth and coverage across issues 
of interest, and the depth of coverage within each (Ritchie & Lewis 2003). I also considered logistical 
feasibility of data collection methods. It is problematic, for example, to use group methods such as focus 
group discussions with hospital decision makers and frontline practitioners who can find it difficult to 
ensure they are available in a pre-arranged place at a specific time. 
 
 
Study Cases 
Hospitals as Cases 
The two hospital cases were selected purposefully guided by the following criteria: 1) public level 4 
hospitals that were designated as county hospitals; 2) hospitals with a high local resource level and those 
with a low local resource level; 3) researcher convenience and access to the hospital; and 4) hospitals 
Hospitals as cases 
Case study 
Hospital A 
Case study 
Hospital B 
Decisions as nested cases 
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which had relationships with either my institution (the KEMRI-Wellcome Trust research programme) or 
someone within my institution. This last criterion was important because prior discussions with research 
colleagues and individuals who had experience working in public hospitals in Kenya revealed that the 
subject of priority setting was likely to be viewed as political and sensitive. This is because it would 
involve observing, asking questions and reviewing documents such as budgets and other accounting 
records. It was likely therefore that I would be perceived as conducting a form of audit and encounter 
some resistance from the hospital administrators and a lack of willingness to participate in the study. By 
identifying hospitals with prior contact/relationship or linkage with my institution, I aimed to minimize 
trust concerns and make it easier for hospitals to accept and allow me to gain entry and conduct the study.  
 
In line with the case study methodology, the selection criteria aimed to identify hospitals that were rich in 
information as opposed to representativeness. I thus endeavored to select cases with varying 
characteristics and experiences. Based on the selection criteria, 2 county hospitals were selected in the 
coastal region of Kenya: 1) Malindi county hospital in Kilifi County and 2) Port Reitz county hospital in 
Mombasa County. A brief background of each of the hospitals and their settings follows.  
 
Malindi County Hospital 
Malindi county hospital is a public hospital located in Malindi town in Kilifi County. Kilifi county has an 
estimated population of 1,109,735 and a poverty rate (poverty head count of people living below the 
Kenya poverty line) of 66.9%, ranking it at number 9 poorest among the 47 Counties in Kenya (CRA 
2011). Malindi County hospital has an estimated catchment population of 264,027 (MDH 2012), an 
estimated annual admission of 8,000 and an estimated annual outpatient visit of 60,000. The hospital has 
a bed capacity of 183 and an estimated annual cash budget of USD 350,000.  
 
Port Reitz County Hospital 
Port Reitz county hospital is a public hospital located in Mombasa town in Mombasa County. Mombasa 
County has an estimated population of 939,370 and a poverty rate of 37.6%, ranking it at number 37 
poorest among the 47 Counties in Kenya (CRA 2011). Port Reitz hospital has an estimated catchment 
population of 96,388 (PRDH 2011) an average annual admission of 5,000 and average annual outpatient 
visits of 60,000. The hospital has a bed capacity of 166 and an average annual cash budget of USD 
280,000. More than a third of Port Reitz hospital beds are permanently occupied by psychiatric patients. 
This can be explained historically. Port Reitz hospital was initially established as a specialist mental 
hospital but later transitioned to a district hospital offering care to general patients. The hospital however 
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continues to receive psychiatric referrals from other hospitals in the region and hence continues to serve 
as a ―quasi-specialty‖ facility. 
These two hospitals differ in a number of ways. Malindi county hospital is larger, in terms of bed, 
capacity compared to Port Reitz county hospital. Also, given the ―quasi-specialist‖ status of Port Reitz 
county hospital, Port Reitz has higher resource needs given that the medical needs of psychiatric patients 
are significantly more costly than those of patients with general conditions. Further, given that user fees 
are one of the main revenue streams for hospitals, and mental health services in hospitals are offered for 
free, Port Reitz county hospital‘s capacity to generate revenues is significantly reduced compared to 
Malindi county hospital. This is contrasted against the fact that Malindi county hospital receives a greater 
share of central government allocation, and higher levels of local revenues compared to Port Reitz county 
hospital. Furthermore, Malindi county hospital has an active donor community and receives far more 
support from locally based non-governmental organizations than Port Reitz. The resource gaps in these 
hospitals, their respective sizes and the nature of healthcare demand that they face are thus different. 
These factors provided a rich diversity between the hospitals that made them suitable as comparative 
cases. Table 5.1 outlines some significant characteristics of the case study hospitals.  
Table 5. 1: Characteristics of Case Study Hospitals 
CHARACTERISTIC 
MALINDI COUNTY
HOSPITAL 
PORT REITZ COUNTY
HOSPITAL 
Estimated Annual outpatient visits 60,000 60,000 
Estimated Annual inpatient admissions 8,000 5,000 
Estimated Annual monetary budget (USD) 350,000 280,000 
Number of staff 234 236 
Number of beds 183 166 
Decisions as Nested Cases 
In the exploratory phase of the study, I engaged hospital decision makers in a discursive process of 
recalling, suggesting and listing priority-setting activities that they considered suitable for in-depth 
analysis in each hospital. The exercise of selecting priority setting activities was thus consultative. I used 
three criteria to select priority-setting decisions/activities that I would later examine as nested cases within 
each of the two case study hospitals: 1) a priority-setting case had to have evidence of availability and 
reliability of information sources about it; 2) the activity had to have a clearly defined beginning and end; 
and 3) the hospital had to give full consent to the study of a selected priority-setting case. Based on this 
process and these criteria, I selected three priority setting activities for in-depth study: 
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1. The hospital budgeting and annual work planning process 
2. Medicine selection decisions in the hospital 
3. Nursing allocation to hospital departments in the hospital 
 
Hospital budgeting and planning comprised two interrelated activities; the annual work planning process 
and the quarterly budgeting process. Every year, the hospital prepared annual work plans, a process that 
involved the identification of hospital priorities and selection of interventions to target these priorities as 
well as determine their costs. This was then followed by a quarterly budgeting process where all available 
hospital resources were assessed and allocated to hospital departments and services. I selected the hospital 
budgeting and planning process because it was perhaps the most important priority setting activity in the 
hospital given that all other priority setting activities in the hospital are, in theory, anchored to these 
processes. Further, it was the most formal priority setting activity in the hospital - with procedures and 
defined activity schedules - and thus relatively easy to observe.  
 
I selected the medicines selection and nursing allocation processes  because medicines and human 
resources consume significant healthcare resources in these hospitals as in many other healthcare contexts 
(MSH 2013). The nursing cadre of healthcare workers formed the largest proportion of staff in both 
hospitals. Also the medicine selection and nursing allocation processes offered an interesting contrast to 
the hospital budgeting and planning process given that while the latter was a relatively formalized process 
that occurred at predetermined and discrete time periods, medicine selection and nursing allocation 
processes were often reportedly informal and/or ad hoc processes that occurred at irregular timeframes. 
Also, the hospital planning and budgeting process involved a wide range of stakeholders and was driven 
by the hospital senior management, as opposed to the medicine selection and nursing processes which 
were driven by specific departments (pharmacy and nursing respectively). The selection of these nested 
cases therefore offered an opportunity to examine the unique characteristics of both formal and informal 
priority setting practices in these hospitals. 
 
Study Participants  
This study sought to understand priority setting practices through the views of hospital decision makers 
and other stakeholders. The selection of participants for interviews was therefore purposive with the aim 
of selecting individuals who had an in-depth knowledge of the identified priority setting activities, and 
those who took part in or were affected by these priority setting activities. This included senior and 
middle level hospital managers, frontline practitioners and members of decision making committees.  
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
87  
 
Within hospitals the senior management was constituted in the form of an executive expenditure 
committee (EEC) which comprised of the medical superintendent (who was the chief executive of the 
hospital), the administrative officer, the accountant, the procurement officer and the pharmacist in charge. 
All these members of senior management were selected for interviews in each hospital. Middle level 
managers formed the hospital management team (HMT), which was a committee that was comprised of 
all hospital heads of department. Members of this committee were also selected for interviews. For 
medicines selection decisions, the medicines and therapeutics committee (MTC) members were selected 
for interviews. The MTC was a multidisciplinary committee that comprised members from clinical 
specialty, pharmacy and nursing. This committee, in theory, made decisions about which medicines to 
select and include in the hospital formularies. Front line practitioners, namely clinicians (clinical officers 
and medical doctors) nurses and pharmacists were also selected for interviews. Given that priority setting 
in hospitals has been shown to be significantly influenced and guided by central ministries of health, key 
informants within the planning departments of the ministry of health services were also selected for 
interviews. 
 
Formal sample size calculations are not appropriate for this case study form of investigation as the aim is 
to explore themes in depth rather than claim that data are ‗statistically representative‘. The number of 
participants was hence determined by theoretical saturation, where selection of participants within the 
four groups (central MOH officials, senior, middle level managers and frontline practitioners) was 
stopped when no new information was forthcoming. In total, 72 participants were selected for in-depth 
interviews, 35 from Malindi county hospital, 32 from Port Reitz county hospital and 5 from the central 
ministry of health.  Table 5.2 outlines the number of participants selected in each hospital under each 
category. 
 
Table 5. 2: Number of participants selected in each hospital under each category 
 
CATEGORY OF PARTICIPANTS NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS 
National-level key informants 5 
 MALINDI COUNTY HOSPITAL PORT REITZ COUNTY HOSPITAL 
Senior managers  6 6 
Mid-level managers  22 19 
Front-line practitioners 7 8 
Hospital sub-total 35 32 
Study total 72 
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Study Strategy 
As indicated earlier, the study had an initial explorative phase and a subsequent explanatory phase.  In 
both of these phases, data were collected through in-depth interviews, document reviews, non-participant 
observations and a research diary. In this section, the two phases of the study and the data collection 
methods are described in turn.  
 
Exploratory Phase 
The exploratory phase of the study was aimed at initiating contact, building trust between me and the 
hospital staff and obtaining an understanding of the types, forms and nature of priority setting activities in 
the case hospitals. In each hospital, I made an appointment for an initial visit to introduce myself with the 
medical superintendent, who is the chief executive of the hospital. For this initial visit, I was accompanied 
by a colleague who had prior contact and a working relationship with the medical superintendent. During 
this visit, I introduced myself and the objective of my study, and outlined the plans for my research work. 
Given the perceived sensitive nature of my inquiry into for instance how resources are managed in the 
hospital, it was imperative at this stage to clarify and emphasize that my study was not intended as an 
audit of the hospital‘s management of resources but rather as an examination of decision making 
processes. This assurance was critical in gaining access to the hospital, and in making the hospital staff 
comfortable and trusting enough to share views, information and data sources.  
 
After this initial introduction, I was introduced to the other departmental heads by the medical 
superintendent, who explained the purpose of my presence in the hospital and requested them to provide 
me with the necessary support. I subsequently requested and undertook in-depth interviews with the 
senior managers of the hospital, namely the medical superintendent, the administrative officer, 
accountant, pharmacist, nursing officer in charge and the procurement officer. These initial interviews 
were undertaken using interview guides that explored general questions about the hospital context and 
priority setting activities (Appendix V). The interviews were augmented with document reviews, non-
participant observations and a researcher diary. A total of 2 weeks was spent in each hospital in the 
exploratory phase. A key output was the identification of priority setting activities that would be 
examined in depth in the explanatory phase, the mapping of key stakeholders and sources of information 
including documents and observation targets such as meetings, and the gaining of the trust of hospital 
staff. These outputs were critical in enabling the subsequent explanatory phase, described next.   
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The Explanatory Phase 
The explanatory phase immediately followed the exploratory phase and was conducted over 3 months in 
each hospital. During this phase, I conducted in-depth interviews, reviewed relevant documents, 
conducted non-participant interviews and kept a researcher diary. These data collection methods were 
targeted at examining the three selected priority setting activities in the hospital. While I initially had 
fears about how open and accepting the staff would be towards an outsider asking questions, reviewing 
documents and observing perceived sensitive activities such as hospital budgeting and senior management 
meetings, I was pleasantly surprised by how open and welcoming the staff were in both hospitals. This 
was made possible by my spending time in the hospital during the exploratory phase where I got to know 
staff and repeatedly clarified my aims. Further the length of time I spent in each hospital (3.5 months 
including the exploratory phase) allowed me to interrogate issues gradually, while building trusting 
relationships with the hospital staff. This allowed the hospital staff to identify with me and come to regard 
me as one of them. Hospital staff were thus quite free and open with me and often volunteered crucial 
information and guided me on where to look for relevant data. The data collection methods used will now 
be described in greater detail. 
Data Collection Methods 
This section details the methods used to collect data. Specifically, I will discuss the use of in-depth 
interviews, non-participant observations, document reviews and a researcher diary.  
In-depth Interviews 
I used interviews to obtain in-depth information about the identified priority setting practices from the 
perspective and experiences of the hospital decision makers, front line practitioners and national level 
informants (Kvale 1996).  I invited those identified as possible interviewees to take part in the study after 
the purpose of the study had been explained to them and after they had provided written, informed 
consent (Appendix IV). Consent was requested for the use of a digital tape recorder to allow the whole 
interview to be captured (and later transcribed) while I (as the interviewer) also took my own notes. In 
two instances, respondents refused to be tape recorded. Each interview took between 30-45 minutes. In 
depth interviews employed topic guides (Appendix VI - IX) that were informed by the study‘s theoretical 
and conceptual frameworks as well as by observations and earlier interviews conducted in the exploratory 
phase of the study. I endeavored to conduct the interviews at the convenience of the interviewee and in a 
place that provided for confidentiality to be preserved and for the interviewee to feel comfortable. This 
was however not always possible:  in some instances I had to conduct interviews in busy outpatient areas 
or wards since the staff could not find time to leave their working areas. In these instances, interviews 
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were sometimes disrupted by noise and staff often had to attend urgent requests from other staff or clients 
mid interview.  
 
Document Reviews 
I reviewed documents relevant to the priority setting activities selected for the study, including the 
hospital 5 year investment plan, hospital annual work plans (AWPs), hospital quarterly budgets, and 
minutes from hospital management committee (HMC), hospital management team (HMT), executive 
expenditure committee (EEC) and medicines and therapeutic committee (MTC) meetings.  I also 
reviewed accounting records and documents recommended by key informants as likely to contain relevant 
information. These documents were selected for two financial years (2011 – 2012 and 2012 – 2013).  I 
made efforts to verify that the required documents were available, accessible and authentic. I also 
considered the completeness and representativeness of the documents to try and minimize bias. I 
employed a data collection checklist (Appendix X) to guide the abstraction of data from the documents. 
The types and number of documents I reviewed in each hospital are outlined in table 5.3. 
 
Table 5. 3: Types and Number of Documents Reviewed in each Hospital 
 
TYPE OF DOCUMENT 
NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 
MALINDI COUNTY HOSPITAL PORT REITZ COUNTY HOSPITAL 
Quarterly Hospital Budgets 8 8 
The AWPs 2 2 
Minutes of AWP meetings 2 2 
Minutes of HMT meetings 8 8 
Minutes of HMC meetings 8 8 
Minutes of EEC meetings 8 8 
Minutes of MTC committee meetings 2 4 
Minutes of nurses meetings 4 6 
Revenue and expenditure reports 8 8 
Hospital investment plans 1 1 
 
 
Non-Participant Observation 
I spent 3.5 months in each of the case study hospitals conducting non-participant observations. These took 
the form of sitting in and observing hospital quarterly budgeting meetings, AWP meetings, senior 
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management meetings and medicines and therapeutic committee meetings. Table 5.4 outlines the types 
and number of meetings I sat in and observed in the two case hospitals. 
 
Table 5. 4: Types and Number of Formal Meetings Observed in the Case Hospitals 
TYPE OF MEETING 
NUMBER OF MEETINGS ATTENDED 
MALINDI COUNTY HOSPITAL PORT REITZ COUNTY HOSPITAL 
Quarterly Hospital Budgets 2 2 
AWP meetings 1 1 
EEC meetings 1 1 
MTC committee meetings - 1 
 
I also spent time with and interacted with hospital workers, and held informal discussions with them 
about priority setting practices in the hospital. During this time, I spent time in key departments/offices 
where priority setting activities took place such as the hospital administrator‘s office, the accounts 
department, the pharmacy department and the nursing department.  The procedure involved ―the 
systematic detailed observation of behavior and talking: watching and recording what people do and say‖ 
(Mays & Pope 1995).  
 
An overt approach to observation was adopted: that is, the hospital staff members were aware of my 
presence and the objectives of the study. However, beyond brief introductions at the start of the meetings, 
I adopted an unobtrusive approach to observation. I used a free note-taking approach aided by a checklist 
whose development was guided by the study‘s conceptual and theoretical framework (Appendix XI). 
 
I found this particular form of data collection very useful in elucidating issues that were either not 
covered or raised in formal interviews. Some subtle realities such as the relationships between actors and 
the expression of actor power that were difficult to capture in documents and interviews also emerged 
over time in observations. 
 
An interesting part of the observations was the informal conversations I had with hospital staff while 
spending time with them. Such interactions occurred both in and out of the hospital. The latter took the 
form of planned and/or chance meetings in social places, lunch or end of working day breaks. It was 
fascinating to observe that staff were often more free and provided vital information during these ―out of 
office‖ informal interactions compared to the information provided during formal work hours or settings. 
This underscores the utility of the prolonged engagement with the hospitals, in line with the case study 
methodology. This time allowed for relationships to form between myself and hospital staff, which made 
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it easier for them to feel comfortable to provide presumably sensitive information.  However this also 
raised ethical dilemmas, as described in more detail below. 
 
The Diary Method 
I documented a personal account of events, feelings, discussions and interactions in the form of an 
unstructured diary during the duration of data collection in the case hospitals (Appendix XII). Qualitative 
diaries are a useful method of data collection in qualitative research given that they give access to rich 
experiences and generate enormous amounts of detail which would otherwise take long periods of 
interviewing. They are also a very useful accompaniment to the observation method, since they allow for 
capturing and documentation of both objective observations and researcher impressions in real time and 
minimize recall bias on the part of the researcher.  
 
5.3.2 Data Management and Analysis  
All recorded interviews were transcribed into MS Word and stored in password protected computers. All 
notes taken during interviews, documents for review, the researcher diary and voice recorders were 
always stored under lock while in the field and even after field work so as to ensure participant 
confidentiality. Interview transcripts were cleaned and, together with field notes, observation summaries 
and documents, imported into NVIVO 10 for coding.  
 
Data were analyzed using a modified framework (thematic) approach. Framework analysis is a process 
that involves identifying connections between the data collected and a pre-determined thematic 
framework by sifting, sorting, coding and charting collected data (Richie & Spencer 1994). This approach 
was adopted so as to provide findings and interpretations that are relevant to policy and also to provide 
pragmatic recommendations. However the approach was modified to include an initial open coding step 
to allow for emergence of important themes which might not have been captured in the study‘s theoretical 
frameworks.  I undertook 5 steps in the analysis namely: familiarization, development of a thematic 
framework (through coding), open and axial coding, charting and finally, mapping and interpretation 
(Richie & Spencer 1994).  
 
a) Familiarization 
Given that I had collected the data myself, I had developed prior knowledge and analytic interests and 
thoughts on the data. However, to gain a deeper familiarity with the data, I actively and iteratively read 
through the interview transcripts, as well as observations and document review notes at the analysis stage 
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while searching for meanings, patterns and ideas, and potential themes. This phase also included the 
taking of notes on ideas for coding that I would then go back to in the subsequent phase. 
 b) Development of a Thematic Framework  
The second step involved the development of a thematic framework which took the form of a coding tree 
(Appendix XIII).  The development of this framework was informed by the study‘s theoretical 
frameworks and the initial thoughts and ideas that emerged from the data.  
Open and axial coding  
The next step involved the production of codes. Coding is regarded as part of analysis  (Miles & 
Huberman 1994) as it involves identifying, organizing and labeling chunks of data in meaningful groups 
(Tuckett 2005). I coded the data in two steps namely open and axial coding. In open coding, concepts and 
ideas that related to lines, sentences and paragraphs of transcripts, documents and observation notes were 
identified and labeled to form open codes. In axial coding, I examined the open codes and grouped them 
into the sub-codes and codes developed from the overarching categories or domains of the thematic 
framework developed in step 2. A schematic of this coding process is provided in appendix XIV.  
Charting  
In the next step I charted the coded data, a process that entailed the reorganization of coded data so as to 
allow the identification of emerging themes. This involved reading through coded data under each 
category of the thematic framework and summarizing the ideas, supported by quotes from the data. 
Charting followed a thematic approach (Richie & Spencer 1994) where individual themes were described 
across respondents or categories of respondents. This process resulted in summaries of ideas on each 
thematic heading drawn from all data sources (interviews, documents, observations, diary notes). An 
excerpt of the chart is provided in appendix XV.  
Interpretation  
I subsequently critically examined the charted data under each thematic category. Interpretation of the 
data entailed identifying key concepts and explaining relationships between these key concepts. Also, it 
entailed explaining relationships between the data and theoretical assumptions and identifying messages 
that are relevant to policy makers.  
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5.4 INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of this inquiry is to produce knowledge that will identify the gaps in priority setting and 
resource allocation practices in Kenyan public hospitals and formulate policy relevant proposals. 
Therefore, a pragmatic interpretive framework seemed fitting for this analysis. Pragmatism as an 
interpretive framework in qualitative research focuses on the outcomes of the inquiry rather than the 
antecedent conditions (as in post positivism) (Creswell 2007). It concerns itself with ―what works‖ and 
therefore seeks to identify solutions to problems (Patton 1990). Pragmatic inquiry therefore does not 
confine itself within specified philosophical assumptions and/or attendant methods, but rather, draws, 
from a range of methods and perspectives to produce knowledge that aids in improving situations 
(Rossman & Wilson 1985; Cherryholmes 1992; Murphy 1990). Powell (2001, p.884) argues: 
―The pragmatist epistemology stands in contrast to prevailing positivist and anti-positivist views 
of scientific discovery. Whereas positivism emphasizes the objective, law-like properties of a 
brute reality independent of observation (Donaldson, 1992; Wicks and Freeman, 1998), anti-
positivism emphasizes the creative role of active, subjective participants, none of whom owns a 
privileged claim on truth (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Astley, 1985; Martin, 1990). Pragmatism, 
on the other hand, rejects positivism, on grounds that no theory can satisfy its demands 
(objectivity, falsify-ability, the crucial experiment, etc.); and rejects anti-positivism, because 
virtually any theory would satisfy them. As such, the pragmatist proposes to reorient the 
assessment of theories around a third criterion: the theory‘s capacity to solve human problems 
(Rorty, 1989; Stich, 1990). To a pragmatist, the mandate of science is not to find truth or reality, 
the existence of which are perpetually in dispute, but to facilitate human problem-solving. 
According to pragmatist philosopher John Dewey, science should overthrow ‗the notion, which 
has ruled philosophy since the time of the Greeks, that the office of knowledge is to uncover the 
antecedently real, rather than, as is the case with our practical judgments, to gain the kind of 
understanding which is necessary to deal with problems as they arise.‖ 
The application of the pragmatic interpretive framework is evident in a number of ways in this study. 
First, the objectives of the study are oriented towards describing, critically examining and evaluating 
priority setting practices with an aim of identifying gaps and proposing solutions. This is in keeping with 
the pragmatic approach that is concerned with problem solving (Rorty 1990; Creswell 2007). Second, in 
the development of an evaluative framework, an integrative approach that draws on a range of paradigms 
and concepts deemed useful was adopted, as opposed to grounding the framework in one priority setting 
paradigm. This is in recognition of the fact that the range of priority setting paradigms available each has 
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something useful to offer. Third, characteristic of the pragmatic approach, the research process employed 
multiple data collection methods and data collection sources (Creswell 2007; Cherryholmes 1992; 
Murphy 1990) including in-depth interviews, document reviews, non-participant interviews and a 
researcher diary. The choice of approach (qualitative case study) and data collection methods was 
informed by their suitability in answering the study questions. Fourth, a modified framework approach 
was employed in the analysis of study data. The framework approach is deductive and is the preferred 
method of analysis when inquiry is aimed at producing policy relevant recommendations (Ritchie & 
Lewis 2003). However this approach was modified to include an inductive component to allow for 
emergence of unanticipated themes.   
 
In this inquiry therefore, the nature of reality (ontological belief) is what is useful or practical, and this 
reality is determined (epistemological belief) by the use of multiple tools of research. Characteristic of 
qualitative research, I recognize that my inquiry is value –laden (Creswell 2007). My values as a 
researcher will therefore be actively reported. The role of values (axiological beliefs) is recognized in this 
thesis, and will be explicated and discussed based on the assumption that the knowledge produced by this 
inquiry reflect both my (the researcher) and participant values. Further, as explained earlier, the research 
process (methodological beliefs) involves multiple approaches in recognition of the utility of the methods. 
 
5 .5 THE ROLE OF MY POSITIONALITY IN THE RESEARCH - REFLEXIVITY 
It is generally recognized that the nature and findings of qualitative inquiry are shaped, to a certain extent, 
by the experiences, world view and theoretical perspective of the researcher (Green & Thorogood 2007; 
Cutcliffe & McKenna 2002). To take into account this influence, the researcher exercises reflexivity 
(Kingdon 2005). It is thought to be an integral process in qualitative research whereby the researcher 
continuously reflects on how their own values, actions and perceptions influence the research process and 
interpretations (Gerrish & Lacey 2006; Kingdon 2005; Pillow 2003). It has been suggested that in being 
reflexive, the researcher‘s self-examination allows biases and assumptions that could affect the study to 
be understood (Morrow 2006). For the researcher, being reflexive entails reflecting upon their  beliefs, 
views and experiences and considering how these might influence the research (Parker 1999). 
 
In reflecting on the likely influence of my perceptions and experiences, it is perhaps likely that my 
academic training, professional experience, formed opinions and views influenced the research process in 
some ways. Whereas I currently look at myself as a health systems researcher based on my position and 
the nature of work that I do as a researcher at the KEMRI-Wellcome Trust research programme in Kenya, 
I initially trained as a pharmacist, and practiced as a hospital pharmacist for 3 years. Of these 3 years, one 
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was spent working for a public hospital and two spent working in a private hospital. This perhaps 
influenced my interest in focusing my research on hospitals and made it more comfortable and easier for 
me to spend a prolonged amount of time (7 months) doing non-participant observations in the study 
hospitals. My perceived professional identity as a pharmacist perhaps had an impact on my interactions 
with hospital staff in the case study hospitals. Researching on an issue that seemed to pit clinicians on the 
one hand against non-clinicians on the other (8. 3), I got the sense that clinicians perceived me to be ―on 
their side‖ and were perhaps more open about their views of non-clinicians. It did not help (or perhaps did 
help!) that in each of the case hospitals, some of the clinicians were my former college mates in medical 
school. The fact that I used multiple methods, beyond interviews, may have improved the trustworthiness 
of the research findings.   
 
During the time that I worked as a pharmacist in hospitals, I developed a keen interest in medicines 
selection processes and took an active, even leading, role in medicines formulary management processes. 
I was especially interested in developing systematic processes for medicines selection in hospitals and 
promoted the use of medicines formulary lists as rationing tools and medicines and therapeutic 
committees (MTCs) as decision making forums for medicine selection and use questions. I was part of the 
MTC in each of the hospitals I worked in and facilitated (as a trainer) trainings where hospital managers 
from across the country (Kenya) were trained on medicines management and specifically the roles of 
formulary lists and MTCs. It could be argued that this experience influenced my pre-conceived view that 
MTCs and formulary lists are important priority setting structures for medicines selection processes.  
 
Further, in the course of doing this work, I developed a keen interest in the use of economic methods in 
decision making and tried to incorporate some form of economic analysis in decision making for 
medicines selection. My interest in economic evaluation drove me to pursue a post graduate degree in 
health economics and launched my research career. The initial research I carried out was a cost-
effectiveness analysis of a complex quality improvement intervention. In what is perhaps a sign of my 
naivety at the time, I imagined that the evidence on the cost-effectiveness of the intervention would 
inform the decision by the country to adopt and scale up the intervention. I found it interesting that the 
intervention was adopted by a number of hospitals even before information on the cost-effectiveness of 
the intervention was available. This and my documented frustration on the use of economic methods to 
evaluate complex interventions (Barasa & English 2010) led me to ask myself; ―how then do hospitals 
make decisions about where to allocate scarce resources?‖. While I held the view (and still do) that 
economic methods are important, my experience led me to realize the importance of other considerations 
in priority setting decision making. This evolution of my thoughts and perceptions led to my interest in 
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priority setting at the hospital level, which forms the focus of this thesis.  The fact that I had experienced 
the inadequacy of the economic approach influenced my inclination for an integrated approach 
(combining consequential and procedural approaches - see 2.3) to priority setting that forms the basis of 
the evaluative framework used in this thesis.  Developing the evaluative framework from a review of 
literature (3.3) I hope strengthens the trustworthiness of the processes.  
 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that my identity, experience and perceptions are likely to influence the 
research process and outcomes. A number of measures were undertaken to ensure rigor and 
trustworthiness of the research, discussed next.  
 
5. 6 ENSURING RIGOR OF THE STUDY METHODS 
I undertook a number of measures to enhance the rigor of study methods and hence maximize the 
trustworthiness of this study. One strategy adopted was the use of theory to inform the inquiry (Gilson 
2012); the reviews chapter (chapter 3) of this thesis has outlined the development of the conceptual 
frameworks that guided the design, data collection and analysis of data. Further, section 5.2 of this 
chapter has presented these conceptual frameworks and theory that has guided the thesis.  
 
Also, a multiple case study design was adopted rather than a single case study. The selection of two cases 
allowed for cross-case analysis and to explore the replication of findings and explanations (Gilson 2012). 
Further, the hospital cases and nested cases within the hospitals were selected purposively to allow the 
initial assumptions of the study to be tested. For example, one of the study assumptions was that resource 
gaps would influence priority setting gaps. In the selection of cases, one of the hospital cases had greater 
resource gaps compared to the other. In obtaining nested cases within hospitals, I selected both informal 
and formal priority setting activities. This was done in an endeavor to ensure that findings of the inquiry 
would be applicable to as wide as possible a range of priority setting activities in hospitals.  The design of 
the study procedures provided for my spending a prolonged amount of time (3.5 months in each case 
hospital) observing, interacting and collecting data in the case hospitals. This prolonged engagement 
allowed me to obtain first hand observation of priority setting practice, to build relationships and trust 
between myself and hospital staff which made it possible to obtain more honest responses from them (Yin 
1999).  
 
I also endeavored to select a wide range of respondents so as to obtain a wide range of perspectives on the 
same phenomena. Senior, middle level managers, frontline practitioners (doctors, clinical officers, 
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pharmacists, nurses, and dentists) and national level decision makers were selected.  Methodological 
triangulation was also used (Yin 1999); I employed several data collection methods, namely in-depth 
interviews, document reviews, non-participant observation and a researcher diary. These triangulations 
allowed for comparing of findings across multiple sources of evidence (Yin 1999). The complementary 
nature of multiple methods of data collection was especially evident in the use of interviews and 
observations. While it was not always possible to elicit responses considered sensitive such as power 
relations between actors, spending time in the hospital observing how actors interacted and related with 
each other provided useful insights into how power and actor relations played out in priority setting 
processes.  
Another way I sought to improve the rigor of the study was to share preliminary findings of the study at 
different stages with research colleagues so as to benefit from their feedback. To this end I presented 
research plans as well as preliminary findings in various forums including in-house research workshops 
and seminars and international workshops and conferences. For example, the data collection tools were 
presented to selected health systems research experts, with knowledge in the topic areas, to assess them 
for face and content validity. Feedback from these exercises was used to modify the tools. Throughout the 
study period colleagues at the KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Research programme engaged in related health 
systems research and I also engaged in what we called ―reflective practice‖ sessions. These were regular 
formalized meetings where we shared our research plans, processes and findings, and discussed and 
interrogated them based on the researchers‘ diverse experiences and findings from their own research. 
This provided further opportunity to assess the trustworthiness of the research and interpretation of 
findings.   
To enable an audit trail of the research activities, I clearly articulated the study procedures and methods in 
a research protocol, with documentation and records of all the research activities and an account of how 
the methods evolved. Lastly, reflexivity was an important part of the research process. Both personal 
reflexivity (critically appraising how my own values, experiences, interests, beliefs and social identity 
have influenced the process and outcome of the research) and epistemological reflexivity (reflecting on 
how the research design and conduct - how the research question was defined, choice of study design and 
methods, why issues are framed in particular ways, investigated in particular ways, and how these 
approaches lead to particular kinds of conclusions) was built into the study process. 
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5. 7 CLAIMS TO GENERALIZABILITY 
One of the aims for conducting health systems and policy research is to build the evidence base to inform 
policy directions. In this regard, it is desirable that research findings in the research setting be useful in 
explaining other similar situations (Grbich 1999). In qualitative inquiry, a distinction has been drawn 
between statistical and analytic generalization (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Yin 2003). While on the one hand, 
statistical generalization infers from a sample the characteristics of the whole population, on the other 
hand, analytic generalization is a direct confrontation of the case study with an established theory (Glaser 
& Strauss 1967). In analytic generalization, previously developed theory is used as a template with which 
to compare the empirical results of the case study (Yin 2003). The theory then becomes the vehicle for 
examining other cases. Replication is claimed if two or more cases are shown to support the same theory 
(Yin 2003). In analytical generalizability, ―insights derived from carefully selected cases, through a 
careful process of analysis, are judged to hold a sufficient degree of universality to be projected to other 
settings‖ (Robson 2002; Gilson 2012). 
 
In this thesis, the aim is to generate findings that have analytical generalizability. The process of analysis 
in the study involves the development of conclusions from detailed findings about context, processes and 
outcomes in two case study settings, which are then lifted to a sufficient level of generality to have 
resonance in a different context (Gilson et al. 2011). A number of strategies were employed by the study 
to enhance analytical generalizability. First, the study is focused by a clearly defined research question. A 
clear and well focused question influences the selection of cases and the kind of data to be collected 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Second, the design of the study is shaped by constructs that were specified a priori 
(5.2.1, 5.2.3). These constructs informed the development of data collection tools and are a key 
component of theory building (Eisenhardt 1989). Third, while the study has a priori constructs, the data 
collection tools and process is designed such that it allows for emergent information (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Fourth, study cases were selected theoretically, to fit in theoretical categories rather than for statistical 
reasons (5.3.1) (Eisenhardt 1989). Fifth, the study employs multiple data collection methods (5.3.1). 
Triangulation made possible by multiple data collection methods provides stronger substantiation of 
findings (Eisenhardt 1989). Sixth, the study is characterized by overlap of data analysis with data 
collection. This iterative and overlapping process of data collection, coding and analysis of data provides 
for freedom to make adjustments during data collection (Eisenhardt 1989). Seventh, analytical 
generalizability is facilitated by the use of theory (5.2.2) to explain the study findings. Eighth, 
comparisons between the two case studies, and between the nested cases also allows for  ―middle range 
theories‖ derived from observations in one case to be tested and revised based on observations in other 
cases (Gilson 2012). Ninth, analytical generalizability is also enhanced by the comparison of emergent 
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concepts with extant literature (Eisenhardt 1989). As a multiple case study, the generalizations of the 
thesis findings are not grounded in the representativeness of the cases selected but rather in a process of 
abstracting from the specifics of one case to ideas that encompass several cases. These conclusions, 
although derived from a limited number of experiences, will provide theoretical insights that can be 
considered and tested similar situations (Gilson et al. 2011).  
 
5. 8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Before commencement of the study, I sought and obtained ethical review and approval from the 
University of Cape Town Faculty of Health Sciences, Human Research Ethics Committee in South Africa 
and the KEMRI ethics review board (Appendix XVI and XVII).  Further, I sought the consent and 
approval of the Ministry of Medical Services of Kenya and obtained a letter of consent from the Coast 
Province director of medical services in Kenya. At the time of the first contact with the study hospitals, I 
clearly explained the study purpose and procedures to the hospital management and obtained verbal 
consent from the hospital‘s medical superintendents. I also explained the study purpose and procedures to 
all participants before conducting interviews, obtaining documents for review or making observations 
(e.g. attending meetings to observe priority setting practices). Participants were also informed that their 
participation was voluntary and that they could decline or withdraw from the study at any time without 
consequences. This was explained in the informed consent forms which were always signed by 
participants before I conducted any formal interviews. Verbal consent to undertake document reviews and 
non-participant observations were obtained from the hospital management.  
 
For protection of hospital and individual participants‘ confidentiality, data collected were anonymized by 
ensuring that names of hospitals and individual participants were not recorded, rather codes were used. 
Specifically, in reporting results from the hospitals, codes rather than the actual names of the hospitals are 
used. Further, a code was developed and used to label the sources of interview quotes that are presented in 
the results (Table 5. 5).  All data that were provided were kept confidential.  Where participants were 
unwilling to be tape recorded, I took notes of their responses. Given that the study was non-experimental 
it was unlikely to cause any physical harm to participants.  It was also explained to the participants that 
while the study had no direct benefits to them, the results will form a useful basis for potential policy 
interventions that will improve the way their institutions plan and manage their resources and hence 
improve their performance in delivering care and meeting the needs of the community they serve.  
 
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
101  
 
 
 
Table 5. 5: Sample Codes used to anonymize sources for interview quotations 
 
SAMPLE CODE MEANING OF CODES 
Hospital A One of the case hospitals 
Hospital B One of the case hospitals 
HASM01 A senior manager in hospital A 
HBML02 A middle level manager in hospital B 
HAFL05 A frontline clinician in hospital A 
 
To ensure the safety of the documents used in this study, all original documentation are kept in a secured 
location at the research site offices and are only available to the researchers concerned with the study.  
 
I however encountered a number of ethical challenges in my work. Some of the information that emerged 
from the study could potentially have a negative impact on individuals within the hospitals if their 
identities were to be exposed. Examples include reports about the competence of some senior managers, 
abuse of office and allegations of corruption (7.3). While I took measures to conceal the identity of 
concerned individuals as explained previously, it can be argued that the thick descriptions associated with 
case study research might still make it possible to identify individuals. The same risk of exposing 
individuals has to be managed when giving feedback of the research findings to the study hospitals. To 
minimize this risk I plan to give feedback on key areas of potential improvement that are cross-cutting 
across the hospitals rather than on behaviors of specific individuals or institutions (the latter would 
implicate individuals). A discussion of these ethical challenges by me and colleagues at the KEMRI-
Wellcome Trust Research Programme who are engaged in related research can be accessed on this link 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTrGNx5PF0k&feature=youtu.be. 
 
5. 9 STUDY LIMITATIONS 
As with any other study, this study has a number of limitations. One of the limitations, consistent with the 
case study approach, is concerns about statistical generalizability. As indicated in section 5.7, statistical 
generalizability is not the intention of case study methodology but rather analytical generalizability. Being 
able to generalize study findings to the population from which a sample is derived (in this case public 
hospitals in Kenya), is problematic when one is observing and examining a phenomena as highly complex 
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and context specific as priority setting. Nevertheless, analytic generalization allows for conclusions about 
relationships (middle-range theories) to be drawn that are transferable to other settings.  
Another limitation of the study is that while the evaluative framework was developed from reviews of 
literature, its‘ components were not tested empirically in the hospitals. The usefulness of the evaluative 
framework would be improved by eliciting the views of stakeholders in healthcare priority setting on the 
suitability of the domains and their relative preference for each. This has been proposed as a further area 
of study (10.3.2).  
The findings and conclusions of the study would have benefited from the views of community members 
in each of the case study hospitals. While hospital managers and frontline health workers were 
interviewed and observed, the views of community representatives were not captured because of logistical 
and resource constraints. It could be argued therefore that ―one side of the story‖ is missing in this 
analysis. The study however set out to understand decision making by hospitals, and in a setting with 
minimal community involvement (9.2.1).  I believe the objectives were adequately addressed even in the 
absence of community interviews.  
Another issue that is perhaps more of a challenge rather than a limitation is that the research was carried 
out at a time when the health system was transitioning to align itself with the new devolved governance 
structure (KPMG 2013). In this situation, there were and still are significant changes going on (Appendix 
XVIII). One could question whether the findings of this study would still be applicable in a more ―stable‖ 
environment, to the extent that such an environment ever exists. To minimize the effect of the relatively 
dramatic changes, the study deliberately targeted the examination of ―micro-practices‖ of decision 
making within the hospital. Such micro-practices, including for example the influence of relationships 
between actors, and the decision making structures and processes, remain largely unchanged in the 
transition.  Also, in line with analytical generalization, this type of inquiry is not so much about reporting 
specific observations (such as structures, processes, actors) but rather about how different configurations 
of these observations interact with and influence the phenomena of interest. Such relationships remain 
relevant and useful even when specific configurations change.  
Another challenge was that during the period of data collection, there were two health worker strikes:  a 
doctors‘ strike followed by a nurses‘ strike, with both agitating for improved remuneration and working 
conditions (Appendix XIX). During this time, it was difficult to secure interviews. Although clinician 
perceptions about their relationships with hospital administration (an issue that came out in the findings 
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(8.3) may have been affected during this period, my prolonged engagement within hospitals, and multiple 
interviews before, during and after the strikes, helped mitigate any extreme distortions. 
 
5. 10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined the design and approach adopted in carrying out this study. I adopted a case 
study approach given its suitability for exploring complex social processes. Two public county hospitals 
were selected as cases for the study. The chapter also describes the procedures used in collecting data, 
which includes in-depth interviews, non-participant observations, and document reviews, as well as 
shares my fieldwork experiences. I also present the conceptual and theoretical frameworks adopted for 
this study. Specifically, I employed frameworks developed in chapter 3 (3.2 and 3.3) to describe and 
evaluate priority setting practices in the case study hospitals, while I used CAS theory to explain the study 
findings. I have also highlighted in this chapter that I adopted a pragmatic interpretive framework for this 
study, given that the findings are intended to distil policy relevant recommendations. Further, the 
measures undertaken to ensure rigor of the methods are presented and ethical considerations described. In 
the next chapter, an overview of the results as well as the analytical choices adopted to interrogate the 
data is presented.  
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CHAPTER VI: RESULTS (PART ONE): 
DESCRIBING PRIORITY SETTING PRACTICES 
IN COUNTY HOSPITALS IN KENYA 
 
6. 1 INTRODUCTION 
n the previous chapter, I described and discussed the methods used to explore the study questions of 
this thesis. I employed a nested case study design, with two county hospitals as the cases, and 3 
priority setting activities in each of the two hospitals as nested cases (5.3.1). In explaining the findings of 
the thesis, I will employ Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) Theory (4.2.3). CAS metaphors have found 
relevance in explaining complex phenomena in healthcare organizations (Begun et al. 2003; Health 
Foundation 2010) and will be used here to explain the observations of the complex relationships between 
actors and components within the case study hospitals. To further unpack the hospital system, the 
framework proposed by Aragon (2010) and adapted by Elloker and colleagues (2012), on organizational 
capacity is relevant (4.2.3). As discussed in chapter 4, this framework, in addition to considering 
hardware components of the healthcare organizations such as infrastructure, technology and resources, 
also recognizes the critical role played by software aspects of the system such as management knowledge 
and skills and organizational systems and procedures (tangible software), and values and norms, 
relationships and power (intangible software) (Elloker et al. 2012).  
 
This thesis will have four results chapters. The first (current) results chapter is a descriptive presentation 
of priority setting practices in the case study hospitals. The second and third results chapters are more 
explanatory and analytical and employ theory to shape the explanations. The last results chapter is 
normative and employs a framework developed in chapter three to evaluate priority setting practices in 
the case hospitals. 
  
In this chapter, I will describe the what and the how of each of the priority setting activities studied, 
highlighting the similarities and differences in how these activities were carried out in the hospitals and 
how this affected the priority setting process. The chapter begins by presenting a brief description of the 
hospital management structure. This is important given that the subject of study, priority setting practices, 
is essentially about decision making, which is a function of the management structures in the hospitals. 
I 
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This is followed by a description of the hospital planning and budgeting process, the hospital medicines 
allocation process and lastly the hospital nursing allocation process. 
 
6. 2 THE HOSPITAL BUDGETING AND PLANNING PROCESS 
The hospital budgeting and planning process is the main priority setting activity in the county hospitals. It 
is the process that, in theory, identifies and selects hospital priority activities and services, and allocates 
available resources against those activities. In the county hospitals, it comprises two distinct but, in 
theory, inter-related activities namely the budgeting process and the annual work plan (AWP) process.  
 
Formally, decision making for priority setting as undertaken by the hospital is highly hierarchical and 
consists of six main decision making levels namely (Figure 6.1):  1) departmental level 2) the hospital 
management team level (HMT) 3) the hospital executive expenditure committee level (EEC) 4) the 
hospital management committee level (HMC) 5) the provincial director of medical services level and (6) 
the central Ministry of Health (MOH) level. I will first present the formal budgeting and planning process, 
followed by how these processes played out in practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 1: Decision Making Structures in Public Hospitals 
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6. 2. 1 The Formal Budgeting and Planning Process in Hospitals
The development of the hospital budget and the AWP is designed to be linked and aligned. At the 
beginning of each government fiscal year (July 1st), hospitals are required to develop and submit AWPs to 
the central MOH for approval. The AWP is a document that outlines the priorities that the hospital has 
identified and earmarked for implementation for a particular year, the activities to be undertaken under 
each of the priorities and the resource requirements for these activities. For example, the hospital 
identifies and selects a number of disease conditions that are considered a priority, selects interventions to 
be implemented that target these diseases, sets annual performance targets for these interventions, and 
identifies resource requirements for their implementation. Hospitals are then required to develop quarterly 
budgets that outline the allocation of available resources to the plans and priorities indicated in the AWPs. 
This is based on financing resources received from all sources. The budgets are therefore expected to be 
linked to the AWPs.  
Regarding the budgeting process, hospitals are expected to develop them at the beginning of every quarter 
and submit to the HMC for review and approval. The HMC is a hospital oversight committee that draws 
members from the community. The hospital is represented in the HMC by the medical superintendent, 
who is also its secretary, and the hospital administrative officer. The role of the HMC is to provide 
oversight of hospital management by members of the community. Its role in the budgeting process is to 
review and give hospital level approval. Budgets approved by the HMC are then required to be submitted 
to the regional level (provincial director of medical services‘ office) who then submits them to the MOH 
for approval. Submitted budgets are accompanied with requests for authority to incur expenditure (AIE) 
which is issued by the MOH, through the provincial director of medical services once the budget had been 
approved. The AIE is a formal written approval by the MOH that gives the hospital authority to access 
and utilize funds based on approved budgets.   
Regarding the AWP process, once again the hospitals are required to develop them and submit to the 
regional level for onward transmission to the MOH for approval. AWP templates are developed by the 
MOH and provided to the hospitals. These templates provide guidelines on what information should be 
included in the AWP and the required format. The key information in the AWP includes 1) hospital 
priority areas 2) priority interventions associated with priority areas 3) annual performance targets and 4) 
a service delivery work plan that outlines the specific activities to be undertaken under each priority 
intervention, the person responsible, the time frames and the costs. 
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A set of guidelines governs the hospital budgeting and AWP process. For budgeting, guidelines target the 
allocation of different sources of monetary resources. The funds that are allocated by the MOH, through 
the hospital management services fund (HMSF) are categorized into development funds and recurrent 
expenditure funds. Development funds are ring fenced for development activities only, such as 
construction or rehabilitation of hospital structures, while recurrent funds are earmarked for recurrent 
expenditures such as electricity and water. Budgeting guidelines for these sources of funds is in the form 
of specified ―vote heads‖. These represent activities, or areas to which funds could be allocated. These 
vote head guidelines also govern the allocation of the facility improvement fund (FIF) which is the 
revenue collected by the hospital from user fees. These guidelines are also enshrined in the MoH AIEs 
issued after budgets have been approved. The budget can only be approved if it adheres to these 
guidelines.  In addition, the allocation and use of FIF is governed by a cost-sharing policy developed by 
the MOH.  
 
The MOH also provides guidelines for the development of hospital AWPs. These are in the form of 
templates and instructions that specify what should be included in the AWP. The AWP templates also 
provide options from which hospitals are required to select disease priorities. The budgeting and planning 
guidelines are available in the hospital; however, the cost sharing guidelines are not. All these planning 
and budgeting guidelines were developed and are enforced by the MOH.    
 
There are no clear guidelines on the roles and terms of the management structures within the hospitals. 
For example, based on discussions with hospital managers in the case study hospitals and also policy 
makers at the national level, there seems to be no official management structure for a public hospital. In 
both case study hospitals, there seems to be confusion over the management organogram. Hospital B for 
example presented two different organograms in their planning documents while Hospital A did not have 
one at all. Even though there is no official organogram in the case hospitals, observations and discussions 
with hospital managers and staff implied the existence of a management structure which was highly 
hierarchical (Figure 6.2). At the lowest level are frontline healthcare workers and non-health staff, who 
are answerable to heads of their respective departments. These heads of departments are middle level 
managers for clinical departments (e.g. pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology), wards (e.g. adult male, 
adult female and pediatrics), non-clinical departments (e.g. pharmacy and laboratory) and support 
departments (e.g. accounts and maintenance) and are answerable to the three senior hospital managers 
namely the medical superintendent, the hospital administrator and the hospital nursing officer in-charge. 
The medical superintendent is the chief executive of the hospital and is responsible for the overall running 
of the hospital. The hospital nursing officer in charge is in charge of the nursing department and hence all 
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nursing ward in charges. The hospital administrative officer is in charge of all the hospital non-clinical 
departments. The public hospital is thus seen here to be a complex system with multiple actors and groups 
of actors whose interactions will be explored in subsequent chapters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 2: Hospital Organogram 
 
The role of these management structures with regard to the budgeting and the AWP processes is also not 
clear. For example, the role of the departmental managers in the budgeting and planning for the hospital is 
not specified in any guideline. Neither are the constitution of the HMT and EEC or their roles in hospital 
planning and budgeting. In practice therefore, the hospital budgeting and planning process played out 
differently in both case study hospitals.  
 
6. 2.2 The Hospital Budgeting and Planning in Practice 
A number of issues stood out as problematic in the hospital planning and budgeting process in the case 
study hospitals (Table 6.1), which will be discussed in turn.  
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Table 6. 1 Key features of the hospital budgeting and planning process in case study hospitals 
KEY FEATURES HOSPITAL A HOSPITAL B 
Alignment of the budgeting and 
planning process 
Hospital budgets and AWPs are not linked or aligned  
Roles of hospital committees 
Actual budgeting conducted by 
the EEC 
Actual budgeting conducted by 
the HMT 
Deliberation 
Limited deliberation in budget 
making 
Deliberation in budget making 
Decision making criteria  Both formal and informal criteria used 
 
Alignment of the Budgeting and Planning Process  
While the budgeting and planning process is expected to be linked and synchronized, in practice, this is 
not the finding in both case study hospitals. Ideally, it is expected that the AWP process precedes the 
budgeting process and outlines activities and priorities for the next year. The budgeting process then 
follows and draws from the AWP to budget for these activities quarterly. 
 
HBSM03:―These two processes are supposed to be related. The quarterly budgets are supposed to 
be based on activities that have been planned for in the AWP. But this is not how it happens‖ 
 
In practice, these two activities appear to be separate and unrelated in both case study hospitals. First, they 
are led by different managers (the medical superintendent and the hospital administrative officer for the 
budgeting process and the hospital nursing officer in charge for the AWP process) and also attract a 
different set of actors. While the budgeting process has the prominent participation of senior managers 
(the EEC), the AWP process is left largely to the middle level managers (HMT) with seemingly little 
interest from most of the senior managers. As will become clear in the next chapter, this emergent 
property of the hospital is a result of, amongst other things, the lack of perceived importance and 
relevance of the AWP process in both case study hospitals (7.4). Second, the AWP is developed almost 
one quarter into the planning year, while the budgets are always developed on time at the beginning of 
every quarter. This means that the first budget of the year is often developed without the existence and 
hence any reference to the AWP. Subsequent budgets are also developed without reference to the AWP. 
The result is that activities budgeted for in the quarterly budgets are dissimilar to activities planned and 
budgeted for in the AWP. The general observation was that very few managers know what is contained in 
the AWP, very few participate in the process, and hardly any care about implementing the AWP. The 
result is that the AWP is hardly implemented by the hospital. Managers in both case hospitals reported 
that the AWP is rarely referred to for implementation in the course of the planning year. 
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HAML11: ―They come and tell us that they have been given a deadline by the ministry 
[MOH]….that the AWP needs to be filled and sent to the province by this date. So people just fill 
the template very fast but they don‘t even know what they are putting in the plans. If you ask 
people ‗okay you did the AWP some three months ago do you remember what you did?‘ Most of 
the people don‘t have an idea. They‘ll tell you ‗we did it and it has already been sent to the 
province. We finished that business‘‖ 
HBSL005:  ―We don‘t even attend the meetings because they are useless. There are too many 
delays by the ministry bureaucracy. By the time we are preparing the AWP, one quarter is already 
gone so how useful can it be?‖ 
A second observation was that there are no clear guidelines on the roles of the different decision making 
structures in the hospital with regard to the budgeting. This will be discussed next. 
Roles of Hospital Committees 
In both case hospitals, heads of each hospital department are required to consult with the members of their 
departments and develop departmental budgets. These are then presented by the departmental heads to the 
quarterly HMT meeting. In both case study hospitals, the HMT committee is comprised of all 
departmental heads in the hospital and is chaired by the medical superintendent. However, the roles of the 
EEC vis-à-vis that of the HMT in the budgeting process differ in the case study hospitals. In Hospital A, 
departmental budgets are presented in the HMT, but the actual budgeting and allocation of hospital 
resources to departments and services is carried out by the EEC. The EEC is a smaller, more exclusive 
committee that is composed of selected (perceived to be senior) heads of departments in the hospital 
namely the medical superintendent, the nursing officer in charge, the pharmacist in charge, the 
accountant, the hospital administrative officer and the procurement officer. In Hospital B, the HMT not 
only receives departmental budgets, but also develops hospital budgets.  This means that more actors are 
involved in the budgeting process in hospital B than in hospital A. This, as we shall see in subsequent 
chapters, has a significant influence in the priority setting processes in the case study hospitals (8.2).  The 
inclusivity of priority setting processes is closely related to the extent of deliberation, discussed next.  
Deliberation and Consultation 
The process of presenting departmental budgets is quite different in the case hospitals. In Hospital A, the 
presentation of departmental budgets appears to be a mere formality and provides limited room for 
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deliberation. The departmental heads in this hospital submit hand written or typed budgets which are not 
deliberated upon in the meeting.  
 
HAML12: ―We don‘t really discuss the budget, we just write them down and give it to them 
[senior managers]. I have not seen people discussing anything‖ 
 
In Hospital B however, the HMT meetings allow for greater deliberation and discussion. Departmental 
heads are asked to justify their budgets, which are then discussed by the rest of the members in 
attendance. The HMT then considers the available funds, vis-à-vis departmental budgets and justifications 
and develops the hospital budget.  
 
HBML009: ―We present budgets and people are asked to say why they need the money. At least 
we get to understand why a departments budget is like this or like that. People also see why for 
example they are going to get less than what they asked for….because we also discuss what 
[resources] is available and how much departments can get‖ 
 
Decision Making Criteria  
In both case study hospitals, criteria used to allocate budgets can be classified into formal and informal. 
Formal criteria are objective criteria that are used explicitly by hospital decision makers to determine how 
the hospital budget is allocated across departments and/or services. Informal criteria refer to subjective 
considerations, which are often implicitly employed, that influence priority setting practices in hospitals. 
To get an idea of the prominence of criteria used in the case study hospitals, I developed a word cloud by 
identifying decision making criteria mentioned in interview transcripts and the number of times they were 
mentioned (Figure 6.3). A word cloud pictorially represents the prominence of words based on how 
frequently they appear in a text. The larger the font, the more frequently the word appears and vice versa. 
The criteria identified will be discussed next.  
 
Formal Criteria 
In both case study hospitals, the dominant criterion used to allocate budgets to hospital departments and 
services is the revenue generating potential of the departments (Figure 6.3). Departments or services that 
generated more revenue from user fees collections are prioritized over departments that generate less 
revenue and subsequently received a larger share of the hospital budget. For example, the maternity and 
surgical departments are key revenue generators in the hospital. This is because surgeries attract higher 
user fees than other services offered by the hospital. The maternity department is responsible for the 
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highest number of surgeries in the form of caesarian sections.  The physiotherapy department on the other 
hand collects very little revenue compared with other departments in the hospital. The maternity and 
theater departments are therefore always assured of a larger share of the hospital budget, while the 
physiotherapy department complained of systematic underfunding.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 3: Word Cloud of Criteria used to set priorities in county hospitals 
 
The reason given for using the revenue generating potential of departments as the key determinant of 
allocations is that the hospitals experienced a severe scarcity of resources and relied on user fee collection 
to finance their day to day operations. To make sure that the hospital continued to run, resources have to 
be allocated in a manner that assures further generation of revenues: 
 
HASM003: ―Before we allocate money to any department, we first consider the amount of 
revenue they generate…‖ 
 
HBML13: ―The hospital generates very little money which means priorities have to change…. So 
first we want to make money, we allocate where we can make money……‖ 
 
As we shall see in the next chapter, this is an adaptive process of the hospital system that has a significant 
impact on priority setting processes. 
 
Historical budgeting also features prominently among criteria used by managers to allocate budgets 
across departments in both hospitals. Departments often receive the same budgetary allocation or 
increments to previous year‘s budgets: 
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HBML07: ―We consider what was allocated last year…how much did you allocate pharmacy? 
KES 500,000 [USD 5882] okay this time lets allocate KES 600,000 [USD 7059]…….it‘s 
historical‖ 
 
Managers also consider the extent of necessity of a service in making budgetary allocation decisions. 
Services are considered essential if the hospital cannot run without them. For example, it is thought that 
the hospital cannot run without medicines. The pharmacy department is hence always considered a 
priority. Essential hospital supplies are also considered in this category: 
 
HASM04: ―We consider those services which are very essential…these are the ones that if we 
miss then the hospital will not run. For example if we do not have non-pharmaceutical supplies, 
this hospital will not run because we know that for you to touch the patient you need to have 
gloves‖ 
 
How essential a service is also seems to be related to the public‘s perception about the service: 
 
HBML14: ―Obviously there are some areas that have to get significant allocations for the hospital 
to be able to run or to be able to be seen to be running….for example how will the public feel if 
the mortuary were to collapse?‖ 
 
The perceived medical need in the hospital‘s catchment area is also a determinant of hospital allocations. 
The need is however based on the volume of patients seeking different services at the hospital rather than 
any formally assessed need in the community.  
 
HBML19: ―We consider what affects us most in our community, is this type of disease, this type 
of health problem common here? We base these on our medical records….‖ 
 
Other formal criteria used include international and national priorities such as the Millennium 
Development Goals, feasibility of implementing the service, and affordability of proposed services. While 
these formal criteria are used in both case study hospitals, differences in decision making lay in the use of 
informal criteria, which will be presented next.  
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Informal Criteria 
Use of Informal Criteria in Hospital A 
In Hospital A, a number of informal criteria influence the allocation of resources across the departments. 
First, managers feel that how vocal departmental heads are, or their lobbying and bargaining ability, has a 
direct influence on whether or not their department get allocated resources. Managers that are more vocal 
during meetings and make ―a lot of noise‖ are rewarded with allocations while the departments of 
managers that are not very vocal are often neglected.  
HAML09: ―You see you can have a head of department who is not very vocal and does not 
articulate your needs as well as they should….some departments…they seem to always get more 
than others….it all depends on how eloquent and convincing the head of department presents his 
proposals‖  
Resource allocation is also dependent on interpersonal relationships and mutual benefit between the 
middle-level managers and the senior managers. Middle level managers that enjoy a good relationship 
with the senior managers are likely to get better allocation compared to those that do not.  
HAML10: ―Allocations depend on your relationship with the hospital administrators….I mean in 
life sometimes things work because of relationships right? You are a friend of mine and we get 
along well so I will allocate something to you‖ 
Middle level managers at Hospital A also feel that allocations always favor the senior managers who are 
part of the EEC. They feel that the EEC members always allocate to their own departments more 
resources, leaving few resources for other departments. The use of these informal criteria is made possible 
in hospital A because, as pointed out previously, there is little deliberative space in the budgeting process 
in the hospital. Given that actual allocation decisions are made by a small group of senior managers 
(EEC), this provides an opportunity for the EEC managers to leverage on their unique position to favor 
their departments and the departments of those they enjoy good relationships with. This also means that 
only the ―brave‖ and outspoken middle level managers have a chance to be heard.   
The use of Informal Criteria in Hospital B 
The situation is different in Hospital B where the middle level managers, through the HMT, are 
empowered to make allocation decisions. While managers in this hospital also feel that the bargaining and 
lobbying ability of managers has an influence, the general feeling is that favoritism does not influence 
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decisions. Each manager is given a chance to justify their requirements and all managers get a chance to 
contribute to the debate on how the limited resources can be allocated across departments.  
 
HBML08: ―I can say that there‘s no favoritism and all that. Everyone presents their needs in the 
meeting [HMT] and we try to give something to everyone even though it is not enough‖ 
 
The result is that while in Hospital A managers generally feel that the allocation decisions are unfair, in 
Hospital B the feeling is that allocations are relatively fair.   
 
HBML14: ―We don‘t get all that we need but I can say that the budgeting is fair. The medical 
superintendent ensures there is equity. At least each department gets something small‖  
 
A description of the medicine selection process will be presented next. 
 
6. 3 THE MEDICINES SELECTION PROCESS 
Another priority setting activity that I examined in the case hospitals was the medicines selection process. 
In this thesis, medicines selection refers to the decision making process that determines the type and 
quantities of medicines that will be procured and made available in the hospital. As in the previous 
section, I will first present the formal medicines selection process in public hospitals followed by a 
presentation of the process in practice in the case study hospitals.  
 
6. 3.1 The Formal Medicines Selection Process 
Hospitals are supposed to obtains medicines from two main sources, the Kenya Medical Supplies Agency 
(KEMSA), which is a government owned central medicines procurement and supplies agency, and from 
local private suppliers of medicines.  Hospitals are required to procure medicines from KEMSA every 
two months, using prescribed forms that are provided by KEMSA. There are no official guidelines on the 
procedure to be used for medicine selection decisions in hospitals. The MOH has however provided two 
instruments that are supposed to guide the medicine selection process in public hospitals. The first one is 
the Medicines and Therapeutic Committee (MTC). The MTC is a multidisciplinary committee whose role 
is to provide guidance on medicine management issues in the hospital. These roles include formulary 
management, a process whereby decisions are made about which drugs should be made available to the 
hospital and monitoring the use of medicines in the hospital. The chair of the committee is supposed to be 
a clinician and the secretary is the hospital pharmacist in charge. The rest of the committee should be 
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comprised of clinical heads of departments. The MOH provides for the establishment of MTC‘s in 
hospitals, and has developed guidelines that outline the establishment and roles of these committees.  
 
The second instrument provided to guide the selection of medicines is the essential medicines list (EML). 
This is a list of medicines that are considered essential for the provision of healthcare in public hospitals 
and is thus used as a rationing tool for medicines in the public health sector. Only medicines listed in the 
EML should be procured by the MOH and made available by KEMSA for distribution to public health 
facilities. Hospitals medicines selection decisions are therefore restricted by the EML for orders made to 
KEMSA. The hospital is however not restricted by the EML for medicines it procures from local private 
medicines suppliers.  
 
6.3.2 The Medicines Selection Process in Practice 
In both case hospitals, the selection of medicines to be procured by the hospital is done every two months 
for medicines to be procured from KEMSA and quarterly for medicines to be procured locally from local 
private suppliers. Based on views of managers in both hospitals and from document reviews, KEMSA is 
the main source often comprising about 80% of the total hospital medicine procurement needs in terms of 
volume. In both hospitals, the pharmacist prepares a list of the medicine needs of the hospital and then 
places an order to KEMSA for medicines that are available from KEMSA, and forwards another list to the 
procurement manager for the procurement of medicines (not available from KEMSA) from local private 
medicine suppliers. Purchase of medicines from local private medicine suppliers is therefore used to 
supplement KEMSA supplies. Key features of the medicines selection process in the case study hospitals 
are outlined in table 2 and will be discussed in turn. 
 
Table 6. 2: Features of the medicines selection process in the hospitals 
KEY FEATURES HOSPITAL A HOSPITAL B 
Consultation and deliberation Limited consultation Increased consultation 
Status of the medicines and therapeutic 
committee 
MTC inactive MTC active 
Existence and use of a medicines 
formulary 
No local medicines 
formulary 
Presence of a local medicines 
formulary 
Medicines selection criteria Use of both formal and informal criteria 
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Consultation and Deliberation 
A key feature of the medicine selection process in the case study hospitals is the extent of consultation. 
Based on observations and views expressed by respondents, it seemed that the medicines selection 
process in Hospital A was less consultative than in Hospital B.  
 
Consultation and Deliberation for Medicines Selection Decisions in Hospital A 
In Hospital A, the pharmacist only consults with some of the managers of clinical departments to 
determine the medicine needs of their respective departments. The departmental heads prepare lists of 
medicines needed in their departments and forward it to the pharmacist who in turn uses it to prepare a list 
of medicines to be procured both from local private medicine suppliers and KEMSA. The consultation of 
departmental managers is seen as a useful process because it provides an opportunity for the medical 
needs of the departments to be taken into consideration. 
 
HAML16: ―I like it when the pharmacist consults; they always ask me ‗what do you need? What 
can I buy for you?‘ So she always involves me when doing her orders. This happens maybe twice 
every quarter. At the beginning of every quarter when she needs to order something she always 
comes to ask what I need.‖ 
 
This consultation however does not involve all the managers of clinical departments. Managers of some 
clinical departments complained that they are rarely consulted by the pharmacist in medicines selection 
decisions. This lack of consultation resulted in the medicine needs of their departments not being factored 
into medicine selection. These departments often go without essential medicines because of this.  
 
HAML12:―We always ask why we [managers] are not consulted when they‘re ordering drugs. 
This is why we don‘t get the drugs that we need at the wards, why we don‘t have these drugs in 
the pharmacy. It is because we are not consulted.‖ 
 
Front line clinicians in Hospital A also complained that they are never consulted on medicines selection 
decisions and that this often results in reduced availability of needed medicines in the hospital.  
 
HAFL21: ―We [clinicians] are never consulted. I‘ve never seen any consultation between 
pharmacy and the user departments. It‘s like we wait for them to order then we just try and use 
whatever they have brought. It affects the departments because for example some of the drugs 
that are very essential in this department [maternity] are out of stock for so long like ‗magnesium 
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
118  
sulphate‘ and ‗Buscopan‘. It‘s like they are never ordered nowadays in the hospital and yet they 
are very essential. Now we have to keep telling the mothers to buy them outside the hospital 
[from private pharmacies]. If we‘re consulted we‘ll be able to give the list of the drugs we really 
require which we feel we cannot do without instead of telling the patients to go and buy. ‖ 
Departmental heads and clinicians in Hospital A feel that consultations are necessary between the 
pharmacy departments and the clinical department. They feel that the lack of consultations results in the 
pharmacy department stocking non-essential medicines while missing the essential ones. Consultations 
between the pharmacy department and the clinical department would provide a platform for the 
departments to request medicines that are essential and help the pharmacy department to order essential 
medicines. 
HAML13: ―There is need for the user departments to be consulted because it‘s like we are just in 
darkness. It‘s like the two departments [pharmacy and clinical departments] are there but there is 
no consultation going on between them. You will find that the [clinical] departments suffer at the 
end of the day because the pharmacy orders and stocks drugs which are not essential in the 
hospital. If they consulted us, they would be able to order the essential ones‖ 
Consultation and Deliberations for Medicines Selection Decisions in Hospital B 
The situation is however different in Hospital B, where it was reported that the hospital pharmacist 
regularly consults with departmental managers on medicines selection decisions. The deliberation in 
Hospital B is enhanced by the fact that the hospital has an active and inclusive MTC, as described in the 
following section.  
The Status of the Medicines and Therapeutic Committee 
The contrast in the level of consultation between the two hospitals was perhaps contributed to by the 
status of the MTC in these hospitals. 
The Status of the Medicines and Therapeutic Committee in Hospital A 
In Hospital A the MTC is dysfunctional and meets only infrequently. Whereas the MoH guidelines 
stipulate that the MTC is required to have meetings at least once every quarter, the Hospital A MTC had 
not met for over a year at the time of this study. The hospital managers do not have knowledge of the role 
of the committee, and those that are not committee members do not have knowledge of its existence. A 
number of reasons were given to explain the state of the MTC at Hospital A. First, there is lack of 
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leadership for the committee. The chairman of the committee is a consultant physician who has since left 
the hospital to pursue further studies. His position has not been filled and so, given that the responsibility 
of calling for meetings rests with the chairman of the MTC, no meeting has been held for over a year.  
 
HAML07: ―It has been hard for the committee [MTC] to meet…you know the chairman is not 
even there, he left for studies a year ago and we don‘t have a new chairman‖ 
 
Second, the committee at Hospital A is mainly comprised of senior clinicians (consultants). These 
clinicians often have private practice alongside their public jobs and so hardly have time to take part in 
hospital administrative/management activities.  
 
HASM03:―The problem with the MTC is that most of its members are consultants. [A] is a small 
town and so the consultants are very busy with their private clinics as well since they are the only 
ones in [Hospital A].  It is very frustrating because every time I try to organize for meetings, they 
tell me that they are busy and not available to attend the meetings. This makes it difficult because 
I cannot have the meetings without the majority of the committee members.‖ 
 
Third, hospital managers feel that the senior management staff do not support the activities of the MTC. 
For example, the senior management does not organize for staff cover whenever clinicians were 
scheduled to attend MTC meetings. This makes it difficult for clinicians to attend meetings because they 
cannot leave their work stations unattended to attend the meetings. Hospital managers also stated that the 
hospital administration does not support the meetings by for example providing rooms for the meetings or 
refreshments as they do for other hospital meetings. This leads the committee members to feel like the 
administration does not appreciate the importance of the MTC and therefore discourages the committee 
members from actively participating in committee activities: 
 
HAML08: ―They [administration] do not care about our [MTC] meetings. They do not give us 
rooms to meet, and do not even give us refreshments. When I asked for someone else to stand in 
for me at the clinic so I can attend the meeting, they did not give me someone, so I cannot attend 
the meetings.‖ 
 
Fourth, the hospital managers and specifically the MTC committee members do not appreciate the 
importance of the MTC and are not fully aware of the role of the MTC. This is because most of the 
committee members have not received any form of training or sensitization on the roles and functions of 
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the MTC. While the government has a standardized training for MTC‘s, very few hospital managers have 
gone through this training. This is made worse by the unavailability of physical copies of the MTC 
guidelines in the hospital. While the guidelines are available online on the MOH website, hospital staff 
have limited internet access: 
 
HAML16: ―If you have a committee and the members of the committee have not been sensitized 
on the need to have such a committee then the committee will not succeed. People should be 
aware of the mandate, expectations and the benefits of having such a committee. Also there is 
need for support from the hospital management. Sometimes you want to have a meeting and you 
need some logistical issues…. some small things like maybe a soda or a snack or something like 
that but you don‘t get it. But I think the biggest factor is the sensitization. The members are not 
aware of the usefulness of such a forum‖ 
 
The Status of the Medicines and Therapeutic Committee in Hospital B 
The situation is different in Hospital B. The MTC in this hospital is very active and functional and meets 
every two months. The committee has very strong leadership from the medical superintendent who is also 
the chairman of the committee. Based on the meetings that I attended and the minutes of the previous 
meetings, the medical superintendent is often available and present in MTC meetings. Contrary to the 
observation in Hospital A, the MTC at Hospital B appears to me to have a healthy mix of senior 
(consultant) clinicians and junior clinicians. Given that the junior clinicians are more available compared 
to the senior ones, it is possible for the MTC to get a quorum with adequate representation from clinical 
departments during meetings. Also the fact that the medical superintendent is also the chairman gives 
significant administrative support to the committee. The meetings for example are often held in the 
medical superintendent‘s office. During MTC meetings, clinicians and departmental heads get a chance to 
discuss their medicines need and contribute to decisions over what medicines should be stocked by the 
hospital. 
 
Use of a Medicines Formulary 
One of the significant contributions the MTC in Hospital B has made to medicines selection processes in 
the hospital is the development of a hospital formulary. While in Hospital A, the hospital is guided by the 
national essential medicines list (EML), in Hospital B there is active discussion about developing a local 
formulary list that would guide the procurement and use of medicines in the hospital. The MTC has 
developed a draft formulary and was in the process of revising and finalizing it at the time of this study.  
While the national EML guides the procurement of medicines from KEMSA, the hospital formulary 
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would guide the selection and procurement of medicines from local suppliers. It was felt that a local 
formulary would be more responsive to the local medicine needs of the hospital.   In practice however, 
given that Hospital A has not developed its own medicines formulary list, the hospital pharmacist 
reported that procurement of medicines from local suppliers is also in part guided by the EML.  
 
Criteria for Medicines Selection 
In both hospitals, a range of criteria are used to make decisions about what medicines to procure. One of 
the criteria used is the revenue generating potential of the medicine. The hospital pharmacists reported 
that they place high priority on medicines that can be sold to clients and generate revenue for the hospital.  
They therefore procure medicines that are in high demand in the hospital and medicines for adults. For 
example, low priority is placed on medicines for children given that public hospitals are not allowed to 
charge any user fees for the provision of services to children under five: 
 
HBSM04: ―For me to generate revenue , I have to stock fast moving medicines that I can sell to 
the users. I therefore mostly order drugs that are required in the private pharmacy. Medicines 
such as syrups for children are not supposed to be sold to the users and hence do not generate any 
revenue for the hospital‖ 
 
The demand for the medicines, reflected by the disease patterns and prescription trends in the hospitals is 
also a significant determinant of medicines selection decisions. The pharmacists reported ordering 
medicines that are of high demand, and that are indicated for the most common diseases in the hospital.   
Another criterion that is used by both hospitals is the availability of the medicines with local medicines 
suppliers. Local availability of selected medicines is considered so as to assure sustainable supply of the 
medicines. Also the costs/affordability of the medicines is a major criterion, given that the hospitals have 
resource constraints, and the budgets allocated to the pharmacy for medicines procurement is not 
sufficient.  
 
HBSM04: ―First of all it‘s the cost of the drug, it should fit in our budgets because we have a very 
small budget, second availability of the drug in the local market so that supply is guaranteed and 
thirdly the demand for the drug in the hospital because I cannot stock something that will not be 
used‖ 
 
In both hospitals, the pharmacist also reported that they place high priority for medicines required by 
what they termed ―essential departments‖. It appeared that the term essential departments encapsulates 
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two key criteria and slightly differs between the two hospitals. The first criterion, which is used in both 
hospital A and B, is ―rule of rescue‖; high priority is given to theater and maternity departments because 
they handle emergencies compared to departments that do not. In Hospital A however, as shall be 
explored in a subsequent chapter on actor and power dynamics, a second criterion that is used is the 
perceived influence or power of the managers. High priority is placed on departments that are headed by 
senior managers who have greater power and authority over the pharmacist. For example the theater 
department receives special attention because it was headed by the medical superintendent. The 
pharmacist reported that if she makes sure that these departments had their medicines, she would be ―at 
peace‖: 
HASM04: ―I give priority to essential departments. I know that at least theater and maternity 
should not miss the medicines that they require. Those two departments are the ones which can 
stress me the most. For example, theatre machines run on Isoflurane [anaesthetic], if I miss 
Isoflurane and the medical superintendent is the one who works there he cannot operate on 
anyone, so I know that is a very big problem. Then in maternity I know if I miss something like 
Amoxycillin or IV metronidazole [antibiotics] that will be a major issue for the mothers…..for the 
other departments the patients can go and buy medicines outside the hospital, they‘ll survive. If 
those departments don‘t have a problem, I am stress free honestly. But once there is just 
something wrong in that department…there is a problem in the pharmacy‖  
The third priority setting activity that I examined in the case study hospitals is the allocation of human 
resources across departments. This will be presented next. 
6. 4 HOSPITAL NURSING ALLOCATION PROCESS
In this thesis, nursing allocation refers to the decision making process for the allocation of nursing staff to 
the different service delivery departments of the hospital. I will first present the formal nursing allocation 
process in public hospital followed by what was observed in practice in the case study hospitals. 
6. 4.1 The Formal Nursing Allocation process
Public hospitals are provided with nursing staff by the MOH. The MOH interviews and hires nurses 
centrally and then deploys them to public hospitals in different parts of the country. The MOH is also 
responsible for the remuneration of nursing staff in all public hospitals. The number of nurses sent to 
public hospitals by the MOH is determined by the workload of the hospital. This workload formula 
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considers the hospital bed capacity, admission and outpatient visit numbers as well as guidance from the 
MOH norms and standards for health service delivery (Ministry of Health 2006). The MOH obtains 
hospital workload information from hospital reports such as service delivery and utilization reports and 
human resource reports. 
HASM03: ―Deployment of nurses is based on hospital needs. I send hospital reports every time. 
For example when we expand our bed capacity we have to report it. I send reports of how many 
nurses I have, how I have located them and the deficit…the gap that I have.‖ 
While the MOH is responsible for allocation of nurses to hospitals, the hospital is responsible for the 
allocation of nurses across departments within the hospital. The MOH has in place nursing guidelines that 
specify the staffing norms and standards that should be used in the allocation of nurses to the various 
hospital departments. These staffing norms are based on workload considerations. There are no guidelines 
however on the process of nursing allocation within hospitals. 
6. 4.2 The Nursing Allocation in Practice
In addition to the nurses allocated by the MOH, the two case study hospitals also rely significantly on 
nursing interns and students on attachment to supplement nursing staff shortages.  
HBSM03: ―We are very grateful to schools that send their students here for attachment because 
they plug the staffing gaps in the hospital. Otherwise the workload would have been just too 
much for the nurses‖ 
In both case study hospitals nursing allocations occur in the form of major reshuffles and mini reshuffles. 
Major reshuffles, where all nursing staff are re-deployed from their current departments to other 
departments, are carried out in Hospital A every 3 years and in Hospital B every 1 year. Mini reshuffles 
occur whenever nurses are transferred by the MOH from one hospital to another. 
A number of features of the nursing allocation practice in case hospitals are outlined in table 6.3 and will 
be discussed in turn. 
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Table 6. 3: Features of the Nursing Allocation Process in the Case Hospitals 
 
KEY FEATURES HOSPITAL A HOSPITAL B 
Consultation and deliberation Increased consultation  Limited consultation 
Compliance with staffing norms 
Staffing norms were not complied with due to resource scarcity 
 
Nursing allocation criteria Use of both formal and informal criteria 
 
 
Level of Consultation 
In both case hospitals, it was reported that the nursing officer in charge is the main actor in the nursing 
allocation decisions. Other actors in the decision making process are the deputy nursing officer in charge, 
the nursing officer in charge of the different wards in the clinics, departmental heads of clinics and ward 
consultants.  
 
HAML07: ―The main actor is our nursing officer in charge. Also the nursing officer in charge of 
the clinical areas and ward. But she‘s the main actor, the nursing officer in charge of the hospital 
and her deputy‖ 
 
―The matron [nursing officer in charge] and her deputy just reshuffle. Sometimes she does it on 
her own without even involving the deputy‖ 
 
The level of consultation over allocation decisions varies between the case study hospitals and is always 
informal. In Hospital A, it was reported that the nursing officer in charge consults with her deputy and the 
heads of all clinical departments and wards. In Hospital B however, it was reported that the nursing 
officer in charge consults with only a select group of in charges and excluded the rest of the departmental 
heads.  
 
HBML17: ―She does not consult us, maybe just the few nurses around her. For us, you just come 
to work one day and find a new nurse. Then you are told that there has been a reshuffle. We are 
not consulted.‖ 
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Compliance with Staffing Norms 
In both case study hospitals, the numbers allocated to each area do not meet the staffing norms‘ 
recommended ratios because of a severe shortage of nurses. While these guidelines are available at the 
national level, they were not available in both case study hospitals.  
 
HASM03: ―We also have the nursing council guidelines of workload. For example ICU, HDU, 
you are supposed to have a ratio of one nurse to one patient. While in the general ward is one 
nurse to six patients. So the definition of workload has been standardized by the nursing council‖ 
 
Criteria used to Allocate Nurses in the Hospital 
The same criteria are used in both case study hospitals to determine the number of nurses that are 
allocated to the clinical areas in the hospital (clinics and wards). The main criterion that was cited by 
hospital managers is the workload in the ward or clinical area. An area that has a higher workload is 
allocated more nurses compared to an area with a lower workload. The workload of a clinical area is 
defined in terms of number of patients that are seen and/or admitted in the clinical area. This is 
determined by the capacity of the area (for example bed capacity of a ward) and the utilization level of the 
service offered by the area. Sometimes it is also be determined by the availability of the professionals to 
offer the service. Workload is also defined by the nursing guidelines developed by the Nursing Council of 
Kenya.  
 
HBSM03: ―We used to have a surgeon who used to operate most on male patients. So we used to 
have a bigger workload in male ward. But when he went for his studies, the workload in the male 
ward reduced. So the nurses were also reduced‖  
 
The workload is also determined by the nature of tasks routinely performed in the area and the level of 
effort required to perform the tasks. For example, the general feeling in both hospitals is that the 
maternity ward and the intensive care unit have a higher workload than other wards because of the nature 
of tasks carried out in this area.  
 
HAML14: ―In the maternity unit, the procedures are hard. They are long, they are tedious. 
Conducting a delivery is not like dressing a wound. It is not like feeding a patient. A delivery is a 
very long process. It‘s a long involving procedure. So the maternity workload is high.  Also the 
maternity unit has about five wards in one unit, there is labour ward, antenatal ward, post natal 
ward, the acute room and the NBU. So maternity has to have more, more nurses‖ 
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HBML12: ―In the ICU you may have one patient but because the patient is very critical definitely 
it requires a lot of work. Then in other places like the pediatric ward, you may have a big number 
of patients, but most of the children are with their mothers. So the mothers help out with some of 
the tasks like feeding. This is unlike a ward like the female or male adult wards where you [the 
nurse] may need to feed the patient yourself‖ 
Another criterion that influences the allocation of nurses across hospital departments is the presence of 
emergencies.  This rule of rescue consideration resulted in more nurses allocated to maternity and theater 
compared to other departments.  
HAML18: ―The nature of cases admitted in a particular area have an effect on how many nurses 
are allocated to that department. For example, maternity is a priority area. It is a life and death 
issue. This is because if they are not attended to properly, there is a chance of losing a mother or 
the unborn child. So these areas get more nurses‖  
HASM03: ―We handle emergencies at the maternity ward. That‘s why we have more nurses in 
maternity compared to all the other units.‖ 
The training of nurses also influences their allocation to departments. In both hospitals, an attempt has 
been made to align nurses training specialization with their assigned departments. For example, nurses 
who have specialized in pediatrics have been deployed to the pediatric ward and those that have 
specialized in critical care have been deployed to the intensive care unit. 
HBSM03: ―Their qualifications and training also influences their allocation to different areas in 
the hospital. For example if somebody is trained in theatre or in intensive care nursing, definitely 
I won‘t put them in maternity; I‘ll put them in theater or ICU respectively. But the general areas 
like the general wards I just put any qualified nurse‖ 
HAML18: ―If somebody has done psychiatric nursing….that is one of the specializations. Having 
that nurse in maternity unit is like wasting that person working in other departments. So we prefer 
them being in the mental unit‖ 
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Sometimes the allocations are influenced by special requests and personal preferences of individual 
nurses. Nurses request to be assigned to a department because they were interested in gaining experience 
in that specialty. 
 
6. 5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter I presented a description of three priority setting activities across the two case study 
hospitals. The focus of the description has been on the priority setting processes, which include the 
procedures employed, the decision making structures and the content of the priority setting activities 
which includes the rules and guidelines in place to govern the priority setting activities and the criteria 
used to make decisions. In presenting these descriptions, I have endeavored to highlight the similarities 
and differences across the priority setting activities and between the case study hospitals. One of the 
features of CAS that has emerged from the description of priority setting process is that the case study 
hospital are seen to be complex system with multiple actors (and groups) of actors who interact at 
different levels. Further, the distinction between how priority setting processes are supposed to occur and 
how they occur in practice is characteristic of the emergent behavior of CAS. These properties of hospital 
systems as CAS will be explored more deeply in the subsequent result chapters. In the next chapter, I will 
present results on the influence of contextual issues on priority setting practices in the case study 
hospitals.  
 
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
128  
 
CHAPTER VII: RESULTS (PART TWO): THE 
INFLUENCE OF HOSPITAL CONTEXT ON 
PRIORITY SETTING PRACTICES IN COUNTY 
HOSPITALS IN KENYA 
 
7. 1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I presented a description of priority setting in the two case study hospitals, 
typified by three priority setting tracers. Consistent with CAS theory, the case study hospitals are seen to 
be complex systems with multiple interacting agents. The emergent behavior of case study hospitals also 
became visible, represented by the differences between what hospitals ought to do, and what they do in 
practice. In this chapter, these characteristics and interactions will be explored further by examining the 
influence of contextual factors on hospital priority setting processes.  
 
In examining priority setting practices in these hospitals, it emerged that a number of contextual factors 
interact with and influence these processes and outcomes. Priority setting in these hospitals was found to 
be influenced by the following contextual factors; 1) hospital financing 2) hospital management and 
leadership and 3) hospital autonomy and decision space. Even though these contextual factors are 
considered separately, in practice there are significant interactions among them, consistent with CAS. 
These factors emerged from the iterative analysis process conducted during and after data collection, 
guided by the descriptive framework developed from the literature review (5.2.1), but also by what 
emerged from the collected data (5.3.2).  In this chapter, I present findings on how these contextual 
factors interact with priority setting practices in the case study hospitals. The chapter is structured into 5 
sections starting with an introduction followed by a section for each of the contextual factors and a 
conclusion.  
 
7. 2 HOSPITAL FINANCING 
The mechanism and level of financing significantly influences how priority setting is conducted in the 
two case study hospitals. Formally public hospitals in Kenya receive funding from three main sources 
namely 1) the central MOH, 2) user fees charged to patients and 3) donors. These will be discussed in 
turn.  
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7. 2.1 Financing from the Central Ministry of Health 
Other than the capital investment by the MOH on infrastructure and equipment, financing from the MOH 
is in the form of recurrent items which included:  
 
1. Financing of human resources for the hospital; all the technical staff, including healthcare workers 
and support staff are recruited centrally by the MOH and assigned to the hospitals. The MOH is also 
directly responsible for payment of their salaries and benefits  
 
2. Financing of essential consumable medical supplies (pharmaceuticals and non-pharmaceuticals) 
 
3. Monetary allocation for recurrent and development activities; the MOH allocates funds to hospitals 
for recurrent expenditures and additional capital investments through the hospital management 
services fund (HMSF).  
 
These funds (HMSF), pharmaceutical supplies and human resources are allocated to hospitals according 
to a formula that takes into consideration the hospital inpatient and outpatient workload, whether or not 
the hospital is in an area with a high incidence of road traffic accidents, hospital fuel costs and poverty 
levels (Figure 7.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. 1: MOH resource allocation formula 
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Monetary allocations are, on paper, supposed to be disbursed to hospitals‘ bank accounts quarterly. 
Hospitals are expected to budget and request for AIE before utilizing these funds. Pharmaceuticals and 
non-pharmaceutical supplies are to be ordered by hospitals and supplied by KEMSA every two months. 
On paper, human resources are allocated as and when needed and depended on availability and guided by 
the MOH staffing norms for health facilities.  
7. 2.2 User Fees Charged to Patients
The MOH has also adopted a cost-sharing policy that requires hospitals to charge user fees on services 
offered to patients. User fee revenues are intended to supplement central MOH financing and are referred 
to as facility improvement fund (FIF).  FIF is collected by hospital cashiers at the points of service and 
banked in hospital bank accounts and through claims to the national insurer, the National Hospital 
Insurance Fund (NHIF). Hospitals are then required to make budgets quarterly and submit them to the 
central MOH for approval. The approval comes in the form of an AIE which is then used to access the 
funds that have been banked by the hospital. 
7. 2.3 Donor Financing
Hospitals also benefit from support by development partners. Donor support is often in kind rather than 
monetary. Donors, in collaboration with hospitals, identify hospital needs and meet them in kind. For 
example, if a hospital needs some renovations, the donors hire contractors to do the renovations and then 
hand over the project to the hospital. 
7. 2.4 Hospital Financing in Practice and its Influence on Priority Setting in Case
Study Hospitals 
Table 7.1 outlines the contributions of the different sources of funding to the case study hospitals resource 
envelopes for the financial year 2011-2012. This excludes donor funding which is always in kind and 
difficult to trace. 
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Table 7. 1: Sources of Hospital Funding for the financial year 2011-2012 
FINANCING SOURCE AND DESCRIPTION HOSPITAL A (%)* HOSPITAL B (%)* 
MOH Financing 
  
Human Resources USD 1,232,539 (64%) USD 1,038,583 (67%) 
Pharmaceuticals USD 101,523 (5%) USD 76,794 (5%) 
Non-pharmaceuticals USD 68,634 (4%) USD 51, 916 (3%) 
Direct monetary allocations to hospitals USD 68,530 (4%) USD 51,875 (3%) 
Total MOH resources USD 1,471,226 (76%) USD 1,219,168 (79%) 
  
  
User Fees Revenue 
  
Out-of-pocket user fees USD 389,996 (20%) USD 255,551(16%) 
NHIF Claims USD 70,286 (4%) USD 77,046 (5%) 
Total User Fees Revenues USD 460,282 (24%) USD 332,597 (21%) 
 
 
Total Hospital resources USD 1,931,508 USD 1,551,763  
*As percentage of total hospital resources 
 
One of the findings, based on document reviews and also on views of hospital managers, is that the MOH 
is the major source of financing for both case study hospitals. 
 
HASM04: ―If you look at our total resources, I would say the MOH contributes significantly 
because they are the ones who pay the human resource, who pay the workers and they are the 
ones also who send us drugs and non-pharmaceutical and occasionally some equipment.  I would 
say the government still plays a very significant role in funding this hospital‖ 
 
HBSM03: ―The MOH and user fees. The MOH supplies us with drugs and non-pharmaceuticals 
and also sends us staff and pays their salaries‖ 
 
Funding from the MOH is however mostly in the form of human resources and essential medical supplies 
with only a small proportion in the form of direct monetary allocations (Table 7.1). In both hospitals 
therefore, user fees account for a higher proportion of cash budgets. 
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HASM04: ―I would say FIF accounts for about 70% of our total monetary resources. The 
Ministry of health I can say maybe 30%. For example last quarter we collected [KES] 9 million 
[USD 105,882] from user fees while the ministry [of health] sent us only [KES] 1.7 million [USD 
20,000]‖ 
 
HBML08: ―If you compare what we collect per quarter and what we receive from GOK [ministry 
of health] per quarter, you will see that in this hospital we get most of our funds from FIF. For 
example we normally get around [KES] 1.5 million [USD 17,647] from GOK every quarter while 
in the same period we collect about [KES] 6 Million [USD 70,588] from cost sharing, so you can 
see FIF is almost 75 percent of our monetary resources‖  
 
This is also evident from hospital budgets and accounting records. For example, in the year 2011-2012, 
user fee revenues accounted for 89 % and 87 % of the total cash budgets of Hospital A and B respectively 
(Figure 7.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. 2: Sources of cash resources for case study hospitals 
 
Another major finding was the fact that both hospitals are severely underfunded. Managers in both case 
study hospitals complained that their hospitals are operating under severe resource constraints. 
 
HASMO3: ―Resources are a challenge to us. If you look at the money we collect and look at the 
budget requests you will see that we have huge gaps, almost 50%. It is a challenge for us to pay 
for services, to buy drugs and non-pharmaceuticals and to pay casual workers. We are always in 
financial problems‖ 
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HBML09:―The hospital does not have sufficient resources. The ministry gives us very little funds 
and the collections from user fees are also not enough because the people are poor. So it is very 
difficult to run the hospital‖ 
 
It is also evident from planning and budgeting documents and from observations of budgeting meetings 
that there are significant gaps between budget requests and projections of resource needs and the 
resources available to both hospitals. For example the financial year 2011 -2012, hospital A had a 
resource gap (the difference between the annual budgets and the resources that were available to the 
hospitals) of 45% while hospital B had a gap of 54% (Table 7. 2). 
 
Table 7. 2: Hospital‘s Financial Resources, Budget Needs and Debts for the Financial Year 2011-2012 
  
HOSPITAL A   
(AS % OF AVAILABLE FUNDS) 
HOSPITAL B  
(AS % OF AVAILABLE FUNDS) 
Total Available Funds USD 528,862 USD 384,472 
Budget needs USD 767,399 USD 592,095 
Resource gap USD 238,537 (45%) USD 207623 (54%) 
Total Debts USD 207,137 (39%) USD 159,138 (41%) 
 
Other than scarcity of monetary resources, both case study hospitals also experience severe scarcity of 
essential (pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical) supplies and human resources. The scarcity of 
essential supplies is attributed to inadequate supplies by KEMSA and limited financial resources at the 
hospital level to procure supplies from local private supplies. While there is a general scarcity of human 
resources in the hospitals, the situation is worse for nursing staff. The shortage is caused by the fact that 
the MOH had deployed an insufficient number of nurses to the hospitals and also because there is a high 
turnover of nurses in the hospitals.  
 
HAFP17: ―We have not had drugs in the hospital for some time now. Last week we had a 
meeting with the pharmacist to raise our concerns. She said that they had ordered for drugs from 
KEMSA but they got less than 40% of what they ordered‖ 
 
 HBSMO3: ―The nursing shortage is a serious issue. I cannot even give my nurses leave or day 
offs because they are so few. And also they have to work very few in a ward. If you go to the 
ward you will find one nurse in a shift covering a whole ward with 50 patients‖ 
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Another key observation is that MOH financing is unreliable and unpredictable. For example, while the 
hospitals are expected to receive quarterly disbursements of funds for recurrent and development 
expenditure (HMSF) from the MOH, both hospitals often have to wait for as long as 2-3 months before 
receiving the funds.  
HASM05: ―Usually, the allocation is done quarterly, but usually it‘s very late.  You can get an 
AIE but there are no funds in the account. So we cannot depend on the ministry [of health] 
allocation. Like now [July] we are supposed to get the first quarter allocation but we will 
probably get it in September when the quarter is almost ending‖ 
HBSM03: ―For example now we are in the third quarter of the year, and the first month of the 
quarter is ending and yet we have not received any communications from the headquarters about 
what we have been allocated for this quarter.  So maybe we will receive the AIE in the second 
month of the quarter, then the money in the last month‖ 
The situation is the same with the distribution of pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical supplies by 
KEMSA. Again, this means that both case study hospitals go for long periods of time without adequate 
quantities of essential medical supplies. 
HAML06: ―We order drugs and KEMSA is supposed to deliver them to us every 2 months, but 
we don‘t get them. Sometimes we get them three months after we order‖ 
HBML09: ―There is a problem with the supply chain. KEMSA never delivers on time, so we 
have to buy drugs locally to keep the hospital running‖ 
The influence that the financing of case study hospitals have on priority setting practices is consistent 
with the dynamics of CAS. The case study hospitals are seen to be complex systems nested within larger 
systems, notably the public health sector on the one hand and the local community on the other. The 
larger systems are seen to interact with the hospital systems, presenting conditions that lead to self-
organization. For example, one of the conditions that the case study hospitals face as a result of financing 
arrangements is the over-reliance on user fees:  
HASM01: ―FIF is very important, because if FIF is stopped today the hospital will shut down. 
This is because even though the government gives us some drugs and some non-pharmaceuticals, 
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we still have to use cost sharing money to buy most of them. Even the food for patients is bought 
using cost sharing money….. Water bills, electricity bills are all paid with cost sharing money‖ 
 
Hospitals over-rely on user fees because the financing arrangements are such that a significant proportion 
of their major source of financing (the central MOH) is in kind (human resource and essential supplies) 
with the implication that they have little flexibility on this form of financing. Further, the delays 
experienced with all forms of MOH financing due to slow bureaucratic processes means that they have to 
rely more on user fees collected locally since it is readily accessible.  For hospitals to self –organize so as 
to adapt to this situation, they have to look for ways of maximizing their user fee revenues. An emergent 
behavior of both case study hospitals is the use of revenue generating potential of departments and 
services as the main priority setting criteria. As described in the previous chapter, in both hospitals 
managers expressed preference for departments that generate more user fees and hence allocate more 
resources to them compared to departments that generated less user fee revenue. As CAS therefore, the 
hospitals have self-organized in the face of environmental pressures into ―revenue-maximizers‖. 
 
Consistent with observations of CAS, this emergent behavior of revenue maximization is not as a result of 
one but rather multiple interacting factors. In addition to over-reliance on user fees, the severe resource 
scarcity that hospitals faced also means that they have to self-organize to remain operational. This 
resource scarcity is attributed to factors in both systems that the hospitals are nested in; underfunding and 
funding disbursement delays by the MOH (public health system) and poverty in the catchment areas of 
the hospitals that result in poor revenue collections from user fees. In the face of severe resource scarcity, 
managers, who are agents in the hospital system, have an incentive to favor departments that generate 
more revenues in their budget allocations.  While hospital managers justified this behavior as necessary 
for the hospital survival, the use of revenue maximization seems to result in undesirable consequences. 
These non-linear consequences are again consistent with CAS where the metaphor of the ―butterfly 
effect‖ is commonly used. Typically in CAS, seemingly small changes in some parts of the system can 
dramatically affect the long-term behavior of that system (Begun et al. 2003). For example, the use of 
revenue generation as a criterion often also leads to decisions that are inequitable and against intended 
government objectives to increase access to services to special interest population groups. For example, 
the MOH, in an endeavor to increase access to treatment to children under five has made services to this 
population group free in all public health facilities in Kenya. However this policy has resulted in 
unintended and unpredicted consequences, where pediatric departments are perceived as low income 
generators and hence receive little priority. This is an example of a sub-systems non-linear response to 
changes or conditions imposed by the larger system in which it is embedded. 
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HASM04 ―Since I am allocated a small budget I only procure medicines that I can sale, I cannot 
buy medicines for children under 5 years because they don‘t pay for services‖  
 
HAML08 ―Departments like rehabilitation, physiotherapy hardly get allocations……but most of 
these patients are disabled and do not complain…‖ 
 
The unintended effects of policies that require public hospitals to rely on user fee revenues have been 
documented in other settings (Harding & Preker 2000). These are usually linked to hospital reform 
initiatives that seek to reduce the financial dependence of hospitals on central government budgets 
(Harding & Preker 2000). It has been observed that such policies introduce inequities in the public 
hospital sector mainly by incentivizing hospitals to increase user fee rates beyond the reach of the poor 
(Harding & Preker 2000). This has for example been observed in Indonesia, China and Vietnam (World 
Bank 2011). The observation in the case study hospitals where resources are allocated in a manner that 
denies some segments of the population access to services highlights another important mechanism by 
which such policies promote inequities.  
 
Further, given that this preference for high revenue generating departments is operationalized by senior 
managers in the hospitals, who are agents in the complex system that is the hospital, it has led to 
perceptions of unfairness in the allocation of resources in the hospitals.  
 
HAML13 ―It is not fair, it is not fair at all. I think they should at least allocate some money to me 
(physiotherapy department) like the other departments….‖ 
 
Perceptions of unfairness in the allocation of resources, coupled with severe resource scarcity resulted in 
reduced staff motivation. In both hospitals, managers are less enthusiastic about participating in planning 
and budgeting meetings and often skip them. They attributed this to the fact that, among others, they are 
unlikely to get any allocations even if they attended planning and budgeting meetings.  
 
HAML11: ―I don‘t attend the meetings (HMT)...I don‘t even submit my department‘s 
budget…the meetings are useless and I don‘t get allocated any money‖ 
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HBML09: ―At first I used to attend those meetings [budgeting meetings] but then all the time it is 
the story…no money no money…so I don‘t attend them anymore because it does not make any 
difference‖ 
 
Frontline clinicians are especially frustrated because they are ill-equipped to provide care to patients 
because of lack of essential supplies and nursing staff. This lack of resources has compromised the quality 
of care provided to patients. 
 
HBFL13: ―Sometimes we have to do operations, but when the patients go to the wards, the 
wounds get infected, because there is no gauze for dressing or there aren‘t sufficient gloves so the 
patients have to buy gloves for their own‖ 
 
 HAML22: ―The shortage of nurses compromises the quality of care given to patients. For 
example in my ward sometimes we have over 60 patients and yet you have only two nurses on 
duty, sometimes only one. Yet in ideal situation in medical wards you are supposed to have six 
patients per nurse. And you can imagine 60 patients per nurse. Now do you expect any quality 
there? So nurses prioritize tasks and attend only to life threatening cases and leave the other cases 
unattended‖ 
 
Access to resources at the workplace has been shown to increase motivation of staff in other settings 
(Willis-Shattuck et al. 2008; Henderson & Tulloch 2008).  For example in a study from Mali, it was 
reported that lack of material resources such as essential supplies was an important factor for 
demotivation among health workers (Dieleman et al. 2006).  
 
Another emergent behavior in both hospitals in response to the condition of resource scarcity is the use of 
historical allocations as one of the priority setting criteria. Managers in both hospitals feel that the severe 
scarcity of resources makes it very difficult to objectively determine the relative allocation of resources to 
departments given that resources are scarce. 
 
HAML06: ―What criteria? We use no criteria; the money available is so small that we just ask 
‗what did you get last time? Ok we will give you the same this time‘‖ 
 
HASM01: ―How can you set priorities when there are no resources? We just give departments 
what we gave them last time, or add a bit more‖ 
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Severe and perpetual resource scarcity has also led to the hospitals‘ priority setting and resource 
allocation activities focusing on short term operational issues and neglecting longer term strategic 
planning. For example, despite the fact that both hospitals have developed 5 year strategic plans and 
AWPs, managers reported that these exercises are not taken seriously by the hospital, are hardly 
implemented and hence are of little significance to the hospital. Managers in both hospitals reported that 
it was unlikely that plans would be taken seriously when there were no resources to implement them. In 
both hospitals, there is more focus on meeting ad hoc needs that arise on a day to day basis.  
HAML21: ―It is management by putting off fires. Everyday there is a crisis that we have to sort 
out. Today there is no electricity, tomorrow the ambulance has broken down, such things‖ 
MBML09: ―We try to plan but mostly we just try to keep the hospital running by dealing with the 
problems that we face day to day. When something happens, you will see people running around 
trying to resolve it‖ 
Other than hospital financing, it is evident in both case study hospitals that the state of management and 
leadership also influences priority setting. This will be presented in the next section.  
7. 3 MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN THE HOSPITAL
Another factor that seems to interact and influence priority setting practices in hospitals is the state of 
leadership and management coalescing around a number of key features now explored (7.3).  
Table 7. 3: Case hospital leadership and management characteristics 
MANAGEMENT AND
LEADERSHIP FEATURES 
HOSPITAL A HOSPITAL B 
Technical skills in budgeting 
and planning 
Managers lack formal training in management and leadership and have 
no planning and budgeting technical skills 
Leadership vision 
Hospitals have a mission and vision on paper, but do not take them into 
consideration in practice. Hospital leadership does not champion a 
vision for the hospital  
Monitoring and evaluation 
Hospital leadership does not monitor and evaluate performance of 
hospital and staff against stated goals 
Availability and leadership 
presence  
Leadership presence is not felt in 
the hospital. The medical 
superintendent is always busy and 
unavailable for management 
Leadership presence is felt in the 
hospital. The medical 
superintendent is available for 
management responsibilities.  
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MANAGEMENT AND
LEADERSHIP FEATURES 
HOSPITAL A HOSPITAL B 
responsibilities. 
Leadership interest in 
management responsibilities 
The medical superintendent is not 
interested in management and 
leadership roles, and prefers 
clinical roles 
The medical superintendent 
appears interested in management 
and leadership roles 
Managing interests and 
relations 
The role of the medical 
superintend as an arbiter of 
conflicting interests and power 
relations is lacking 
The medical superintendent is seen 
as a ―peacemaker‖. She plays the 
role of managing relations and 
interests 
Leadership Technical Skills in Budgeting and Planning 
One of the findings on the leadership and management situation in both hospitals is the general limited 
technical capacity of hospital managers for planning and budgeting.  
HASM03: ―Most of the hospital management committee members do not have the training and 
skills in budgeting and planning. This makes the process of making the hospital annual work plan 
and budgets very difficult since they cannot even come up with simple budgets and plans for their 
departments.‖   
HBML06: ―One of the reasons why I don‘t think the HMT has the capacity for decision making 
is because we don‘t have appropriate levels of education amongst the members. I also think that 
we also don‘t have enough experience‖ 
This is attributed to a number of issues. First, the hospital management is comprised of senior and middle 
level managers who have received technical training in their profession but not management training.  
HASM01: ―I had to learn on the job, we did not receive any management training in medical 
school. So when I first got here, I was clueless about management issues. It‘s like you are just 
thrown to the deep end and expected to swim‖ 
HBSM01: ―One day you are a dentist, the next day you are medical superintendent in charge of a 
big hospital. That is how it happens. You are sent here [the hospital] without any [management] 
training. All you have is your clinical training‖ 
In recognition of the gaps in management and leadership competencies among hospital managers, the 
MOH and a number of development partners have developed in-service leadership and management short 
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courses. However, in both hospitals, only a select few senior managers have attended these courses, with 
most of the middle level managers remaining untrained.  
 
HAML17: ―Not all the HMT members have been taken for the training. I think there are four key 
members who were taken. That is the medical superintendent, the hospital administrative officer, 
the matron and the Human resource officer‖ 
 
HBSM03: ―We don‘t look at the qualifications, it‘s just who is head of department at that 
particular time, he is the one who comes to the HMT. Definitely there is need for further training 
and I think most of the HMT apart from me, the nursing officer the HAO and the pharmacist have 
not been trained in management. It makes it hard for people to understand how to budget and 
plan. So we sit arguing the whole morning and the whole day‖ 
 
This means that the majority of hospital managers, most of them middle level managers, have not 
received any form of management training. The lack of technical competency for budgeting and planning 
activities makes it difficult for the hospital to develop budgets and AWPs. Senior managers (who 
happened to have received training in these processes) complained that the rest of the managers (the 
middle level managers) lacked an appreciation of the need to ration health care.  
 
HASMO1: ―The managers do not have budgeting and planning skills…..it affects the budgeting 
process because they don‘t appreciate the process of budgeting and keep presenting unrealistic 
requests and do not understand why they can‘t always get what they ask for. Yet we don‘t have 
that money ― 
 
HBSM01: ―Most of them don‘t have the training or they don‘t have the knowledge required to 
carry our management roles. So conducting budgeting or planning with some of them is very 
difficult. They cannot develop realistic budgets or plans‖ 
 
Failure to appreciate the need for rationing manifests itself in lengthy and inconclusive budgeting and 
planning meetings. It is also thought to result in the presentation of budgets that are out of touch with the 
reality of resource scarcity in the hospital, and non-alignment of budgets and plans. This lack of 
appreciation of the need to ration resources is also likely to contribute to the feeling of unfairness among 
hospital managers, which alongside other factors like resource scarcity, described in the previous section, 
has led to the emergent property of lack of motivation and what is referred to severally by respondents as 
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a ―government culture‖ among hospital managers in the hospital system. The term ―government culture‖ 
is used to refer to a situation where people seem to lack a sense of commitment to (or seem not to care 
about) what they are expected to do and hence rarely take action or initiative to carry out any activities. I 
observed that hospital staffs are generally lethargic towards their duties, and about priority setting 
activities such a budgeting and planning meetings. Staff often show up late at work, and spend a 
significant amount of time doing non-work related activities such as social chats in their offices, reading 
newspapers and having teas.  
 
HMML12: ―It‘s the government way…. Paper work paper work paper work but nothing is 
done…‖ 
 
HPSM04: ―In government nobody is serious about their work, people just show up to be seen but 
do not really care whether work is done or not‖ 
 
The lack of technical competence in budgeting and planning also contributes to another emergent 
property of the hospitals, the use of historical budgeting and informal considerations in the allocation of 
hospital resources (6.2.2). This is because the managers lack the skills and awareness of alternative 
budgeting methods.  
 
HASM04: ―How can we use criteria to budget when they don‘t even know that they should be 
doing that? The only thing they know is last year‘s budget. That and noise making. We just argue 
all day‖ 
 
HBSM04: ―The only thing they know how to do is to argue and to play politics. But if you tell 
them okay let‘s as use proper budgeting procedures you find that they have no skills for that‖ 
 
Leadership Role in Fostering a Vision for the Hospital 
It has also been observed in other settings that one of the important roles of leadership in priority setting 
processes in hospitals is the provision of a sense of direction for the hospital (Reeleder et al. 2006). In 
both case study hospitals, it was observed that the leadership does not champion a vision that the hospital 
should endeavor to achieve. One of the reasons advanced for this is that while the hospital has a mission 
and vision, these are merely adapted from the central MOH and hence lack a local focus and hospital 
ownership. Indeed it was evident in both hospitals that the vision and mission are clearly and boldly 
written on the administration block walls, but the managers and the staff are not familiar with them. 
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HAML05: "Here we don‘t have leaders, we have managers…because a leader is somebody who 
has a vision for the hospital…….but here do you see anybody with a vision for the hospital? No. 
On the walls we have just the MOH mission and vision"  
 
HBML08: ―I don‘t think there is any particular direction that the hospital is headed or aspires to. 
Here we just work like we are on auto pilot. As long as the hospital is running the managers are 
happy. I have never seen them [management] telling us ‗this is where we need to go, this is our 
vision‘. What you see there is the ministry of health‘s vision, not ours‖ 
 
The absence of a vision that is locally owned and embraced by staff likely contributed to the general 
observation that hospitals tend to focus on short term operational issues and neglected to invest in long 
term strategic planning.  
 
HASM06: ―There is nothing like a vision. This is why we don‘t even improve as a hospital. 
Because we just do the day to day things to run the hospital. But I cannot say that the hospital is 
improving or progressing‖ 
 
HBML11: ―A vision will help the hospital to progress. People would be working to achieve 
something and to better the hospital. But here we just come in and work without direction‖ 
 
Leadership Role in Monitoring and Evaluation 
Another characteristic that has been considered an important function of leadership that is lacking in both 
case study hospitals is monitoring and evaluation. Managers reported that there is no mechanism to 
monitor and evaluate whether the budgets or the AWP have been implemented as intended. So while the 
hospitals have plans and budgets, information about progress in their implementation or evaluation of the 
success of previous plans is lacking.  
 
HAML11: ―One of the problems we have is that we do not monitor and evaluate what we do. 
You will see that people will just prepare the budgets and AWP and forget about them, no one 
follows up to see if they have been implemented‖ 
 
HBML07: ―There is no such thing as monitoring and evaluation in this hospital. We just submit 
our plans to them [ministry of health]. But we don‘t hear anything from them [ministry of health]. 
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And the managers here don‘t follow up on them either. So you will find that people are not really 
serious about the plans‖  
A number of reasons are likely to have contributed to the lack of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism. 
First, monitoring and evaluation is assumed to be a central MOH role. Local managers therefore do not 
feel that it is within their mandate to monitor implementation of hospital plans. They feel that their role is 
restricted to submitting reports to MOH and that the MOH has failed in their responsibility to follow up. 
Second, characteristic of the ―government culture‖, managers are generally not motivated to carry out 
managerial duties. Third, it is also the case that hospitals are constrained for resources and hence perhaps 
do not consider the monitoring and evaluation function high up in their agenda. 
The lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for hospital priority setting activities is thought to be 
one of the reasons the hospital managers and staff lack a sense of ―doing the right thing‖. Managers, who 
are agents in the hospital system adapted to the state of weakened accountability mechanisms by adopting 
a ―government culture‖.   
HAFL19: ―If there was a way to monitor whether we are implementing the plans, maybe you will 
see people being serious about it. But there is none. So this is one of the reasons that the plans we 
make don‘t get implemented‖ 
HBML13: ―Every year we make plans but we don‘t look to see last year‘s plans were 
implemented. Because there is no follow up, no one bothers to even implement. I think this is one 
of the reasons most of these activities are useless. It is just paperwork‖ 
The Influence of the Leadership Characteristics of the Medical Superintendent 
One of the striking differences in leadership and management between the two hospitals is the role of the 
medical superintendent. Based on observations and backed by views of other managers, the medical 
superintendent in Hospital B is more motivated and committed to her leadership and management roles 
compared to the medical superintendent in hospital A.  
Hospital A 
The medical superintendent in hospital A is often unavailable to attend to his administrative 
responsibilities. Other hospital managers complained that the medical superintendent is often very busy 
and that they find it very difficult to see him when they have an issue that needs his attention. 
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HAML05: ―He doesn‘t have that time for management. Mostly he concentrates on what he likes, 
being a surgeon. I think the right person to be a medical superintendent is either a pediatrician or 
a gynecologist because they have time, they have time.‖ 
 
These sentiments were also validated by my observations spending time in the hospital. I observed that 
the budgeting and AWP meetings have to be organized by the hospital administrative officer and nursing 
officer in charge respectively in the absence of the medical superintendent. On the day of the budgeting or 
AWP development meetings, the meetings often start without the medical superintendent who would 
come when the meetings are in progress or almost about to end. Because of his absence, these meetings 
are chaired by the hospital administrative officer or the hospital nursing officer in charge even though on 
paper the meetings are supposed to be chaired by the medical superintendent.  One of the reasons 
advanced for the unavailability of the hospital superintendent is that he dedicates most of his time to his 
clinical duties within the hospital and in private practice and neglects his managerial and leadership 
duties. The hospital superintendent is the only surgeon in the hospital and the entire district. Even though 
he had been appointed as a medical superintendent, with extensive leadership and management 
responsibilities, he has not been relieved of his clinical responsibilities and is still expected to run the 
surgical clinic and attend to all theater cases. This means that the medical superintendent has to split his 
time between management and clinical responsibilities.  
 
HAML07: ―He is very busy with the theater. You see there are two important days for the 
surgeon. The first day is the clinic days to filter the patients and schedule operations. Then there 
is the day for the scheduled operations. The medical superintendent is busy on those two days and 
cannot attend to any management issues. Then the other days of the week he has to review the 
patients he has operated on. He has to spend time doing ward rounds in the hospital reviewing his 
patients. So he does not have time for administrative issues‖ 
 
HAML12: ―You know he is the only surgeon in the district….if he is not working here (hospital 
A) he is working at [a private hospital in town A]…he is very busy‖ 
 
Respondents also felt that, while the medical superintendent has to share his time between clinical and 
administrative responsibilities, he seems to prefer his clinical responsibilities more and hence dedicates 
most of his time attending to surgery at the expense of his management and leadership responsibilities.  
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HAML015: I think the medical superintendent likes his theater work more than administration. If 
you talk to him about theater you can see that he is interested. But it is very difficult to find him 
to sort out administrative issues. I think he is not interested in that‖ 
 
Informal discussions with some hospital managers revealed that the medical superintendent is perhaps not 
interested in a management position at all. It was indicated that he expressed unwillingness to take up the 
hospital management position when it was given to him and was keener in developing his clinical career 
by acquiring more specialist training. However, there is no provision within the MOH to turn down an 
offer for a management position. One has to become a hospital manager if assigned this responsibility by 
the central MOH.  
 
HBSM01: ―In government you don‘t choose to be a manager. You just wake up and you are told 
that you are now the medical superintendent of this or that hospital. You don‘t ask for it. They 
don‘t care whether you want it or not‖ 
  
Hospital B 
The situation was quite different in Hospital B. Here the medical superintendent‘s presence is felt in the 
hospital.  
 
HAML05: ―We have a good medical superintendent. She is very dedicated. And she is also very 
helpful. She is always around to attend to issues and also for us to talk to her if we have a 
problem in our departments‖ 
 
HBML016: ―She is really dedicated to her work. If you go to the office now you will find her 
there. And she is always following up on issues and trying to sort them out‖ 
 
I observed that she is always in her office holding meetings with other managers and attending to 
administrative issues. She was very accessible to me due to her presence in the hospital and her interest to 
discuss hospital administration issues and takes an active role in them. For example, other than the 
budgeting and planning activities which she actively leads, she also chairs the MTC and organizes the 
committee meetings in her office. She also holds monthly meetings in her office with nurses for the 
allocation of food and food supplements to the different wards. She seems to be in touch with resource 
allocation issues and offered explanations of why activities such as food allocations were important in the 
hospital. 
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HBSM01: ―In this hospital food takes up a lot of our resources…especially the mental ward, 
those patients consume more food than other patients, so we have to sit every month and carefully 
allocate food to all the wards‖ 
 
Her availability to carry out her management and leadership responsibilities is aided by the fact that she 
does not have a heavy clinical work burden. Given that the hospital has three other dentists, she has been 
relieved of her clinical responsibilities and focuses fully on the management and leadership 
responsibilities.  
 
HBSM05: ―We have enough dentists so most of the time she is in the office. If you need anything 
to be sorted you will always find her in the hospital.  So she has enough time to run the hospital‖ 
 
The difference in leadership between the two case study hospitals perhaps best depicts how the 
disposition and actions of an agent in a system can have far reaching effects on other agents and influence 
system dynamics. It has been observed in other settings that a key leadership role in healthcare 
organizations is that of managing relations between other actors or agents and balancing power 
differences between them (Reeleder et al. 2006). The unavailability of the medical superintendent in 
Hospital A means that there is no one to manage the relationships and often varying interests of the 
different managers. As will become clear in the next chapter, this resulted in heightened power 
differences between the managers that has led a number of managers to feel that there is unfairness in 
priority setting processes. Further, in hospital A, there is a leadership vacuum at the top which has 
unofficially been filled by the hospital administrator and the hospital accountant; often, these two are the 
ones to attend to administrative issues that arise, make decisions and seek the official approval of the 
medical superintendent. Hospital managers feel that the hospital administrator and the accountant have 
colluded to usurp the powers of the medical superintendent and use them to further their own interest. 
This has led to feelings of unfairness and a sense of distrust among the managers.  
 
HAML13: ―So the two of them have to be as a team, they basically back an idea about what they 
need and the med sup doesn‘t interfere…..I think he is just overwhelmed….he is a very busy 
person…so  it‘s kind of he is overpowered by those two‖ 
 
HBML05: ―He is never there, so those two take over. And I told you about them, they only favor 
their departments and their friends. And since the medical superintendent is not there, nothing can 
be done about it. So most of us feel that especially the budgeting process is unfair‖ 
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It was also claimed that the leadership vacuum provides an opportunity for corruption. Managers reported 
that there have been cases of misappropriation of funds by some senior managers, which have gone 
undetected and unpunished because the medical superintendent is not ―in charge‖. 
HAML05: ―But so like the incident where money for renovating the mortuary disappeared. It 
came up very clearly that even the medical superintendent was not aware of what happened. 
People wondered why he had not taken action. But he does not have time to notice such things or 
take action. I think he has too much on his mind so he ends up…it has happened‖ 
Compared to Hospital A, the presence and availability of the medical superintendent in Hospital B has 
contributed to a sense of fairness in the priority setting process. Managers reported that the medical 
superintendent is always at the budgeting and planning meetings and tried to ensure that every department 
gets some allocation.  
HBML24: ―She is a very nice medical superintendent. If it were someone else there would have 
been a problem but with her she makes sure, every department. Okay she, she makes sure that 
equity prevails. At least she makes sure everyone gets something‖ 
HBML15: ―The thing about the Medical superintend is that she is very fair. She always calls us to 
get our input. She always sends me an SMS telling me ―come for the meeting‖. So she tries to be 
fair and also transparent. That is how she is. I have worked in a lot of hospitals and I can tell you 
it is not always like that. I think it depends a lot on the individual‖ 
Linked to management and leadership, it was evident in both case study hospitals that the range of 
decisions that hospital managers are allowed to make (decision space), and that they exercise, affects 
priority setting practices. These findings are presented in the next section. 
7. 4 HOSPITAL AUTONOMY AND DECISION SPACE
The decision space experienced by the hospital is another contextual factor that interacts with priority 
setting in the case study hospitals. Bossert (1998) has defined decision space as the range of effective 
choices that organizations are allowed to make by central authorities. Usually defined by laws and 
regulations, decision space defines the specific rules that determine the decisions that managers can or 
cannot make in their organizations (Bossert 1998; Bossert & Beauvais 2002).  Further, Harding and 
Preker (2000) have suggested a framework for mapping the levels of hospital autonomy into four main 
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categories namely: 1) budgetary unit, 2) autonomized organizations, 3) corporatized organizations and 4) 
privatized organizations. Under budgetary units, hospitals are run as departments of either the central or 
local government (Harding & Preker 2000; World Bank 2011).  The hospitals strategic issues and most 
day-to-day decisions are determined by the government‘s hierarchy of officials and rules. Revenues are 
determined through a direct budget allocation by the central or local government. Under Autonomization, 
the day-to-day decision-making control is shifted to hospital management (Harding & Preker 2000; 
World Bank 2011). These changes are typically accompanied by increasing the scope for generating and 
retaining revenue in the hospital. With corporatized organizations, managerial autonomy is stronger than 
under autonomization, giving managers significant control over all inputs and issues related to production 
of services (Harding & Preker 2000; World Bank 2011). The organization is legally established as an 
independent entity and hence the transfer of control is more durable than under autonomization. Under 
privatization, public hospital ownership is transferred to private hands.  
 
The range of decisions that hospital managers are allowed to make are fairly similar in both case study 
hospitals (Table 7.4).  An examination of the level of autonomy and decision space that the case study 
hospitals have paints a picture of a hybrid system where the hospitals have both the characteristics of a 
government unit and an autonomized organization. On paper at least, the government unit structure 
applies to resources provided by the central MOH while the autonomized system applies to the revenues 
collected locally. As it has been explained in the section 9.2 and it shall be seen in this section, the case 
study hospitals exhibited unintended features of such a hybrid system (World Bank 2011).  
 
 
Table 7. 4: Decision space in case study hospitals 
FUNCTION LEVEL OF DECISION SPACE 
BUDGETING AND PLANNING PROCESS 
Sources of revenue 
Hospitals have mandate to set user fee rates. However central MOH can 
impose policies to waive user fees for specified patient groups and set limits 
for user fees 
Allocation to 
departments 
Hospitals have discretion over allocation of funds to hospital departments 
Expenditures 
Hospitals have no autonomy over expenditure items. Central MOH provides 
pre-determined (and narrow) expenditure items that hospital budgeting must 
comply with 
Selection of priorities 
Hospitals have no discretion over selection of priority diseases or service 
areas. MOH provides guidelines on priorities that can be selected 
Selection of 
interventions to address 
priorities 
Hospitals have discretion over selection of interventions 
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FUNCTION LEVEL OF DECISION SPACE 
MEDICINES SELECTION PROCESS 
Procurement 
Hospital‘s selection of the type of medicines to procure from KEMSA was 
restricted by the essential medicine list developed by the central MOH. 
Hospitals have greater autonomy when procuring medicines from local 
suppliers 
 
NURSING ALLOCATION PROCESS 
Recruitment 
Hospitals have no mandate to hire or fire nurses. The MOH hires nurses and 
assigns them to hospitals and have the mandate to fire them.  
Remuneration 
Hospitals have no mandate to remunerate nurses. The central MOH sets 
remuneration rates, and remunerates nurses assigned to hospitals. 
Human resource 
management 
The central MOH has the mandate for performance management, effecting 
transfers and promotions.  Hospitals can only deploy nurses across their 
departments 
 
In examining the interaction between decision space and hospital priority setting, the case study hospitals, 
as CAS, are seen to respond to and adapt to conditions imposed by the larger system (the MOH) in which 
they are embedded. Specifically, both case study hospitals have adapted to situations where MOH 
regulations restrict the authority that hospitals have over certain decisions.  For example, in both case 
hospitals, it is felt that the hospitals decision space with regard to the AWP is limited. Hospital managers 
indicated that they receive significant guidance from the central MOH on what to include in the AWP. 
This is also evident from document reviews of past hospital AWPs and AWP templates which reveal that 
the MOH provides a list of health priorities from which the hospitals can select. Managers in both 
hospitals feel that this limits the hospitals‘ autonomy in the sense that they cannot select health problems 
that are not listed by the MOH.  
 
HAML013: ―We don‘t feel like we contribute to the AWP [Annual work plan process]. It is like 
it is not ours. We just get these templates from the ministry and have to fill them according to 
instructions. The diseases are already listed there so just choose‖ 
 
HBML09: ―The AWP is very rigid. We select diseases from a list that‘s it. Sometimes you want 
to include a priority but it is not in the list‖ 
 
Further, managers from both hospitals feel that the manner in which priorities are expressed in the AWP 
is not compatible with the activities undertaken by their departments. It was reported that the MOH 
requires priorities to be put in the AWP targeted at specific diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, TB and 
diarrheal diseases. It is felt that these are mostly national priorities that the central MOH expects the 
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hospitals to adopt. Managers of departments such as physiotherapy and dental feel that they find it 
difficult to relate their departmental priorities in line with such requirements in the AWP. 
 
HAML13: ―When I attend those AWP meetings I don‘t see how my department‘s priorities can 
be included. It only talks about malaria and HIV and MCH (maternal and child health). I don‘t 
see how it applies to my department‖ 
 
The limited flexibility that hospitals have in the development of the AWP has resulted in a feeling that the 
process is not responsive to hospital needs. There is therefore a general feeling of lack of ownership and 
disinterest in the AWP process by the hospital managers, who see it as just a process that is conducted to 
meet government requirements but one that has little relevance to the hospital. 
 
HAML14: ―No one in the hospital cares about the AWP. The AWP to us is just a ministry 
document, not a hospital document. We just do it because it is a requirement‖ 
 
HBML06: ―I don‘t think anyone ever looks at the AWP or follows up to implement it. People feel 
like the ministry forces us to fill it but it is not relevant to us. We feel that it has ministry priorities 
but not hospital priorities‖  
 
In both case study hospitals, an emergent property to adapt to the constrained decision space over the 
AWP process is the development of a culture of what I will call here ―feigned compliance‖. While 
managers appear to on paper comply with all MOH guidelines, templates and timelines for the AWP 
process, in practice they either do not implement them or act differently. Managers reported that they 
have to comply because it is an expectation of the MOH and also part of their performance contract. They 
however stated that this compliance is not translated into action because often these rules and guidelines 
are not in line with hospital priorities. 
 
HBML22: ―That AWP we just prepare it because it is a ministry requirement. But in reality it is 
not followed or used in the hospital.‖ 
 
Another example of the influence of decision space is the medicines selection process. Managers in both 
hospitals reported having low autonomy over what and how much to procure from KEMSA. The MOH 
provides budget ceilings for the procurement of medicines and other essential supplies. The central MOH 
also provides guidelines for what can be ordered by the hospitals in the form of an EML. Hospitals can 
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only order medicines that are listed in the list. In both hospitals, managers complained that this list is very 
restrictive and does not adequately meet the medicines needs of the hospital. The situation is made worse 
by the fact that this list has been shortened over time to include only 50 medicines. To self organize in 
light of this situation, hospitals rely more on user fees to purchase medicines from local private providers, 
an avenue that is more flexible and responsive to hospital needs. As described in the previous section, this 
reliance on user fees resulted in greater non-linear consequences. 
HAML05: ―The KEMSA list [essential medicines list) has very few drugs. A lot of the things that 
we want to buy are not in the list so we have to buy locally‖] 
HAML07: ―The KEMSA list is not sufficient. They [KEMSA] actually reviewed the drug list 
recently and they removed some of the very key drugs like diclofenac and diclofenac injection. 
So the question was whose idea was it? How do you remove diclofenac and remain... retain 
aspirin in the list. That means now from next quarter we may have to start procuring diclofenac 
and other drugs that were removed from local suppliers‖ 
Perhaps the greatest decision space restriction is experienced in human resource decisions. Specifically 
for nurses, the authority to recruit nursing staff and to deploy them to hospitals around the country and 
promote them rests with the central MOH. Hospitals have no influence over which nurses are deployed to 
them or the number deployed. The hospital also has no influence over the remuneration of the nursing 
staff and mechanisms to discipline and/or motivate staff. This too is done by the central MOH. 
Respondents in both case study hospitals therefore feel that the hospital has no control over its skilled 
human resource:  
HASM03: ―We do not have control over human resources…..they are paid by the government, 
they can be transferred by the government…like now I cannot transfer someone to another 
hospital but I can just get a positing order from the government that someone has been transferred 
for here to another hospital and I have to release them…so we have no control over our human 
resources……‖ 
An emergent property of the reduced human resource planning decision space is the high turnover of 
nurses. This is because the central MOH often sends nurses who are not willing to work in particular 
hospitals. The hospital managers feel that if recruitment is done at the hospital level, only nurses who are 
willing to work in particular stations will apply for the jobs.  
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HASM03: ―Our suggestion is that in future, if they are to employ nurses, let the nurses be 
selected by the hospital so that we interview and we select the ones who are willing to stay here. 
For example in the year 2004, we interviewed nurses and we took 10 and up to today those 10 
nurses are still with us because we had people from all over the country and we selected people 
who committed they are going to remain in [town A], they are going to settle in [town A].‖ 
HBSM02: ―Currently, nurses are interviewed sometimes at the province but mainly at the 
ministry of health headquarters and then posted to us [the hospital]. We are not given a chance to 
contribute and have no choice but to accept the postings. Some of them request to be transferred 
immediately they get here. They want to go back. In fact some of them reported and left even 
before they were orientated. They said ‗No, this is too far‘‖ 
The high turnover of nurses has contributed to the nursing shortage, which as explained in the previous 
section has resulted in unintended consequences.  
7. 5 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has presented findings on the influence of hospital context on priority setting practices in 
case study hospitals. It emerged that priority setting in these hospitals is influenced to varying degrees and 
in varying ways by the hospitals financing arrangements, the scarcity of resources in the hospital, the 
decision space for making priority setting decisions, and the management and leadership practices in the 
hospital. It is clear that both case study hospitals rely heavily on user fee collections and experience 
severe resource scarcity resulting in the adoption of ―revenue maximizing behavior‖ that promotes 
perceived unfairness or inequity in resource allocation. It also emerged that weak management capacity 
has weakened priority setting and resource allocation processes in both hospitals and led to the 
development of unrealistic plans and budgets which compromise their implementation. The difference in 
leadership between the case study hospitals is also seen to influence priority setting. Managers in hospital 
B feel that their medical superintendent is available to attend to their issues and that there is some fairness 
in allocations. Managers in hospital A however felt that there is a leadership vacuum which has been 
filled by a few other senior managers who have perpetrated unfairness and corruption. This has led to 
discontentment and disenchantment among managers in hospital A. The fact that hospitals have reduced 
decision space in the preparation of AWPs has resulted in reduced ownership of the process, while the 
fact that nurses are recruited by the central MOH has been blamed for the high turnover that is 
experienced in both case study hospitals. Lastly hospital culture is seen to significantly interact with 
priority setting practices. Key among them was the presence of a ―government culture‖ that has led to 
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disinterest in participating in priority setting activities and poor implementation of planned activities.  In 
the next results chapter, I will present results on the influence of actors, their interest and practices of 
power on priority setting practices in the case study hospitals. 
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CHAPTER VIII: RESULTS (PART THREE): THE 
INFLUENCE OF ACTOR DYNAMICS & 
PRACTICES OF POWER ON PRIORITY SETTING 
PRACTICES 
 
8. 1 INTRODUCTION 
n the previous chapter, I presented findings on the interaction between hospital context and priority 
setting practices in the case study hospitals. By examining the case study hospitals through the lens of 
CAS theory, it emerged that a number of contextual factors have presented hospitals with an environment 
that has resulted in emergent properties with significant influence on priority setting practice. A 
prominent feature of CAS is the role of agents and their interactions. Agents in hospital systems are the 
actors that make up the system.  While the role of agents in influencing priority setting process has 
already been a common thread in the results presented in previous chapters, this chapter will explore and 
focus more on the role of the interactions between the agents, their interests and micro-practices of power 
in shaping priority setting practices. In doing so, I will use Norman Long‘s (1999) actor interface analysis 
to analyze actor dynamics and its influence in priority setting processes (4.2.5). Interface analysis is 
particularly useful given that it provides a means through which the platforms of interactions between 
actors and the power dynamics can be critically examined (Long 1999; Long & Jinlong 2009).  A key 
feature of actor interfaces is practices of power. To explore the power dynamics at these interfaces, I will 
employ two frameworks. The first framework is John Gaventa‘s (2005) ―power cube‖ framework that 
visualizes power as comprised of three dimensions namely 1) the forms of power 2) the spaces of power 
and 3) the levels of power (4.2.5). The second framework is the VeneKlasen and Miller‘s (2002) 
―expressions of power‖ which postulates that power is expressed in four main forms namely 1) power 
over 2) power to 3) power with and 4) power within (4.2.5). I use both these frameworks given that they 
are complimentary in examining the dynamics of power in organizational settings. While the power cube 
framework unpacks different useful facets of power dynamics, the ―expressions of power‖ framework 
provides another useful dimension by conceptualizing power as something that is owned and expressed 
by actors in different ways (both positive and negative) (Pantazidou 2012).  
 
Far from being a homogeneous and harmonious milieu of actors, their interactions in the case study 
hospitals seem to result in socially constructed interfaces. This chapter is organized around the key actor 
interfaces that are encountered in priority setting practices in both case study hospitals namely: 1) senior 
I 
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managers and middle level managers 2) non-clinical managers and clinicians, and 3) hospital managers 
and the community. Within each set of actor interfaces, I explore the actors and their interactions in light 
of the power they possess, how this power is exercised and how these interactions influence priority 
setting processes.  
8. 2 SENIOR MANAGERS AND MIDDLE LEVEL MANAGERS
One of the main actor interfaces, where power dynamics plays out in both case study hospitals is that of 
senior managers and middle level managers (Figure 6.2). In both case study hospitals, the authority vested 
in the position of senior managers, who constitute the EEC, means that they exercise power over the 
middle level managers, who form the HMT. The power differences between the two levels of managers 
was particularly observed in the budgeting process, which as shown in chapter 6, is the main priority 
setting activity in the hospitals. However, how this power is exercised differs between the two case study 
hospitals and shall be examined next.  
Interactions between Senior and Middle Level Managers in Hospital A 
In Hospital A, the dominant group of actors in the budgeting and planning processes is the EEC. This 
committee makes the actual allocation decisions and develops final budgets for the hospital (6.2.2). 
Middle level managers, who are also HMT Members, feel that the EEC is the most powerful decision 
making body given that they make the actual allocation decisions. The EEC thus derives their power from 
the fact that they have control over resources: 
HAML14: "Those [EEC] are the people who actually allocate resources. Once you have that 
power to allocate resources then you are the most powerful person and you are actually the one 
who is planning for the whole hospital" 
The EEC in Hospital A therefore exercises visible power in decision making over budget allocations in 
the hospital. Further, by restricting HMT meetings to presenting budgetary requests, and deferring 
budgetary allocation decisions to the EEC, it appears that the senior managers in Hospital A also exercise 
some hidden power over budgetary decisions. Budget allocation decisions in this hospital are therefore 
made in the closed space of the EEC meetings, where middle level managers are excluded from 
participation. 
Senior managers in Hospital A feel that the budgeting process has to be conducted in this manner because 
the middle level managers lack the capacity to develop hospital budgets at the level of the HMT. They 
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feel that if the budgeting process is left entirely to the HMT, it would take an unnecessarily long time to 
develop, and that the proposals would not be realistic. This justification by senior managers is however 
questionable, because in practice senior and middle level managers have comparable capacity to 
undertake budgeting exercises.  
The exclusion from the budgeting process contributes to frustration and reduced motivation among the 
middle level managers. As shown in chapter 7, this exclusion is one of the reasons for reduced attendance 
and participation in HMT meetings among middle level managers. It has also created an atmosphere of 
suspicion and reduced trust between the middle level managers and senior managers. Middle level 
managers in hospital A feel that the budgeting process is not transparent and fair and suspect that some of 
the senior managers take advantage of the process and perpetrate corruption (7.3). 
Even at the HMT meetings, senior managers, as individual members of the HMT are also thought to have 
power over by virtue of the positions they hold. In hospital A, I observed in the HMT meetings that the 
senior managers appear to be more vocal, while the middle level managers hardly participate in the 
discussions. The power difference between these two groups of managers is also evident in the 
organization, sitting arrangement and interactions during the meetings. The meetings are organized and 
called by the hospital administrative officer who together with the hospital accountant and medical 
superintendent set the meeting agenda timetable. These three also set the agenda of the meetings and 
circulate them to the other managers. At the meetings, I observed that senior managers and middle level 
managers sit in different places. Senior managers sit at a table in front of the room (high table) facing 
middle level managers who sit in seats arranged in rows (as in a classroom). During the meetings, there is 
hardly any deliberation and middle level managers appear reluctant to engage and participate in 
discussion. Views of senior managers carried the day and the middle level managers are expected to 
accept decisions without questioning them. 
The medical superintendent, the hospital matron, the hospital administrative officer (HAO) and the 
hospital accountant are also thought to have significant power as individuals. This power is derived from 
the position authority they have as senior managers in the hospital: 
HAML16: ―People can argue and argue but what the medical superintendent says is final because 
he is the boss. If he says he will give you fifty thousand shillings that is what you will get‖ 
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HAML09: "I think the matron has more powers than other managers...because of her 
position….the HAO [hospital administrative officer] also has a lot of power because he is the one 
that calls for and chairs the meetings" 
 
In addition to the power over that the matron in hospital A has over middle level managers, she also 
exercises power with the other nursing ward in charges to exert greater influence over allocation 
decisions. Here the hospital matron is seen to exploit the absence of clear guidelines on the composition 
of decision making bodies to her favor (6.2.2). It was reported that within the HMT, the nursing 
department, represented by the matron have the most power because of their numbers.  The Hospital 
matron in hospital A has incorporated all the nursing ward in-charges in the HMT which has lead the 
nursing department to have the highest number of representatives in the HMT: 
 
HAML09: "The matron has incorporated all the nurses-in-charge of wards into the HMT and so 
she has control over most of the HMT members and so has significant influence over HMT 
decisions‖ 
 
HASM04: "The matron has more power because she has the numbers and is more 
eloquent……the nurses can be able to make a lot of noise and their proposal is considered, but 
you are only a single person‖ 
 
The power imbalance between senior and middle level managers is exacerbated by the fact that two senior 
managers not only appeared to wield power but also use it to their advantage. It was clear from my 
observation and from the feelings of other managers, that these two senior managers exercise significant 
influence over hospital decision making. For example, whereas there are official decision making 
structures in the hospital (HMT, EEC and HMC), I observed that these two managers always have side 
(informal) meetings before and after each of these committee meetings. In these side meetings, they 
deliberate and agree on their preferred outcome of the formal meetings, and steer the formal meetings to 
this outcome. In essence therefore, actual decisions are made in these side meetings rather than the formal 
meetings. This phenomenon has contributed to the distrust and perceptions of lack of transparency 
expressed by hospital managers and frontline staff (7.3). 
 
These two managers therefore seem to exercise power with to exert influence over hospital priority 
setting decisions. 
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 HAML08: "These are very sensitive issues I think he should handle…..I think he is overpowered 
by those two you know when they are the two they support each other"  
 
It is also felt that these two senior managers derive power from the fact that they have access to crucial 
information needed for planning and budgeting. 
 
HAML07: "They (the two senior managers) are important given that they have information which 
is useful for budgeting and planning……..for example they have information about 
finances….they are very important members such that if we plan a meeting and they do not come, 
it will be very difficult to do budgeting and planning" 
 
Middle level managers in Hospital A complained of unfairness in resource allocations because these two 
―senior managers‖ wield excessive power and use it to favor their own departments and those of 
managers they enjoy good relations with. The power enjoyed by these two managers is such that middle 
level managers feel that any proposal for funding resource allocation in the hospital has a chance of 
receiving funding only if it receives their support. It was thought that managers that are not aligned to 
these two managers are significantly disadvantaged in resource allocation decisions. 
 
HAML15: "Most of the time you bring up an issue or propose an idea and if those two (hospital 
administrator and hospital accountant) are not on your side, trust me it won‘t go through, it is as 
simple as that, so the two of them basically have to back an idea and the medical superintendent 
does not do anything about it.....I think he is just overwhelmed" 
 
From the foregoing, the key outcome of the power plays at Hospital A is to breed an atmosphere of 
distrust, suspicion and frustration. The interaction of agents in the complex system that is Hospital A is 
seen to contribute to the emergent property or a ―government culture‖. This is an example of how the 
actions (or more appropriately inaction) of one actor (the medical superintendent) in the complex system 
that is the hospital influences the actions of other agents (the two senior managers) and significantly 
affects relationships between all system agents (senior and middle level managers and frontline staff). The 
relationship between senior and middle level managers in hospital B was quite different and shall be 
examined next. 
 
 
 
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
159  
 
Interactions between Senior and Middle Level Managers in Hospital B 
While the EEC in hospital B, similar to Hospital A is comprised of senior managers and the HMT of 
middle level managers, the power differences between these two levels of managers appear to be reduced 
or ―managed‖. This is thought to be as a result of the medical superintendent‘s initiative to ensure priority 
setting in the hospital is an inclusive and consultative process (7.3). The presence and leadership of the 
medical superintendent in this hospital is felt (7.3). She exercises her power to and power over to ensure 
that all managers are included in the decision making process. For example, unlike in Hospital A, the 
hospital budget is deliberated on and finalized in the HMT at Hospital B (7.3). The EEC only rarely 
finalizes the budget, and when it does, it is only after ―getting permission‖ from the HMT to do so. 
Hospital budgeting in Hospital B hence takes place in an invited space where both senior and middle level 
managers participated.  The medical superintendent feels that it is only by developing the budget at the 
HMT level that all managers, senior and middle level would understand and accept the outcome of the 
process.  
 
HBSM01: ―We try to make sure that all managers are involved in the budgeting process. If the 
budget is developed by the HMT, then every manager gets a chance to contribute. This way the 
understand how difficult it is to develop the budget and they understand why they cannot always 
get what they ask for‖ 
 
I also observed in the budgeting meetings in hospital B that the atmosphere is less tense compared to the 
budgeting meetings in Hospital A and that all managers, senior or middle level felt free to speak out. The 
medical superintendent is keen to allow anyone who wants to speak in the meetings to do so. As a result, 
middle level managers feel included in the decision making process and think that the process is fair. The 
suspicion that accompanies the budgeting and resource allocation process in Hospital A is also absent in 
Hospital B.  
 
HBML08: ―We [hospital managers] are usually involved in the budgeting process and so there is 
nothing to hide. All the money collected is announced in the HMT and we decide on how to 
spend it. The process is transparent‖ 
 
The power difference between hospital managers is typical in other settings where decision making 
environments tend to be highly hierarchical and politically complex (Gibson et al. 2005). In these settings, 
like in the case study settings, power was derived from similar sources. For example, in Argentina, senior 
managers, with control over the hospital budget, like the hospital administrator and accountant in hospital 
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A, had more power compared to middle level managers (Gordon et al. 2009). This underlies the critical 
role that hospital leadership should play in balancing the interests and managing the power differences 
between different actors (Reeleder et al. 2006). 
8. 3 NON-CLINICAL MANAGERS AND CLINICIANS
Another interface where power differences play out in priority setting practices is between hospital 
managers in general (hospital administration) and hospital clinicians. It was a general observation in both 
case study hospitals that clinicians do not participate in budgeting and planning activities for the hospital. 
In both case study hospitals, the EEC and HMT comprised of non-clinical managers except for the 
medical superintendent. Even though clinical departments such as obstetrics and gynecology and 
pediatrics are headed by clinician managers, these departments are represented in these meetings by the 
nurses rather than the clinician managers.  In both case study hospitals, frontline clinicians do not attend 
these meetings. Senior managers feel that one of the reasons clinicians do not participate in budgeting and 
planning meetings is that they are not interested in participating in management or administrative 
activities and are only keen on their clinical responsibilities. 
HASM05: "You know sometimes the problem is negligence.....because they are invited to the 
meetings and they do not come......also they feel that their interest is taken care of by the medical 
superintendent" 
MBSM03: ―The doctors are just not interested in hospital management issues. They know when 
we plan for the meetings but they don‘t show up because they prefer to be in the wards and the 
clinics‖ 
On closer examination however, it appears that one of the major contributors to non-participation of 
clinicians was professional identity. Clinicians in both hospitals do not seem to think that managerial 
responsibilities such as budgeting and planning are part of their roles as professionals. They identify 
themselves more with their clinical roles and consider time spent participating doing managerial duties as 
―wasted time‖. 
Both senior managers and clinicians feel that the shortage of clinical staff has also contributed to the non-
participation of clinicians in budgeting and planning meetings. This reason is also perhaps not totally 
honest given that, from my observations, clinicians do not spend most of their time in the hospital but 
rather dedicate a significant proportion of it to personal/private practice either in their own clinics or 
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neighboring private clinics. This was observation also echoed by middle level managers who reported that 
these clinical managers have set up private practices (or work part time in private clinics) and split their 
time between their government jobs and their private practice. They therefore have very little time left to 
attend to priority setting activities in the hospitals.  
 
HAML12: ―All these doctors locum in private clinics. The senior ones in fact have their own 
private clinics in town. So they don‘t want to come for budgeting meetings because it will eat on 
their time for their private practice‖ 
  
HBML20: ―They [the doctors] have two jobs, here and in the private hospitals. So they cannot 
find time to participate in hospital management because they are busy making money in the 
private hospitals‖ 
 
Middle level managers in both hospitals also feel that another reason clinicians do not participate in 
budgeting and planning meetings is because they feel less motivated and frustrated by the scarcity of 
resources (7.2.4).  
 
However, clinicians in both case hospitals reported that one of the main reasons they did not participate in 
priority setting activities is because they were not invited to participate. For the clinicians therefore, 
hospital budgeting and planning appeared to be a closed space that excluded them. It was also evident 
from their responses that they have poor knowledge of the priority setting activities that take place in the 
hospital. For example, clinicians interviewed are generally not aware that the hospital prepares AWPs. 
They are also not aware of the decision making structures in the hospital such as the HMT, EEC and 
HMC. Clinicians feel that they are excluded from priority setting activities and that these activities are 
controlled by a ―clique‖ of hospital managers: 
  
HAFL28: "I have never attended an annual operational planning meeting, either because of, you 
know, sometimes you are not even aware there is a meeting going on, because it seems like there 
is a certain clique of people who are always involved in those meetings"   
 
Clinicians also feel that one of the reasons they have little influence is their lack of planning and 
budgeting skills (7.3).  
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It appears that over time, because of this exclusion, clinicians in both hospitals have come to accept their 
non-participation as the norm. Hospital administrators hence appear to exercise invisible power over 
priority setting processes such that, clinicians have come to believe that it is not part of their role or their 
right to participate in these processes.  
 
HBFL22:―To be honest the reason why I have not attended some of these meetings is because I 
have not seen my fellow colleagues attending the meeting. My senior colleagues...because when 
you report to a certain institution sometimes you tend to do what people do, you follow the 
norms"  
 
In both hospitals however, clinicians appear to exert more influence over the medicine selection 
decisions. This was because these decisions required expert knowledge on medicines which the non-
clinical managers did not have. For decisions that required clinical knowledge therefore, clinicians 
exercised their power derived from the position of technical knowledge. 
 
HASM05: ―Of course the clinicians have an influence.  They are the guys who prescribe 
medicines. Sometimes different clinicians have different preferences for medicines to use for 
certain conditions. Take me for instance. If I am treating a certain condition, out of experience I 
know this drug works much better than the other drugs so I‘ll request for it to be stocked by the 
pharmacy‖ 
 
HBFL21: ―The doctors determine what medicines the pharmacist will buy. This is because they 
deal with the patients and so they know what medicines the patients need. So they tell the 
pharmacist to stock the medicines that they think are needed by their patients‖ 
 
At the interface between non-clinical hospital managers and clinicians, the key outcome is the exclusion 
of clinicians from hospital priority setting processes. In both case hospitals, this exclusion is thought to 
result in the misrepresentation of clinical priorities. Clinicians feel that non-clinical managers do not have 
an understanding of clinical needs and therefore cannot adequately articulate them in priority setting 
meetings. It was reported by non-clinical managers that often clinical priorities are not included in plans 
and budgets because there is inadequate representation of clinicians in meetings.  
 
HBFL26: "Some of the things are dealt with by the office of the administrator....since he is not a 
clinician he does not understand what we go through...‖ 
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Perhaps more importantly, the fact that clinicians do not participate in priority setting activities means that 
only values of one set of actors (hospital managers, who were non-clinicians), dominate decision making. 
Partly because of the socialization from professional (non-clinical) background and also because of the 
knowledge (or lack thereof) they possess, non- clinical managers place more value on considerations that 
have administrative importance. For example, in deciding whether or not to fund a proposal, they are 
more concerned about whether the hospital can afford to fund the activity, and whether the activity has 
the potential to generate revenues that can add onto the hospital resource envelope. The managers thus 
operate under a fiscal-managerial decision system (Greer 1985). On the other hand, clinicians are more 
concerned about the needs of the patients (regardless of whether they are paying patients or not) and their 
ability to deliver health care services to these needy patients. Clinicians are also concerned about whether 
services are effective and of good quality. They therefore operate under a medical-individualistic decision 
system (Greer 1985). However, given that clinicians are excluded from decision making processes, the 
fiscal –managerial value system dominates priority setting decisions. The dominance of non-clinical 
manager values perhaps (alongside resource scarcity and reliance on user fees (7.2.4)) contributed to the 
emergence of the revenue generation criterion in decision making which resulted in the case study 
hospitals operating under a ―revenue-maximizing‖ model (Figure 8.1). As discussed previously, this has 
resulted in the inequitable allocation of hospital resources, where high revenue generating departments are 
favored over low or non-revenue generating departments (7.2.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. 1: Revenue Maximizing Behavior of Hospitals 
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Power struggles between hospital managers and clinicians have been documented elsewhere. For 
example, a study of a hospital in Uganda reported that hospital managers were reluctant to share decision 
making power with frontline clinicians (Kapiriri et al. 2006). The power balance between hospital 
managers and clinicians however appears to be dependent on whether priority setting decisions required 
specialized skills and if so, the type of skills required. This is because professional power is typically 
derived from the possession of specialized skills (Gibson et al. 2005). In settings where priority setting 
decisions rely significantly on management skills, managers exercised more power, while in settings 
where priority setting was significantly influenced by clinical considerations, clinicians exercised more 
power. This would explain why in the Kenyan case, managers exercise more power over budgeting 
decisions, while clinicians appear to influence medicine selection decisions more. Further the tensions 
between the two models of actor values, the medical individualist decision system and the fiscal 
managerial decision system has been shown elsewhere (Greer 1985, Danjuox et al .2007, Gordon et al. 
2009). This conflict was however more evident in scenarios where decisions affected identifiable patients 
such as medicines selection processes (Gallego et al. 2007). 
8. 4 HOSPITAL MANAGERS AND THE COMMUNITY
Interactions between hospital managers and the community also provided a platform for the exercise of 
power. In both case study hospitals, priority setting activities are undertaken by hospital staff either as 
individuals (in the case of nursing allocation and medicine selection) or as committees (the HMT and the 
EEC) that do not have community representation. Priority setting activities in hospitals therefore seem to 
occur in closed spaces where the community is not included. Hospital managers in both hospitals feel that 
it would be difficult to include community members in hospital priority setting meetings because they do 
not possess the technical capacity to contribute effectively. 
HASM06: ―The problem with community members here is that most of them are uneducated. It is 
difficult for them to take part in decision making because they don‘t have much knowledge‖ 
HBML11: ―The community members are not well trained to take part in budgeting. It can be very 
difficult to involve them in such a process‖ 
It is also thought that it would be problematic to include community members in priority setting decisions 
because they would lack objectivity to make allocation decisions but rather would be biased by their 
experiences and their healthcare needs.  
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HASM04: ―The problem with community members is that they only think of what affects them. 
If you involve them in decision making, they might just promote things that affect them only‖ 
 
In both case study hospitals, the community is, on paper, only represented in the HMC, which as an 
oversight committee of the hospital. In both hospitals however there are concerns about the representation 
of the HMC‘s. It is felt that the members of these committees are not selected through fair and transparent 
processes but rather based on perceived relationships with local politicians or hospital senior managers.  
 
HASM03: ―How are the members selected? It depends on who they know. If you are a friend of 
the politicians or the senior managers in the hospital then you are made a HMC member‖ 
 
HBSM04: ―HMC members are cronies of local politicians. That is how people are selected to be 
in HMC. It is not a transparent process‖ 
 
These HMC members are therefore not thought to represent community members. Further, the fact that 
their selection is influenced by the hospital managers means that they feel indebted to them. This is 
because HMC member benefit by drawing (financial) sitting allowances and prestige from the position. 
Further their oversight position provides them with an opportunity to access information that would 
enable them to influence and/or benefit from hospital procurement tenders.  It is thought that the HMC 
members are careful not to go against the wishes of the hospital managers so as to retain their support for 
membership in the HMC. Therefore, whereas on paper the community members, through the HMC, have 
an oversight responsibility over the hospital, in practice the HMC is not empowered. In both hospitals, it 
was reported that the HMC is passive and merely ―rubberstamps‖ hospital decisions. For example, 
whereas the HMC is required to review and amend (if necessary) the budget developed by hospitals, in 
practice they have adopted a passive role and approve the budgets without serious scrutiny. 
 
HAML14: ―The HMC is toothless, they just rubberstamp decisions. They don‘t want to step on 
the toes of the hospital managers because they are the ones that influenced their selection‖ 
 
HBML17: ―The committee [HMC] cannot ask any questions. They just accept the decisions of 
the hospital because they are powerless‖ 
 
At the interface between the hospital and the community, the exclusion of the community from priority 
setting processes means that community voice is not directly incorporated in hospital decision making 
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and puts to question both the responsiveness of the hospital to community needs and the legitimacy of the 
decision making process. 
 
The exclusion of the community in priority setting practices in hospitals is a common and recurrent theme 
across different settings (Barasa et al, 2014). Studies of priority setting practices in both developed and 
developing countries have revealed an unwillingness of hospital managers to share the decision making 
space with the community. For example, it has been shown that there is limited community involvement 
in healthcare priority setting practices in Uganda (Kapiriri et al. 2003), Tanzania (Flumence et al. 2013) 
and Colombia (Mosquera et al. 2001). In all these settings the community has been involved mostly 
through oversight hospital committees whose representation and legitimacy was questioned.  
 
8. 5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have presented findings on the influence of actor dynamics and practices of power on 
priority setting practices in case study hospitals. It emerged that actors interact at three main interfaces in 
both case study hospitals namely 1) the senior managers and middle level managers 2) the non-clinical 
managers and clinicians and 3) the hospital managers and the community. Actor dynamics are shown to 
be similar across both case study hospitals for each of the interfaces except for the senior managers and 
middle level managers interface. At this interface it was shown that while in Hospital A there are 
significant power imbalances between senior and middle level managers, in Hospital B this imbalance is 
managed by the hospital medical superintendent. In hospital A, actual budgeting decisions are undertaken 
in the closed space of the EEC while in hospital B, the budgeting process is open to both senior and 
middle level managers in the HMT committee. Even though the HMT in hospital A holds budgeting 
meetings, actual budgeting decisions are deferred to the EEC, an exercise of hidden power by the senior 
managers.   It was shown that unmanaged power imbalances provide opportunities for those with greater 
power to influence decisions to their advantage, and breeds an atmosphere of distrust, lack of motivation 
and perceptions of unfairness. It was also shown that power imbalances can result in the exclusion of 
specific actors from priority setting processes, in this case clinicians and the community, and puts in 
question the fairness and legitimacy of decision making processes. Given that often specific segments of 
actors possess varying values, the lack of inclusivity in decision making processes allows for the 
domination of specific values at the expense of others. In the case of the study hospitals, the exclusion of 
clinicians and hence domination of administrative values has contributed to the transformation of the case 
hospitals into ―revenue maximizers‖ with undesirable implications for the equity in resource allocation in 
the hospitals. All these underlie the importance of structuring and managing hospital decision making 
process in hospitals such that power differences are balanced, and that inclusivity is ensured. In the next 
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results chapter, I will present results on the evaluation of priority setting practices in the case study 
hospitals.  
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CHAPTER IX: RESULTS (PART FOUR): THE 
EVALUATION OF PRIORITY SETTING 
PRACTICES IN CASE STUDY HOSPITALS 
9. 1 INTRODUCTION
n the previous three results chapters, I described 1) priority setting practices in the case study hospitals,
2) the influence of hospital context on priority setting practices and 3) the influence of actors and
practices of power on priority setting. In this chapter, I evaluate priority setting in the case study hospitals 
using the framework developed in the literature review (3.3) and presented in the methods (5.2.3). This 
framework draws on ideas from proceduralist and consequentialist approaches to priority setting to 
propose an integrated evaluation approach in which meso level priority setting practices in healthcare 
institutions are seen as appropriate if they espouse specified substantive principles, procedural conditions 
and results, and are grounded on community values (5.2.3). In this chapter, how each case study hospital 
performed on each of these conditions is presented and discussed.  
9. 2 EVALUATION OF PRIORITY SETTING
In this section, I will present and compare findings on priority setting practices in the two case hospitals 
against the adopted evaluation framework. Table 9.1 presents a summary of these findings.  The section 
will begin by presenting findings on the incorporation of community values, followed by the use of 
substantive principles, procedural conditions and finally the results of priority setting practices.  
Table 9. 1: Summary of Findings on the Evaluation of Priority Setting Practice in Case Study Hospitals 
CONDITION HOSPITAL A HOSPITAL B 
Community values 
In both hospitals, there is no effective mechanism for incorporating 
community values 
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 
Efficiency 
In both hospitals, an attempt to incorporate efficiency, by considering 
affordability of alternatives has been incorporated in decision making 
Equity In both hospitals, equity is not incorporated in decision making 
PROCEDURAL CONDITIONS 
Stakeholder engagement 
Frontline practitioners and middle 
level managers are excluded from 
decision making 
Frontline practitioners are excluded 
from decision making 
I 
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CONDITION HOSPITAL A HOSPITAL B 
PROCEDURAL CONDITIONS 
Stakeholder 
empowerment 
Middle level managers, frontline 
practitioners and community 
representatives are  not empowered 
Frontline practitioners and 
community representatives are not 
empowered 
Transparency Low transparency Moderate transparency 
Revisions In both hospitals there is no provision for revisions  
Use of 
information/Evidence 
In both hospitals, the quality of information used for decision making is low 
RESULTS OF PRIORITY SETTING PROCESS 
Stakeholder satisfaction Low stakeholder satisfaction Moderate stakeholder satisfaction 
Stakeholder 
understanding 
Low stakeholder understanding Moderate stakeholder understanding 
Shifted priorities In both hospitals, priority setting practice does not result in shifted priorities 
Implementation of 
decisions 
In both hospitals, there is low implementation of decisions  
 
9. 2.1 Community Values 
Using Gavin Mooney‘s (1998) conception of communitarian claims, healthcare priority setting practices 
should be guided by values drawn from the community. The role of the community is not seen as that of 
making technical decisions, but rather as determining the ―meta rules‖ that will form the basis for 
technical decisions by professionals (Mooney 1998). Healthcare institutions should therefore have 
mechanisms to obtain and integrate community values in their decision making.  
 
In both case study hospitals, community views are obtained through two mechanisms namely the 
suggestion box and community representatives in the HMC. Both mechanisms are however not seen to be 
effective as mechanisms of channeling community views. In both case study hospitals, it was reported 
that the suggestion box is hardly opened by the hospital administration, and that even when it was opened, 
the views expressed in the contents are rarely incorporated in decision making. Using Rowe and Frewer‘s 
(2000) framework, the suggestion box falls under the ―communication‖ form of obtaining community 
views. It is a form of one way communication where community members write their suggestions or 
complaints on a piece of paper and drop it into the suggestion box. This mechanism does not provide for 
feedback from the hospital management or engagement and debate between managers and communities. 
The fact that in both hospitals the contents of suggestion boxes are hardly ever examined or incorporated 
in decision making means that as a means of obtaining community views, this mechanism is not 
particularly effective.  
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
170  
 
The incorporation of community representatives in the HMC is also shown to be an ineffective 
mechanism for obtaining community values in both hospitals. Even though on paper, this mechanism can 
be classified as a ―participatory‖ mechanism where deliberation occurs between the hospital managers 
and the community representatives, in practice this mechanism was shown to have two main short 
comings in the case study hospitals. First, the method of appointing community representatives into the 
committee is thought not to be transparent and inclusive (8.4). Second, given that the community 
representatives are beholden to the senior hospital managers, their role in hospital priority setting is seen 
merely as that of ―rubber stamping‖ hospital decisions given that they hardly questioned or contributed to 
hospital decision making (8.4). The community representatives in this committee are therefore not 
empowered to contribute to decision making and therefore this mechanism, as designed and implemented 
in the case study hospitals, can also be said to be an ineffective mechanism for obtaining community 
views. 
  
Generally therefore, in both case study hospitals, it can be concluded that there is no effective mechanism 
in place to obtain and integrate community views into priority setting decisions. The finding of limited 
community involvement in hospital level priority setting resonates with experiences from other settings 
reported in literature (3.2).  
 
9. 2.2 Substantive Principles  
Efficiency and Equity 
Given that priority setting is necessitated by the need to tackle the challenge of resource scarcity versus 
unlimited healthcare needs, allocative efficiency has been widely acknowledged as a relevant principle 
that should guide priority setting processes (Norheim et al. 2007). For a priority setting process to be 
oriented towards achieving allocative efficiency, it should incorporate a systematic mechanism that seeks 
to maximize outcomes within the constraint of available resources. Examples of such mechanisms in 
healthcare priority setting include economic evaluation methods such as cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA) and programme budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA). An examination of both case study 
hospitals, however, reveals that priority setting decisions across the three tracer activities are not guided 
by such mechanisms to achieve efficiency. Hospital managers were unfamiliar with this concept and 
specific methods such as CEA and PBMA. When I explained the basics and rationales of these methods, 
they responded that although the methods were potentially useful in decision making, they lacked the 
technical skills and data required. Even though these ―sophisticated‖ methods are not employed by the 
case study hospitals, priority setting tools used at the hospital level such as the essential medicines lists 
(EML) are developed nationally based on, among others, evidence of cost-effectiveness.  It can also be 
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argued that there is an attempt to incorporate efficiency by considering the affordability of competing 
priorities. By taking into account the costs and affordability of competing priorities, managers are 
recognizing budget limitations and the need to make decisions such that the hospital can get the most out 
of available resources. This finding is consistent with my literature review (3.2) where only 3 out of the 
24 included studies reported the use of economic criteria as a consideration in hospital level priority 
setting.  
 
While maximizing outcomes from scarce resources is generally desirable, it is also important that 
individuals be given fair chances to receive those scarce resources. In this thesis equity in allocation of 
resources refers to the absence of systematic disparities in healthcare resource allocation across patient 
groups. While the central MOH has put in place a user fee waiver policy aimed at enhancing equity by 
prioritizing access to service by vulnerable populations (children and the disabled),  in both case study 
hospitals, unintended policy effects has resulted in the underfunding of these services and thus the 
introduction of inequities (7.2.4). In both hospitals therefore, revenue maximization trumps equity. 
Further, the reported favoritism in resource allocation given to departments whose managers enjoyed 
good relationships with senior management can also be considered as a source of inequity (8.2). 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the priority given to departments handling emergencies such as theater 
and maternity demonstrates a special concern for the worse off and is hence a form of incorporating 
equity in hospital priority setting.  
 
 
While equity has been discussed as a consideration in priority setting at both macro and micro levels, its 
application to priority setting at the meso level in hospitals is limited. In my literature review, only 2 out 
of the 24 included papers reported the use of equity as a consideration of resource allocation (3.2). In one 
of the papers, Astley and Wake- Dyster et al (2001) describe a priority setting process in a Women‘s and 
Children‘s hospital in Australia that incorporates PBMA, community values and evidence. In this case, 
the equity criteria requires that hospital services are 1) designed to treat or prevent the major health 
problems for groups most disadvantaged according to health outcomes statistics available and 2) designed 
to improve access to those groups who experience barriers to health care (Astley and Wake- Dyster 
2001). Valdebenito et al (2009) report on the use of ―equality, equity, dignity, universal access to health 
care‖ as a key consideration in hospital level priority setting in a Chilean hospital. While equity is not 
explicitly stated as a goal, it could be argued that it is reflected in criteria that embody different 
definitions of equity. For example, a number of studies have reported the use of medical need (Bell et al 
2004, Gallego et al 2007, Valdebenito et al 2009) and rule of rescue (Bell et al 2004) as a criterion in 
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hospital level priority setting.  We will now turn our attention to procedural conditions of priority setting 
practices. 
9. 2.3 Compliance with Procedural Conditions
Procedural conditions used to evaluate priority setting in this framework are grounded on the principles of 
deliberative democracy. Deliberative democratic processes are thought to result in ―procedural fairness‖ 
and have more legitimacy (Chambers 2003).  
Stakeholder Engagement 
Stakeholder engagement refers to an organization's efforts to identify the relevant internal and external 
stakeholders and to involve these stakeholders effectively in the decision- making process (Sibbald et al. 
2009). For hospital level priority setting, relevant stakeholders include, at a minimum, administrators, 
clinicians, and members of the public (Coulter & Ham 2000).  The active inclusion of relevant 
stakeholders in priority setting process is firmly grounded in deliberative democratic ideals (Chambers 
2003). Stakeholder engagement varies across priority setting activities and between the case study 
hospitals. Generally, the hospital budgeting and planning process is more inclusive (6.2), followed by the 
medicines selection process (6.3), with the nursing allocation being the least inclusive process in both 
hospitals (6.4). The degree of inclusivity however varies across the case study hospitals, with Hospital B 
conducting their priority setting in a more inclusive manner than Hospital A (7.3,8.2).  
Stakeholder involvement has been examined in a number of studies on hospital level priority setting. The 
most commonly excluded stakeholders in most settings are frontline practitioners and the community 
(3.2). While stakeholder engagement is desirable, it is only effective if the stakeholders are empowered to 
contribute to decision making. This shall be examined next. 
Stakeholder Empowerment 
Empowerment is used here to refer to the ability of a stakeholder to effectively contribute to decision 
making. Stakeholders are said to be empowered if there is opportunity for them to voice their opinions 
and that these opinions are considered and potentially incorporated in decisions. The level of 
empowerment of different stakeholders varies between the case study hospitals. In hospital A, middle 
level managers appear to have a low level of empowerment to participate in priority setting activities 
compared to hospital B (8.2) 
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While empowerment has not been documented specifically for hospital level decision making, findings in 
other levels in the health system offer useful lessons. It has been shown that the empowerment of 
stakeholders is not automatic and that a number of factors come into play. For example in Tanzania, 
effective participation of the public in priority setting decisions was influenced by gender, wealth, 
ethnicity and education (Shayo et al. 2013).  
Transparency 
Deliberative democracy literature has generally considered transparency in decision making processes as 
the extent to which decisions about resource allocation and the rationales for these reasons are accessible 
to the relevant stakeholders (Chambers 2003). Based on this definition, the extent to which priority setting 
practices are transparent varies between the case study hospitals and across the priority setting activities. 
Generally, Hospital B exhibits more transparency compared to Hospital A, while in each of these 
hospitals, the budgeting and planning process is more transparent compared to the medicines selection 
process, which is in turn more transparent compared to the nursing allocation process.  
In Hospital A, there is no mechanism in place for disseminating budgeting and planning decisions. Once 
the final budgets and AWPs have been prepared, they are not shared with the hospital managers. Only 
selected senior managers have access to these documents. Managers reported that they have to follow up 
with the hospital accountant or administrator to obtain information about the final outcome of the 
budgeting process. The same applies for the AWP process. For both processes, the reasons for decisions 
are not communicated to the managers. Front line practitioners also reported that they are in the dark as 
far as budgeting and planning decisions in the hospital are concerned. Managers and front line clinicians 
in this hospital also reported having no knowledge of the outcomes and reasons for medicine selection 
and nursing allocation processes. This is because these two processes are undertaken informally in this 
hospital and are led by one individual (the hospital pharmacist and nursing officer in charge respectively), 
with no communication mechanism (6.3, 6.4). For example, managers complained that they would often 
find that their nursing staffs have been moved without any communication. Front line practitioners 
complained that they are not made aware of the medicines that have been procured and hence available in 
the hospital. 
In Hospital B, the fact that budgeting and planning is a more inclusive process means that managers 
generally are more aware of the budgeting and planning decisions and the rationales behind them. They 
therefore reported that the process is transparent. However, they also reported that, like in Hospital A, 
final budgets and work plans are not made available to them unless they individually sought for them. The 
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
174  
 
medicines selection process is also more transparent compared to Hospital A given that decision making 
is more inclusive. As presented in the previous chapters, medicines selection decisions are made in a 
committee (medicines and therapeutic committee) that is constituted by departmental representatives. The 
fact that the hospital is developing a medicines formulary meant that hospital managers and clinicians will 
have access to information on what medicines have been selected for use in the hospital. Further, a list of 
medicines that have been procured and are available at any given time in the hospital is circulated to the 
different clinical departments. It was generally felt therefore that the medicine selection process is 
transparent. The reasons for decisions on medicines selection are however not communicated and hence 
this element of transparency is lacking.  The nursing allocation process in hospital B is not considered to 
be transparent and is similar to that of Hospital A, where decisions are made by one actor (the nursing 
officer in charge) without communication of either the decisions or rationales to other actors.   
 
In both case study hospitals, it appears that communication of decisions is not given high importance. 
Information is often disseminated informally to managers or staff who actively sought it. For example, 
managers have to follow up and seek information about the outcome of the budget allocation meetings on 
an individual basis, since there is no official communication of the decisions. The lack of transparency in 
priority setting in case study hospitals mirrors findings on priority setting in other settings. It has 
generally been observed that while decisions of priority setting practices might be communicated, rarely 
are rationales for these decisions communicated (Barasa et al 2014).  
 
Use of Quality Information 
In both case study hospitals, decisions are rarely made based on information/evidence. Information is 
gathered using formal channels such as the hospital management information system but ignored. 
Decision makers often use their gut feeling and hearsay as the basis for decision making. When 
information is used, the use is symbolic rather than functional. That is, information is used to justify 
rather than clarify decisions. Decisions are first made and then information is sought to justify the 
decisions. One of the reasons given for the low use of information is that the quality of information 
available is questionable. Managers reported that data captured in clinic registers often has gaps and does 
not capture all events. They also complained that the data captured in clinic registers is not accurate. 
 
Revisions 
In the case study hospitals, whether or not priority setting decisions can be appealed and/or revised is 
dependent on the nature of the priority setting activity. It appears that the more formal and centrally 
(MOH) controlled a process, the more inflexible it is to appeal and revise the decisions, and vice versa. 
For example, in both case study hospitals the budgeting and planning process does not have a provision 
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for a formal appeals and revisions process. This is mainly because this is a highly formal process with 
prescriptive and inflexible guidelines from the central MOH that does not provide for revisions. Once the 
quarterly budget or the AWPs have been prepared and approved, they cannot be changed or altered over 
the course of the planning period.  This means that the decision making process is inflexible and cannot 
be improved with emerging information. It also means that there is no formal avenue for parties to contest 
planning and budgeting decisions.  In both hospitals, however, the situation is different for the medicines 
selection process and the nursing allocation process, which are more informal. While there is no formal 
process for appeals and revisions of decisions, it was reported that revisions are possible informally. 
Actors that are not happy with these priority setting decisions often follow up informally with the 
responsible senior managers to argue their case and revise decisions. For example, it was reported in both 
hospitals that often nursing allocation decisions are followed up by one-on-one negotiations between the 
nursing officer in charge and disgruntled nurses or managers and revisions where possible.  
 
This finding reflects findings reported from literature on hospital priority setting practices in other 
settings. In my literature review, only 4 out of the 12 studies that evaluated priority setting reported the 
presence of a formal appeals process while the other 8 reported the presence of informal mechanisms 
where dissatisfied staff would seek redress directly with the hospital chief executive (3.2). Among the 
studies that reported formal appeals processes, this was found to be a fundamental component to overall 
perceived fairness of the priority setting process (Madden 2005). The appeals process also enhanced the 
involvement of stakeholders and increased overall participant satisfaction (Madden 2005).  
 
9. 2.4 Results of Priority Setting Processes 
Stakeholder Satisfaction  
It has been observed that the satisfaction of stakeholder groups in a priority setting process is key to its 
success (Sibbald et al. 2009).  Satisfaction is indicated by degree of contentment as well as the continued 
willingness to participate in the process. Stakeholders may be able to accept priority setting decisions, 
even if though may not always agree with the outcomes (Sibbald et al. 2010). The level of satisfaction 
with the priority setting process varies between hospitals and across the priority setting activities. In 
Hospital A, stakeholders generally reported not being satisfied with all the three priority setting activities 
for a number of reasons. First, the priority setting process in Hospital A is generally not inclusive, leaving 
most stakeholders disgruntled (7.3, 8.2).  Second, the scarcity of resources meant that hospital managers 
are not satisfied with the resources that are allocated and are available to them (7.2.4). Third, the use of 
revenue generation potential as a criterion for priority setting has left the managers whose departments 
generate little revenue disgruntled (7.2.4). Fourth, there are suspicions of corruption among a few senior 
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managers (7.3). All these have led to a general sense of unfairness and resultant lack of satisfaction in the 
priority setting process in this hospital.  
In Hospital B, the stakeholders reported having some level of satisfaction with the budgeting and 
planning process and the medicines selection process. While they are unhappy with the limited 
availability of resources, they seem to understand the scarcity situation. It appears that this general 
satisfaction with the process is due to the fact that they are included in these priority setting processes. 
However, managers of departments with low revenue generating potential, like in Hospital A, are 
unhappy with the process. Further, like in Hospital A, managers in Hospital B are also not happy with the 
nursing allocation process given that it is not inclusive and is led by one manager (the nursing officer in 
charge).  
The determinants for satisfaction with priority setting process in the case study hospitals mirror those 
found in other settings. For example, an evaluation of priority setting in a Canadian hospital reported that 
stakeholders were not satisfied with the process when there was lack of, or poor communication about the 
process and when they were excluded from the process (Sibbald et al. 2010). 
Stakeholder Understanding (Awareness) 
Stakeholder understanding implies that all relevant stakeholders have insight into the priority setting 
process (e.g. goals of the process, rules and guidelines, procedures used, rationale for priority setting and 
rationale for priority setting decisions). Stakeholder understanding increases their acceptance and 
confidence in the process (Sibbald et al. 2010). How well stakeholders understand the priority setting 
process is linked to the procedural conditions of stakeholder engagement and transparency. This is 
because people will only understand a process well if they are involved in it and its outcomes and 
rationales are adequately communicated to them. In both case study hospitals, the level of understanding 
of the priority setting process is low among stakeholders. This level of understanding varies across 
stakeholders and is dependent on the level of their engagement. For example, while in Hospital A the 
middle level managers have a low level of understanding of the budgeting process given that they are 
excluded from it, in Hospital B, the middle level managers reported adequate understanding of the 
process because they are involved in it.   
Shifted Priorities (reallocation of resources) 
A priority setting process should ideally result in changes in the allocation of resources. It has been 
observed that when priority setting processes do not result in change, it leads stakeholders to view it as an 
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inefficient use of time or mere window-dressing for predetermined outcomes  (Sibbald et al. 2009).  In 
both case study hospitals, priority setting processes do not result in shifted resources. This is because 
priority setting processes in these hospitals are significantly guided by historical allocations. This meant 
that departments or services that historically receive a larger share of resources continue to do so and vice 
versa. The priority setting process is therefore not responsive to the changing dynamics of resource needs. 
Consistent with literature, this observation has resulted in the perception by stakeholders in both hospitals 
that the priority setting processes are a waste of time. The importance of reallocation of resources as a 
result of priority setting processes has been reported in literature. For example, stakeholders in a hospital 
in Canada observed that a priority setting process should result in changes in organizational priorities 
reflected by a reallocation or resources (Gibson et al. 2004).  Sibbald et al (2010), in an effort to identify 
indicators of successful priority setting and test these in a pilot study, identified the shifting of priorities 
as one of the results of a successful priority setting process. In their pilot study, they reported that 
resources were reallocated as a result of priority setting processes in a hospital in Canada (Sibbald et al. 
2010).  
Implementation of Decisions 
Ultimately, decisions made during a priority setting process should result in implementation. Without 
implementation, stakeholders will view the priority setting process as a waste of time. The 
implementation of priority setting decisions varies across the priority setting activities that are examined, 
but is fairly similar between the case study hospitals. The budgeting and planning processes in both 
hospitals are considered to be mainly an activity on paper that is hardly implemented in practice. As 
presented in previous chapters, a number of reasons have led to the lack of implementation of decisions 
including the lack of resources, feigned compliance due to perceived lack of local relevance by national 
guidelines, a government culture and lack of a strong accountability mechanism. The implementation of 
medicines selection and nursing allocation decisions is mainly compromised by resource scarcity.  
9. 3 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, I have presented findings on the evaluation of priority setting practices in the case study 
hospitals. In doing so, I have employed a framework that examines four main aspects of priority setting 
namely 1) the role of community values 2) substantive principles 3) procedural conditions 4) results of 
priory setting processes. In both hospitals, there is no effective mechanism to incorporate public values in 
priority setting processes. If we are to accept that hospitals, as social institutions, should base their 
priority setting decisions on the values of the community, then the legitimacy of the priority setting 
process in the case study hospitals could be put to question. It also emerged that in both hospitals, an 
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attempt has been made to incorporate efficiency by using affordability as a decision criterion. Both 
hospitals however lacked the awareness, skills and relevant data to use methods such as cost-effectiveness 
analysis or PBMA.  The use of revenue generation as a criterion meant that resource allocation decisions 
were inequitable, even though the use of rule of rescue demonstrates a special concern for the worst off. 
While hospital managers think that these principles are important, they lacked the mechanism and/or 
capacity to implement them. The level of compliance with procedural conditions varies between 
hospitals. Generally, Hospital B fares better in incorporating deliberative democratic principles in priority 
setting processes compared to Hospital A. For example, Hospital B is better at stakeholder engagement, 
empowerment and transparency. This was also reflected in the results of priority setting, where it was 
observed that there is better stakeholder acceptance and understanding in Hospital B compared to 
Hospital A. Both hospitals are however poor in a number of procedural as well as results of priority 
setting. For example, both hospitals lack a formal process of appeals and revisions and hardly use 
evidence/information in decision making. The priority setting process in both hospitals also does not 
result in shifted resources and decisions are hardly implemented. From the foregoing, it is clear there is 
scope for the improvement of a number of aspects of priority setting in the case study hospitals. In the 
next chapter, I will provide a discussion of the results and offer proposals to policy makers on how to 
improve priority setting practices in case study hospitals.  
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CHAPTER X: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS, 
POLICY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
 
10. 1 INTRODUCTION 
his chapter provides a summary of the main findings of the study along the objectives that were set 
out at the beginning of the research. The chapter has three main sections: section 10.2 summarizes 
key findings based on the main topics of interest: description of priority setting practices, examination of 
the influence of contextual factors that affect priority setting practice in public hospitals in Kenya, 
examination of the influence of actor and power relations on priority setting practices and evaluation of 
priority setting practice. Section 10.3 presents policy issues that can be addressed in order to improve 
priority setting practices in public hospitals in Kenya and areas for further research. Finally, section 10.4 
provides a chapter summary. 
 
10. 2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS BY KEY OBJECTIVES  
10. 2.1 Description of Priority Setting Practices 
One of the objectives of this thesis was to describe priority setting practices in public hospitals in Kenya. 
A key observation emerging from the description of priority setting practices is that the case study 
hospitals are organizations with weak tangible software of systems and procedures. A number of priority 
setting guidelines and/or systems appear to be weak and/or missing in the case study hospitals (6.2.2). 
Consistent with CAS, this phenomenon reflects the properties of the larger system, the MOH, in which 
the case hospitals are embedded sub-systems. The MOH is responsible for developing guidelines for the 
management of public hospitals and the conduct of activities such as hospital budgeting and planning 
processes. The systems and guidelines within the MOH for budgeting and planning for the sector have 
been shown to be weak (Tsofa et al, unpublished). Within the MOH, the budgeting process is controlled 
by one set of actors, the department of economic policy, while the AWP process is controlled by another 
set of actors, the department of technical planning. While these are both departments of the MOH, it has 
been observed that these departments do not work in a coordinated fashion; they operate on different 
timelines, leading to mal-alignment of the budgeting and planning processes (Tsofa et al, unpublished). 
This state of confusion within the MOH is clearly seen to replicate itself in the embedded sub-systems, 
the public hospitals. As long as the role of guidelines and procedure development continue to lie with the 
central MOH, or the county governments in the new constitutional arrangement, then a resolution of the 
lack of clarity of guidelines and systems within hospitals has to start with the central (or county) 
T 
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governments.  The problem of weak systems and guidelines is compounded by the little incentive that 
hospital managers and frontline workers have to carry out the AWP process and implement it (7.2.4). The 
dominance of the budgeting process and neglect of the AWP process means that hospitals focus on short 
term operational goals rather than long term strategic goals. This observation is an emergent property of 
the hospitals in response to resource scarcity and mirrors observations in other settings. For example, in a 
hospital in Canada, it was reported that decision makers often focused on operational issues rather than 
strategic goals due to budget pressures (Martin, Shulman, et al. 2003).   
 
A second observation of the weakness of the tangible software of systems and procedures is the lack of 
clarity about the roles and composition of the different decision making organs in the case study hospitals 
(6.2.2). The absence of official guidelines from the MOH on the composition and roles of these 
committees meant that hospitals have to evolve their own rules which are clearly different between the 
case study hospitals. The emergent roles within each hospital have influenced the relationships among 
actors by altering their power relations (8.2). Hospital B is seen to adopt a more inclusive approach to 
decision making compared to hospital A. This was seen to result in feelings of unfairness, lack of 
transparency and reduced trust between senior and middle level managers in Hospital A and is a 
manifestation of the interaction between the tangible software of systems and procedures and the 
intangible software of relationships among agents within the complex hospital system (4.2.4). The 
importance of clarifying roles of decision making bodies has been highlighted in priority setting literature. 
For example Gibson et al (2004), based on workshops to assist board members and senior managers to 
develop fair priority setting processes in three healthcare organizations in Canada identified the need to 
clarify explicitly and upfront the specific responsibilities of decision making groups in relation to the 
priority setting process.  
 
A third observation concerns the appropriateness of the criteria used to set priorities. It has been pointed 
out in literature that criteria used to set healthcare priorities should be clearly defined and understood by 
stakeholders and decision-makers (Gibson et al. 2004). In both case study hospitals, there is no clearly 
defined priority setting criteria (6.2-6.4). In line with observations from other settings, both formal and 
informal criteria are used to make decisions across both case study hospitals (3.2). The dominant criteria 
used to set priorities in both case study hospitals is the revenue generating potential of the department. As 
will be discussed in section 10.2.2 and 10.2.3, this phenomenon has significant influence on the process 
and outcome of priority setting processes in the case study hospitals and is an example of the emergent 
property of the hospital system consistent with CAS. This finding is however contrary to findings in other 
settings were health need emerged as the most commonly used criterion for setting priorities in hospitals 
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(Barasa et al. 2014). Need was variously defined but generally interpreted as the prevalence or disease 
burden among patients in the hospitals catchment area and included current demand for health services, 
which could be measured on the basis of utilization rates and waiting list data (Gibson et al. 2004).   
The use of informal criteria to set priorities also stands out as an area of concern (6.2). While this 
observation was more prominent in Hospital A, it was minimized in hospital B largely because of the 
leadership style of the hospital superintendent (10.3.2). The use of informal criteria to set hospital 
priorities is consistent with findings in a number of settings.  For example, in a case study of priority 
setting practice in a hospital in Argentina, it was reported that decisions were made based on, among 
others, personal relationships and mutual benefit (Gordon et al. 2009). Also,  a case study of a hospital in 
Uganda reported that departments whose leaders knew how to "lobby", "make noise", ―quickly use up 
their resources", "make their case" are usually prioritized (Kapiriri & Martin 2006). In these settings, it 
was reported that the absence of data led to the use of informal or arbitrary considerations in decision 
making (Gordon et al. 2009). While this is also true of the case study hospitals, it also emerged that 
multiple additional factors have led to the use of informal criteria including the absence of explicit 
guidelines to guide priority setting and resource scarcity (see 10.2.2). As will be discussed in section 
10.3.3, the use of informal criteria has affected the relationships between different actors and is another 
example of the interactions between tangible and intangible software in the hospital systems. In the next 
sub-section, I will discuss the findings on the influence of contextual factors on hospital priority setting 
processes. 
10. 2.2 The Influence of Contextual Factors on Priority Setting Practice in Public
Hospitals in Kenya 
The examination of the influence of contextual factors on priority setting practices paints a picture of the 
case study hospitals as dynamic systems whose characteristics can be explained as non-linear emergent 
properties in response to environmental phenomena (Health Foundation 2010). One of the key findings of 
these interactions is the important role that hospital financing and level of resourcing affects priority 
setting practice in the case study hospitals. Findings from the case study hospitals suggest that these 
aspects of organizational hardware and tangible software are closely linked and their interactions have 
significant influence on the organization‘s intangible software of actor relationships, values and norms. 
Against a background of scarce, unreliable and unpredictable supply of resources, both case study 
hospitals have self-adjusted into organizations with a number of undesirable emergent properties. What 
has been called here a ―government culture‖ is thus an emergent property of the hospital system as an 
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adaptation to, among others, severe resource scarcity. Linked to resource scarcity, is the over-reliance on 
user fee revenues by both hospitals (7.2.4). The interaction between resource scarcity and over-reliance 
on user fees has contributed to the evolution of public hospitals into revenue maximizers. This emergent 
property of the hospital, while motivated by the desire for survival by the hospital, has led to unintended 
consequences, where high revenue generating departments preferentially received resource allocations 
compared to low revenue generating departments (7.2.4).  This consequence was unintended and 
sometimes as a result of national policies whose intentions are the exact opposite (7.2.4). This highlights 
the complex interactions among factors and agents within the hospitals sub-system and between the 
hospitals and the larger health system in which they are embedded and the unpredictability of actions 
consistent with CAS (Schneider & Somers 2006; Ellis et al. 2011; Health Foundation 2010). It is clear 
that an alteration on one part of the system results in somewhat amplified effects on another part of the 
system.  
 
Another contextual issue that interacted with priority setting in interesting ways is the state of leadership 
in the case study hospitals. The role of leadership in promoting the success of priority setting practices in 
hospitals has been highlighted in a number of settings. For example, in a survey of hospital Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) in Canada on the role of leadership in priority setting, leaders were expected 
to foster goals and a vision for the hospital; create alignment between goals, vision, resources and skills, 
actors and processes; develop and maintain relationships among actors; embody and promote desired 
values and establish an effective process for priority setting (Reeleder et al. 2006).  It has also been 
pointed out by hospital board members and senior managers in Canadian hospitals that a key part of 
strengthening institutional capacity for priority setting decision-making is supporting leadership 
development to strengthen institutional capacity for priority setting decision-making (Gibson et al. 2004). 
Further, when hospital decision makers were asked about the fairness of priority setting in their 
institutions, leadership was highlighted among the factors that contribute to fair priority setting (Reeleder 
et al. 2005). The role of leadership is seen to be particularly important in promoting fairness in priority 
setting. For example, a key feature of case studies of priority setting practices which employ the 
accountability for reasonableness framework highlight the role of leadership in aligning health care 
organizations with principles of fairness espoused by this framework (Bell et al. 2004; Madden et al. 
2005; Reeleder et al. 2005; Kapiriri & Martin 2006; Kapiriri et al. 2007; Gordon et al. 2009; Valdebenito 
et al. 2009). Further, one of the recommendations that came out of a case study of hospital priority setting 
in Chile was that hospital leadership should be strengthened to ensure that all resource allocation 
decisions made within the hospital involve all relevant stakeholders, are based on relevant rationales, 
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publicize both decisions and reasons behind them and provide mechanisms for appealing decisions 
(Valdebenito et al. 2009).  
 
One of the outstanding features of these observations and recommendations about the roles and 
importance of leadership in priority setting is the prominence of ―soft‖ leadership skills over and above 
―hard‖ leadership skills. ―Hard‖ leadership skills refer to professional knowledge, tools, or techniques that 
allow leaders to discharge their duties. These include planning, resource management, monitoring and 
evaluation and providing a vision for the organization (Nye 2006). Soft skills include a collection of 
social, communication, and self-management behaviors. These include skills such as relationship 
management, motivating people, influencing perceptions and emotional intelligence (Nye 2006).  These 
skills have also been categorized into three types of intelligence namely cognitive, social and emotional 
intelligence (Daire et al. 2014; Boyatzis 2008; Hogan & Kaiser 2005). Cognitive intelligence is similar to 
what I have called ―hard skills‖, while emotional and social intelligence refer to ―soft skills‖. As it will 
become clear in this discussion, the soft skills of hospital managers play a critical role in influencing 
priority setting practices in case study hospitals.  The cognitive (or hard) leadership skills can be mapped 
to the tangible software of organizational systems while the emotional and social (or soft skills) can be 
mapped to the intangible software.   
 
It is evident from chapter 7 (7.3) that the differences in leadership between  the two case study hospitals 
lay in soft rather than hard leadership skills. On the one hand, the leader in hospital B has better 
developed soft skills; she is self-motivated, has the ability to interact better and network with staff, 
develop trust and manage conflict (Daire et al. 2014). On the other hand the leader in hospital A lacks 
these skills, or at least is not always available to exercise them. This resulted in undesired consequences 
in hospital A (7.3) and underlies the importance of developing and nurturing soft leadership skills, beyond 
the hard skills. This is especially important given the observations in literature that often attention is given 
to hard skills while neglecting soft skills in leadership development initiatives (Daire et al. 2014; Gilson 
et al. 2014). 
 
An important consideration in thinking about the type of leadership competencies that would be required 
in these hospitals is to appreciate that they are complex adaptive healthcare organizations. It has been 
recognized that meeting the challenges in leading complex adaptive healthcare organizations requires 
additional competencies, which have been referred to as complex leadership (Ford 2009; Marion & Uhl-
Bienb 2001; Uhl-Bien et al. 2007). CAS exist in dynamic states with multiple interacting agents, have 
enmeshed and complicated relationship between these agents, exhibit emergence and self-organizing 
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behavior and have unpredictable futures (4.2.4). Complex leadership recognizes these characteristics and 
leverages them to promote organizational effectiveness (Uhl-Bien et al. 2007). Complexity leadership 
theory encourages a recognition of the dynamic capabilities of CAS by focusing on identifying and 
exploring the strategies and behaviors that foster organizational and subunit creativity, learning, and 
adaptability, when appropriate CAS dynamics are enabled within contexts of hierarchical coordination 
(bureaucracy) (Uhl-Bien et al. 2007). This type of leadership cannot be based on controlling the future 
because the dynamic and interdependent interactions of system components typically results in 
unanticipated outcomes. Complex leadership therefore requires the ability to foster conditions that 
encourage the emergence of productive futures (Ford 2009). Ford (2009) and Marion and Uhl-Bienb 
(2001) have suggested competencies required for complex leadership. This competency framework sees 
the leadership role changing from ―providing answers‖ and providing too much direction to creating the 
conditions in which followers‘ behaviors can work through inherent tensions and produce structure and 
innovation (Ford 2009). Complex leaders are thought to need competencies in initiating three 
fundamental activities that enable managing turbulence in a non-equilibrium environment: 1) how to 
foster network construction; leaders in complex organizations are expected to build and foster network  
relations among agents in the system from the frontline, through the middle to the top of the organization 
(2) how to plant seeds to catalyze emergence from the bottom-up; leaders are expected to encourage 
communication and interactions among agents in the system and engage in collective and creative 
problem solving and (3) how to nurture systemic thinking; complex leaders should learn to see and 
approach leadership issues by seeing the systemic whole rather than isolated and independent components 
(Ford 2009; Marion & Uhl-Bienb 2001; Uhl-Bien et al. 2007). 
 
Complex leadership ideas have been employed to explain and examine leadership in complex healthcare 
organizations. For example, Ford et al (2009) examined the performance of three successive CEOs of a 
hospital in the US and reported that the two latter CEOs were successful in improving hospital 
effectiveness compared to the former CEO because they applied ideas of complex leadership. Gilson et al 
(2014) in their examination of the challenges to strengthening primary healthcare (PHC) in the South 
African health system make observations and recommendations that resonate with complex leadership 
ideas. They see the agents in CAS as sense makers where sense making is understood to be the process 
individuals undertake to try to understand what is going on around them, as they try to make sense of 
events and experiences (Gilson et al. 2014).  Because these agents are interconnected and interdependent, 
their interactions results in emergence of shared interpretations and patterns of collective behavior (Gilson 
et al. 2014; Morgan 2005). They propose that leadership in CAS needs to mediate sense making and 
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support changes in the shared interpretations and patterns of behavior and action (Meadows 2008; Kim 
1999; Gilson et al. 2014). In essence, leaders need to foster productive emergence.  
The autonomy that hospitals have over priority setting decisions (decision space) is another contextual 
issue that influenced priority setting practices in both case study hospitals.  The influence of hospital 
autonomy is an example of the interactions between a CAS and the larger system in which it is embedded. 
One of the key findings on this relationship is that managers in both hospitals feel that they have little 
influence over the AWP process. In this tension between central MOH and hospitals, the balance of 
power is in favor of the former, given their key role in hospitals not only in hospital financing, but also 
governance. This ―unwanted‖ influence over hospital planning is shown in both case study hospitals to, 
among others, lead to the emergence of the culture of ―feigned compliance‖ and ―government culture‖. 
Findings similar to feigned compliance have been document in the United Kingdom, where, after the 
introduction of an audit system for medical consultants, it was reported that professionals ―played tick-
box games‘ to give the impression of auditable practice while continuing to practice in a more traditional 
way (McGivern & Ferlie 2007). This has also been described as ―mock bureaucracy‖, a phenomenon 
where both managers and subordinates in an organization comply with bureaucratic procedures, that do 
not seem relevant to them,  on paper, but in practice, operate differently (McGivern & Ferlie 2007).  
It was also shown that the limited autonomy hospitals have over decisions on the range of medicines that 
could be procured centrally contributed to the reliance of hospitals on user fees given that this affords 
them greater autonomy of medicines selection for procurement from local suppliers. As discussed 
previously, this reliance on user fees has unintended and unwanted consequences by transforming 
hospitals into ―revenue maximizers‖.  The lowest decision space is experienced in the nursing allocation 
process, a scenario that contributed to the high nursing staff turnover (7.4). 
Literature suggests that decision space for hospital level priority setting is influenced by the structure of 
the health system and the nature of the priority setting activity. For example, in countries such as Canada 
and Norway where the health system is significantly decentralized, hospitals have greater decision 
making latitude (Kapiriri et al. 2007) while in Chile, a country with a less decentralized health system, 
priority setting at the hospital level is predominantly guided by national decisions with little discretion at 
the hospital level (Valdebenito et al. 2009).   
At the time of collecting data for this thesis, Kenya operated under a unitary system of government with 
significant central government control. The health sector was however decentralized to some extent.  
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Public hospitals operated under a hybrid governance system with significant control from central 
government over resources allocated centrally including human resources, essential supplies and 
budgetary monetary allocations, and some level of flexibility over resources generated locally through 
user fee charges. It is clear from the findings of this thesis that while the hospitals enjoyed some level of 
flexibility under this arrangement, the fact that a significant proportion of their resources were controlled 
by the central government meant that overall hospitals had insufficient decision space to adequately 
function. At the time of writing the thesis, Kenya had transitioned into a devolved system of government, 
with significant powers transferred to the counties. Anecdotal evidence suggests that county governments 
are ―re-centralizing‖ hospitals at the local level, taking up most decision making roles. For example, at the 
time of collecting data for this study, hospitals collected user fee revenues and banked them in their own 
bank accounts, and hence had direct access and control over resources collected locally. Currently, 
hospitals are required to bank user fee revenues to a county treasury bank account (where hospitals are 
not signatories) with the counties having the discretion of reallocating these revenues to other sectors 
based on their priorities. Also previously, public hospitals were allowed to tender and procure 
commodities on their own to supplement central government supplies. Currently this function has been 
taken up by the county governments. In the current governance arrangement therefore, hospitals have 
significantly lost their autonomy. What this means is that while in the previous governance arrangements 
hospitals had limited decision space, it is likely that this situation has been made worse. It is clear that 
county governments need to reconsider the decision to recentralize hospitals, given the findings of this 
thesis. In the next sub-section, findings on the role of actor and power relations will be discussed.   
 
10. 2.3 The Influence of Actor and Power Relations on Priority Setting Practices in 
Public Hospitals in Kenya 
 
From literature, it appears that the relevant set of actors for hospital priority setting processes include 
hospital managers, frontline staff, the public and/or users of healthcare services (3.2). The interactions 
between actors in the case study hospitals and the micro-practices of power are seen to have significant 
influence on priority setting practices (8.2). This resonates with the political frame, which views 
organizations as roiling arenas, hosting ongoing contests of individual and group interests (Bolman & 
Deal 2013). As arenas, hospitals as organizations are seen to house contests among actors with competing 
interests and values. 
 
One of the key findings that differentiated the case study hospitals was the power relationship between 
senior and middle level managers. Power differences between senior and middle level managers are seen 
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to be pronounced in hospital A compared to hospital B. Emergent properties include a sense of distrust 
among managers and frontline workers, perceptions of lack of transparency and unfairness. This is seen to 
contribute to the observed low motivation and a sense of apathy towards priority setting activities, what I 
have termed here a ―government culture‖. The ―government culture‖ among middle level managers is 
seen to impact negatively on priority setting process, given the recognized role of middle level managers 
in organizational functioning (Huy 2011; Balogun 2003; Balogun 2006).  The fact that leadership has an 
important role to play in managing relationships is highlighted by the observation that potential tensions 
between managers in hospital B were managed by the hospital medical superintendent (8.2). This 
observation is best emphasized by a quote from Bolman and Deal (2013) thus: 
 ―Organizational excellence demands a sophisticated type of social skill: a leadership skill that can 
mobilize people and accomplish important objectives despite dozens of obstacles; a skill that can pull 
people together for meaningful purposes despite the thousands of forces that push us apart; a skill that can 
keep our corporations and public institutions from descending into a mediocrity characterized by 
bureaucratic infighting, parochial politics, and vicious power struggles‖ 
It is also clear from findings in the case study hospitals that relationships between actors in an 
organization are a major determinant of organizational capacity to function. Power differences and micro-
practices of power within organizations is something that needs to be managed appropriately to enable the 
functioning of organizations (Gibson et al. 2005).  
Another key finding in both case study hospitals is that there seems to be tension between non-clinician 
hospital managers on the one hand and clinicians (both managers and frontline staff) on the other (8.3). 
While a number of factors could explain this, and were presented in chapter 8, worth mentioning here is 
the role of professional identity, professional autonomy and conflicting values. Clinicians in both 
hospitals do not seem to attach priority to administrative functions but rather identified themselves more 
with their clinical roles. Even though they pointed out that they are excluded from priority setting 
activities, they do not really seem to mind it. It appears that the professional identities they have 
developed attached little importance to their involvement in priority setting activities. Specifically for 
clinician managers, this resonates with findings in other settings on identity challenges of ―hybrid 
managers‖ (clinicians who take on managerial roles) (McGivern et al. 2015).  This is perhaps linked to 
the fact that medical education in Kenya, where most of the clinicians are trained emphasized their 
clinical skills and hardly included administrative skills, while their professional socialization after 
medical school places more importance on clinical competencies and does not seem to recognize 
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management competencies. Choosing a management rather than a clinical path is therefore considered 
less prestigious. The fact that clinicians thought however, that they are the ones who know what is best in 
healthcare matters has put them at cross roads with non-clinician hospital managers (8.3). Clinicians in 
the hospital are also seen to operate under a ―medical-individualistic‖ model where priority is given to 
individual patient needs while hospital managers are seen to operate under the ―fiscal-managerial‖ model 
where concern is placed on financial sustainability and measures to enhance this such as cost containment 
(Greer 1985). While these two values are in conflict, the fact that clinicians do not participate in priority 
setting activities means that managerial values dominate in decision making. This, as has been discussed 
in chapter nine, contributed to the emergence of the revenue – maximization behavior of hospitals.  
Tensions between clinicians and hospital managers is a recurrent theme in studies of healthcare 
organizations (Waldman & Cohn 2008; Matheson & Kissoon 2006; Burns et al. 1993; Freidson 1985). 
Specifically on priority setting, it has been reported in other settings that physicians were marginally 
involved in priority setting practices. For example, in a study of priority setting in a Ugandan hospital, it 
was reported that the process was dominated by hospital managers, with minimal involvement of frontline 
practitioners (Kapiriri & Martin 2006; Kapiriri et al. 2007). Power struggles between practitioners and 
managers who were reluctant to share decision-making power, and frustration by practitioners when their 
concerns were not addressed, are reported to contribute to the non-participation of practitioners (Kapiriri 
& Martin 2006). The conflict of values between clinicians and managers in hospital priority setting 
processes has also been documented. While clinicians, who subscribe to the ‗medical individualistic‘ 
decision system, were concerned with individual patient outcomes, administrators/managers, who 
subscribe to the ‗fiscal managerial‘ decision system, were concerned with the implications of decisions on 
the budget (Danjoux et al. 2007; Gordon et al. 2009). This conflict was more evident in scenarios where 
decisions affected identifiable patients such as medicines selection processes (Gallego et al. 2007). 
Power relationships are also seen to play out at the interface between the hospital managers and the 
community (8.4). Literature suggests that the power difference observed at the interface between the 
community and the hospital in the case study hospitals is similar to other settings. Like the case study 
hospitals, community involvement was in theory effected through representation in hospital management 
boards (Kapiriri & Martin 2006; Kapiriri et al. 2007). There are however reported cases of other 
mechanisms of eliciting community views for priority setting in hospitals. For example a case study of 
priority setting in a Women‘s and Children‘s hospital in Adelaide Australia reported the use of 
community surveys to obtain community views to be incorporated in hospital priority setting decisions 
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(Astley & Wake-Dyster 2001). The reasons given for the minimal involvement of the community were 
similar to those given by hospital managers in the case study hospitals (Martin, Hollenberg, et al. 2003).   
 
From the foregoing, priority setting practices are seen to be complex, and occurring in complex systems 
with significant influence from contextual factors and actor relations. The examination of priority setting 
practices in the case study hospitals reveals a number of properties of the hospital systems which can be 
grouped in to hardware and software (both tangible and intangible) issues. It is evident that whereas 
systems hardware aspects are important and need to be strengthened, software issues are equally 
important and need to be strengthened as well. This finding mirrors findings in other settings. Sheikh et al 
(2011) opined that system software aspects are critical to health systems performance while Elloker et al 
(2012), in examining the complexities of managing a sub-district health system in Cape Town, South 
Africa, observed that the intangible components of systems software are key in shaping the behaviours of 
workers in an organization and underpin the organizations power to perform. The importance of software 
components of health systems has also been highlighted in the 2011 publication Good Health at Low Cost 
– 25 years on (Balabanova et al. 2011). In this report, an analysis of the health systems of Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, Tamil Nadu (India), and Thailand revealed that they achieved better health 
outcomes compared to neighboring countries despite relative similar hardware aspects of health systems 
such as level of resources (Balabanova et al. 2011). It was found that beyond hardware issues, software 
aspects such as leadership and vision were important in sustaining health systems that promote good 
health at low cost (Balabanova et al. 2011). Efforts to improve priority setting practices in the case study 
hospitals should therefore focus not just on hardware issues such as resource availability, but also on both 
tangible and intangible software aspects of complex hospital systems. 
 
The next sub-section discusses findings on evaluation of priority setting practices in the case study 
hospitals. 
 
10. 2.4 Evaluation of Priority Setting Practice in Public Hospitals in Kenya 
One of the key objectives of this thesis was to evaluate priority setting practices in the case study 
hospitals. To do this I developed a framework for the evaluation of priority setting which is presented in 
the literature review chapter (3.3) of this thesis. In applying this framework to evaluate priority setting 
practice in the case study hospitals (chapter 9), a number of key issues emerge. First, it is evident that 
there is no systematic and effective mechanism to elicit and incorporate community values in priority 
setting activities in the case study hospital. The community is not however expected to make technical 
decisions about healthcare rationing such as for example the choice of medicine to be included in the 
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medicine formulary for the management of a specific disease. Rather communities should have the 
opportunity to influence the guiding principles of priority setting. For example, community members can 
contribute to debate about the rationales that are used to set healthcare priorities (Mooney 1998; Cleary et 
al. 2011). Here the society‘s role is seen as that of setting the principles on which to base priority setting 
decisions. Society can also be consulted on the characteristics of people or patient groups that justify 
additional claims to healthcare (Black & Mooney 2002). That is, society can help define what equitable 
allocation of healthcare resources means in their context. It has been argued that communities are well 
placed to foster ideas about what is equitable, about who shall have access to health care and to what 
extent (Black & Mooney 2002). Communitarianism therefore does not propose the replacement of 
technocrats but rather that the community should be provided with an opportunity to establish the value 
base for healthcare decision making (Cleary et al. 2011; Black & Mooney 2002; Mooney 1998). 
 
Approaches used to involve the community in the case study hospitals, namely, suggestion boxes and 
membership in hospital oversight committees are shown to be ineffective and lack the capacity to 
empower the community to effectively engage in the priority setting processes. If we accept the idea of 
hospitals as social institution, which I certainly do, then the lack of a mechanism to incorporate 
community values begs the question of the legitimacy and responsiveness of the hospital priority setting 
processes. A number of reasons contribute to these observations including the fact that there are no clear 
guidelines, systems or mechanisms specifically aimed at harnessing community values. Further, the 
power relations at the interface between hospital managers and the community were such that the 
community was not empowered to engage with the hospital (8.4). Here we again see an example of the 
interactions between hospital tangible software of guidelines and systems and intangible software of actor 
relations.  
 
Second, even though ―sophisticated‖ economic methods such as CEA and PBMA are not used by the case 
study hospitals, there is an attempt to incorporate economic considerations by using the affordability 
criteria. The use of CEA and PBMA was hampered by a lack of both technical capacity and reliable data. 
This finding is not dissimilar to findings in other settings. It has generally been observed that the 
incorporation of economic criteria in priority setting is not very common (Hauck et al. 2004). Perhaps a 
more practical approach for hospitals, and certainly those in developing countries like Kenya, is to 
incorporate economic criteria by use of more feasible methods such as considering affordability alongside 
effectiveness and conducting budget impact analyses. Apart from capacity challenges however, ethical 
opposition to an economic approach to priority setting has been documented (2.2.2). It was not possible to 
determine however whether actors in the case study hospitals share these ethical concerns given that they 
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had not been previously exposed and did not have an understanding of these methods. Further, while 
equity was a concept that hospital actors related to, there seems to be no systematic attempt to incorporate 
it. So for example, while the adoption of a revenue maximizing model is at odds with equity principles, 
the use of ―rule of rescue‖ perhaps points at attempts to achieve some equity by prioritizing the worst off. 
Also, while revenue maximization resulted in perceived inequitable allocation of resources, it is perhaps 
justified by the fact that it enabled the hospitals to continue to run and hence to continue to provide 
services. In the face of severe resource scarcity and over reliance on user fees, investing more resources in 
revenue generating departments and services was the rational choice given that it resulted in continued 
revenue generation that enabled the hospitals to continue running. What is perhaps unacceptable is the 
fact that some departments did not receive allocations at all.  
While hospital managers thought both equity and efficiency were useful concepts to incorporate in 
priority setting, it was evident that the hospitals did not have a system with explicit priority setting 
criteria, where for example such principles would feature among others. This was therefore another 
weakness of the organizational tangible software.  
Third, evaluating priority setting practices in the case study hospitals against the procedural requirements 
of the evaluative framework reveals that there is scope for improvement of priority setting process to 
promote fairness and legitimacy. Procedural requirements speak to the politics of priority setting process, 
and in this thesis, have been grounded on deliberative democracy (Abelson et al. 2003; Chambers 2003). 
A number of procedural frameworks have been drawn from deliberative democratic principles with the 
dominant one in healthcare priority setting being Accountability for Reasonableness (Rid 2009; Daniels 
2008). Discussed in chapter 3 (3.3.2), AFR is an ethical priority setting framework grounded on principles 
of deliberative democracy. This framework specifies that priority setting processes should meet the 
criteria for relevance, publicity, appeals and revisions, and enforcement. This framework has been applied 
in a number of settings and has been relatively well received. A shortcoming of this framework, common 
with other deliberative democratic frameworks, is the lack of considerations of power differences among 
actors (Friedman 2008; Abelson et al. 2003). So while a deliberative process might include the relevant 
range of stakeholders, an equally important consideration is whether or not the range of stakeholders are 
empowered to effectively contribute to decision making (Shayo et al. 2013) .  The general observation in 
the case study hospitals is that priority setting practices do not include the relevant range of stakeholders 
with notable exclusions in both hospitals being frontline clinicians and the public. Further in hospital A, 
middle level managers are also excluded from hospital decision making. Closely related to this, a range of 
actors appear to be less empowered to contribute to decision making namely the community and frontline 
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clinicians in both case study hospitals and additionally middle level managers in hospital B. As discussed 
earlier, this exclusion is a function of unclear or sometimes lacking guidelines and systems and also of 
micro-practices of power among hospital actors. The role of leadership in ensuring decision making 
processes are inclusive and deliberative has also been highlighted (10.2.2). Transparency is also seen to 
be a sticky issue in both hospitals with perceptions of lack of transparency being worse in hospital A. 
Lack of understanding of priority setting processes, poor communication and exclusion of some 
stakeholders is seen to contribute to perceptions of lack of transparency. Further, both facilities do not use 
evidence to make decisions but rather rely on personal experience and hunches. Consistent with findings 
in most settings, there is no formal process for revisions. The most rigid priority setting process is the 
budgeting and planning process which cannot be revised either formally or informally. Less formal 
priority setting processes such as the medicines selection and nursing allocation process have the 
provision for revisions through informal processes.  
 
Closely linked to procedural conditions are the intermediate results of priority setting processes. 
Stakeholders in hospital B are more satisfied and better understand priority setting processes compared to 
hospital A because the process in the latter is more inclusive and deliberative, eliciting perceptions of 
transparency and fairness. Also the fact that stakeholders are included in hospital B makes them 
appreciate the reality of resource scarcity which in turn results in their being more understanding of the 
situation. In both hospitals however, priority setting does not lead to shifted resources due to the fact that 
hospitals rely on historical allocations. Last but not least, the implementation of priority setting in both 
case study hospitals is not satisfactory. As discussed in chapter 9, this is as a result of a number of factors 
including resource scarcity, lack of effective accountability mechanisms, and two prominent cultures in 
both case study hospitals, government culture and feigned compliance. Having discussed the findings 
from this research, the next section seeks to present some of the policy and research implication arising 
from this research.  
 
10.3 POLICY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
10. 3.1 Policy Implications 
This section endeavors to distil and expound on the policy implications arising from the findings of this 
study.  From the findings and discussion sections, it became clear that there is enormous scope to improve 
the organizational capacity of the case study hospitals for successful priority setting. Adapting the Aragon 
framework, the capacity of these hospitals could be improved across the interacting and interrelated 
aspects of organizational hardware, tangible and intangible software (Aragón & Giles Macedo 2010; 
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Elloker et al. 2012).  Efforts to improve priority setting should however be informed by the recognition 
that hospitals are complex adaptive systems. Rather than seeking to rectify isolated aspects of the system, 
efforts should take cognizance of the interrelationships between various system components and hence 
endeavor to create the necessary conditions for the emergence of desired behaviors and properties (Ford 
2009; Marion & Bacon 2000).  
 
One of the key weaknesses that emerged from the findings is the low level of resourcing of both case 
study hospitals, an aspect of the hospital system hardware. The case study hospitals are significantly 
underfunded in terms of funds for recurrent and capital expenditures, human resources and essential 
supplies (pharmaceuticals and non-pharmaceuticals). The finding of poor resourcing of the case study 
hospitals mirrors reports of the situation of hospitals in Kenya generally (Appendix XX). It is imperative 
that policy makers think and implement sustainable mechanisms for increasing the level of resources for 
public hospitals in Kenya. To adequately address the issue, and design appropriate mechanisms, a 
comprehensive assessment of the resource needs of these hospitals would be needed. While there are a 
number of mechanisms, both supply side, demand side or combinations (in various shades), determining 
which mechanism is best was not part of the objectives of this study. For example on the supply side, both 
national and county governments should prioritize and increase investments in hospitals both in terms of 
budgets for recurrent and capital expenditures, supply of pharmaceuticals and non-pharmaceuticals and 
increasing recruitment of and deployment of human resources for health. On the demand side, both 
national and county governments should put in place measures for scaling up prepayment mechanisms 
such as social health insurance to increase the ability of potential users of public hospitals to pay for 
services received. Health insurance coverage of the Kenyan population is estimated at only  20%, with the 
National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) being the major insurer (18% of the Kenyan population) 
(Ministry of Medical Services 2012). While the majority of the population have no health insurance and 
hence have to pay their medical bills from out of pocket expenditures, those with an NHIF cover (this is 
the only form of insurance accepted by public hospitals) also still have to meet a major portion of their 
healthcare costs from out of pocket expenditure given that the NHIF provides a very shallow benefit 
package (inpatient cover only). Reforming health insurance would therefore require both increasing 
population coverage and the range of services covered. 
 
Another area that requires attention in public hospitals in Kenya is the organizational systems software of 
1) leadership and management capacity and 2) organizational systems and procedures. As concerns 
leadership and management capacity, it emerged in chapter 7 that hospital managers have limited 
knowledge and skills in planning and budgeting. These hard skills have also been referred to as cognitive 
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leadership and management skills (Daire et al. 2014) and are part of the hospital tangible software (4.2.3). 
While they had received technical training in their professional training, the Kenyan education system 
(where most of them had been trained) did not equip them with management and leadership skills. 
Further, in-service management and leadership trainings have been done to only a few (mostly senior) 
managers leaving the rest of the managers to learn on the job by doing. There is therefore a need to invest 
in developing the leadership and management capacities of hospital leaders.  To improve the capacity of 
hospital managers to manage and lead their organizations, policy makers should invest in training 
programmes that will equip these managers with the required skills and scale up these sorts of training to 
cover a critical mass of the target group. Specifically for priority setting, skills such as budgeting, 
operational and strategic planning, the application of priority setting tools and techniques would be 
essential skills to impart to hospital managers. More importantly, academic institutions of higher learning 
should introduce and integrate leadership and management training to pre-service health workers. This 
will not only increase their competence in this much needed skills, but also perhaps influence their 
professional identities to attach importance to management and leadership roles.  
A critical point to highlight is the fact that beyond the ―hard‖ management and leadership skills, training 
of hospital managers should also strive to impart and cultivate ―soft skills‖. In other words, efforts should 
be directed at strengthening aspects of hospital organizations intangible software in addition to the 
tangible software. These include such skills as the ability to mentor and motivate staff, awareness and 
appreciation of deliberative processes, the ability to manage relationships and building trust among actors 
especially within the context of a conflict prone dynamic hospital system. It has been highlighted in 
literature (Daire et al. 2014), and is certainly evident in the findings of this thesis that ―soft‖ leadership 
skills are very important in organizational functioning.  Unlike hard or cognitive leadership competencies, 
it is unlikely that soft skills will be developed in managers by the formal ―classroom type‖ leadership and 
management trainings (Daire et al. 2014). Rather, these skills can perhaps be developed by action or 
collaborative learning (Daire et al. 2014; Lave & Wenger 1991; Dorros 2006). Action learning combines 
formal training with on the job mentoring and employs assignments and reflections from work 
experiences to achieve learning (Pedler 1991). In this approach, learning is not transmitted from teacher 
to student but rather co-produced by the interactions and engagements between the facilitators and the 
leaders with real life situation. There are still questions however about the scalability of such initiatives 
(Daire et al. 2014).  
It is also important for leadership development efforts to recognize that hospitals are CASs requiring 
complex leadership competencies (10.2.2). Complex leadership entails focusing efforts on behaviors that 
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enable organizational effectiveness, as opposed to determining or guiding effectiveness (Ford 2009; 
Marion & Uhl-Bienb 2001). Complex leaders foster conditions that enable desirable emergent, but largely 
unspecified, future states (Ford 2009; Marion & Bacon 2000). These leaders feed the natural, bottom-up 
dynamics of emergence, innovation, and fitness (Ford 2009; Marion & Uhl-Bienb 2001). They also need 
to think broadly in terms of systems, of non-linear effects, and of network forces (Ford 2009; Marion & 
Uhl-Bienb 2001). These Leaders need to understand the patterns of complexity and learn to manipulate 
the situations of complexity more than its results (Ford 2009; Marion & Uhl-Bienb 2001). 
To improve the commitment and performance of hospital managers, measures should also be taken to 
motivate them. From the findings of this study, it appears that one of the measures to ensure this would be 
to increase the autonomy of managers by allowing them to choose whether or not they want to be hospital 
managers. Forcing health workers to be managers was seen to result in lack of commitment and 
motivation to their roles. Also, health workers who choose to take on managerial responsibilities should 
be recognized and compensated for this. For example, managers could get a responsibility or 
administrative allowance. It has been shown in other setting that recognition improves the motivation 
levels of workers (Dieleman & Harnmeijer 2006; Häggström et al. 2008). Specifically for the medical 
superintendent, it was clear that in order for them to effectively discharge their duties, they had to be 
relieved off some or all of their clinical responsibilities. Expecting managers to continue to perform all of 
their previous clinical duties after taking up management responsibilities is clearly not feasible.  
There is also considerable scope in improving the systems and procedures of public hospitals. First, the 
financing arrangements for public hospitals should provide a significant level of autonomy to hospital 
managers to allow them to deliver on their functions effectively. This is especially critical in this 
transition phase where the health sector is reorganizing to align itself with the new devolved system of 
government and county governments are setting up mechanisms for governing the health sector in the 
areas of their jurisdiction. Ironically, whereas one would expect that devolution would result in greater 
autonomy at the local level, anecdotal evidence reveals that county governments are taking up most of the 
functions previously carried out by hospitals and hence in effect reducing their autonomy. It has been 
observed that increased decision space is associated with increased efficiency, quality of services and the 
promotion of democracy and accountability at the local levels (Bossert 1998; Atkinson et al. 2000). It is 
imperative that policy makers at the county government level re-think their approach to governing 
hospitals and give hospitals autonomy over resources to enable them to effectively function.  
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
196  
 
Second, it is important that an explicit process is put in place for the major priority setting activities. Such 
a system should clearly outline the various roles and responsibility of decision making bodies in the 
hospital and the constitution of these bodies. The clarity of roles of decision making bodies and 
committees in health facilities has been shown to be an important determinant of their functioning not just 
by the empirical findings of this study but also in literature (McCoy et al. 2012). Strengthening the 
process of priority setting in the hospitals should also involve putting in place a mechanism that promotes 
fairness and legitimacy. From literature, it has been argued severely that to ensure this, greater emphasis 
will need to be put into the process of priority setting to ensure that they espouse the ideals of deliberative 
democracy (Rid 2009; Abelson et al. 2003; Martin et al. 2002; Ham & Glenn 2003; Daniels 2008). Such a 
system would ensure that the relevant range of stakeholders are included in decision making processes. 
These include hospital managers (both senior and middle level), frontline staff and the community at the 
very least. To ensure this for example, there should be clear guidelines that specify that decision making 
committees should have representatives from these stakeholders. Deliberative processes that involve the 
relevant range of stakeholders should not be put in place for the budgeting and planning process only, but 
also the other major priority setting processes such as the medicines selection process and the nursing 
allocation process.  
 
For the medicines selection process, there is scope in strengthening the MTCs since they could offer a 
useful forum for deliberation on medicines formulary decisions. Further, findings from this thesis 
revealed that the most undemocratic process in the hospital was the nursing allocation process. To 
promote fairness and legitimacy, this decision process should also involve the relevant range of 
stakeholders. This could perhaps be achieved by giving this responsibility to the HMTs rather than 
leaving it for the hospital nursing officers in charge to make unilateral decisions.  
 
The involvement of the community should however be qualified here. The intention of this proposal is not 
to have community members involved in every single decision making process in the hospital. Indeed as 
has been observed, given that some decisions require a high level of technical knowledge, it is unlikely 
that lay people could effectively participate. These include for example the medicines selection process. 
In line with the recommendations of the communitarian claims school of thought, the community should 
be engaged to determine the values or ―meta-principles‖ that they would like hospital priority setting 
processes to be based on (Mooney 2005; Mooney 2009). Experts (hospital managers and front line staff) 
would then be left to make the day to day technical decision (Mooney 2005; Mooney 2009).  
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The proposal for the involvement of the community is however not a new thing in Kenya. Far from that, 
the new Kenyan constitution specifically requires that decision making at both the national and county 
levels involve and engage the public for their inputs (GOK 2010). Public budgeting processes at both 
these levels are for example required to organize public forums to share and debate proposals before 
finalization of budgets (Appendix XXI). Extending this practice to health sector priority setting therefore 
has a precedent from public finance practice in Kenya.  A feasible strategy would perhaps be to integrate 
hospital public engagement initiatives with those of the county rather than having individual hospital 
initiatives.  
 
While a range of community engagement mechanisms have been discussed and debated in literature 
(Mitton et al. 2009; Molyneux et al. 2012; Cleary et al. 2013), there is no consensus on how public views 
should be obtained (Mitton et al. 2009).  It has also been argued that the suitability of public engagement 
mechanisms is highly context dependent and hence likely to vary across settings (Sepehri & Pettigrew 
1996). It is therefore impossible for this thesis to recommend any one community engagement mechanism 
for priority setting in healthcare. I propose however that priority setting activities should incorporate 
participatory community engagement mechanisms rather than limit themselves to less interactive 
mechanisms such as one way communication. Examples include the incorporation of community 
members in hospital planning committees such as the HMT rather than just the oversight committees, the 
use of citizen juries and citizen panels. Citizen Juries are a group of 12-20 randomly selected citizens, 
gathered in such a way as to represent a microcosm of their community, who meet to deliberate on a 
policy question. Typically, they are informed about the issue, are presented with evidence which they 
cross-examine, discuss among themselves and reach a decision. They have been used in a number of 
settings to incorporate community views in healthcare priority setting (Lenaghan et al. 1996; Lenaghan 
1999). Citizen panels are a randomly selected group of citizens who meet routinely (e.g. four times per 
year) to consider and discuss issues and make decisions (Abelson et al. 2001). They are typically used to 
guide health resource allocation decisions and act as ―sounding boards‖ for decision making bodies 
(Abelson et al. 2001).  
 
A key factor in the successful engagement through these mechanisms is the legitimacy of the 
representatives of the community.  To assure this, the selection of community representatives should be 
transparent, should involve the community (e.g. though voting) and should ensure diversity reflected in 
the community. Also, vulnerable groups such as women, the disabled and the poor should be represented.  
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As the empirical findings have shown however, representation in decision making bodies alone is not 
enough and there is also need to put in place measures to empower these actors to effectively engage. 
Deliberative mechanisms must therefore be designed in such a way that they minimize power 
differentials, promote trust among actors and decision makers and hence empower them to effectively 
participate in decision making. These include for example giving each stakeholder equal opportunities to 
participate at different stages of the decision making process such as agenda setting, establishing 
procedural rules, selecting the information and expertise to inform the process and assessing the validity 
of claims, clearly defining and enshrining  the role of the each stakeholder in priority setting rules and 
guidelines, ensuring accessibility of relevant information to each stakeholder to reduce information 
asymmetries and ongoing rather than one off or infrequent engagement of stakeholders since it has been 
shown that ongoing engagement builds trust over time.  
 
Another important procedural condition for priority setting processes in hospitals is transparency. From 
the empirical findings, it is clear that one measure that was seen to promote transparency was the 
inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders in decision making processes. Transparency would also be 
improved by publicizing of decisions and their rationales and making these decisions accessible to all 
stakeholders and communicated to them as well. For example, minutes of priority setting meetings should 
be circulated to all hospital stakeholders. Also, priority setting documents such as AWP, budgets and 
medicines formularies should be accessible to all stakeholders in the hospital.  
 
Another procedural condition that needs to be incorporated in hospital priority setting processes is the 
provision of a formal opportunity for the revisions of decisions in light of emerging information/evidence. 
This flexibility was thought to be important by managers in the case study hospitals, and has also been 
shown to be important in other setting in literature (Martin et al. 2002; Ham & Glenn 2003). 
Strengthening the priority setting process in the case study hospitals should also include improving the 
use of evidence in decision making. Apart from improving the quality of information by for example 
training of health workers and providing them with information management tools and technologies, 
changing their culture to appreciate the use of evidence is perhaps more important. For example, priority 
setting guidelines and processes should require that an initial process of analysis of information/evidence 
available to them is carried out before decisions are made. It would also require that the basis of decisions 
(the information/evidence that guided the decisions) be explicitly outlined. Lastly a priority setting 
process should have a mechanism for ensuring that all these processes are adhered to. Part of the approval 
processes for decisions such as budgeting and planning or medicines selection should include a 
requirement of a demonstration that the five procedural conditions have been met. As it has been shown 
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in other settings, this enforcement mechanism is one of the key roles that leaders should play in hospitals 
(Reeleder et al. 2005).  
10. 3.2 Areas for Further Research
Emerging from the study, a number of issues deserve further investigation. First, one of the key areas of 
research is the need to explore methods for developing soft leadership and management skills among 
hospital leaders given the importance of these skills in hospital functioning. While action learning has 
been proposed as a means to build health managers competencies in soft skills, there is need for work to 
explore feasible and scalable strategies for implementing this and other potential strategies. 
Second, another potential research area is exploring the views and perceptions of health managers and 
policy makers on the evaluative framework developed and applied in this thesis. Specifically research 
could explore the acceptability of the different attributes of the evaluation framework and the relative 
importance of the different attributes. This is especially important given that when decision making is 
based on multi-criteria approaches, the relative importance of the different attributes makes the trade-offs 
explicit. Answering these questions would refine the framework and improve its utility as an evaluative 
tool for healthcare organizations priority setting practices.  
Third, while the thesis has proposed and highlighted the importance of basing hospital priority setting 
decisions on community values, approaches that are both appropriate and feasible in specific contexts 
remain contested. Future research can focus on testing alternative methods for eliciting community values 
and comparing their suitability and applicability in public hospitals in Kenya. Such a study would answer 
questions such as the acceptability, suitability and cost-effectiveness of alternative mechanisms.  
Fourth, research should also focus on effective ways of ensuring and promoting empowerment among 
stakeholders in deliberative processes. As noted in this thesis, and by other authors, power differences 
between stakeholders often mean that some actors are not empowered to effectively participate in 
deliberative processes. It has also been shown in other settings that empowerment of stakeholders in 
deliberative processes is affected by ―social stratifiers‖ such as social-economic status, gender, tribe and 
education levels (Shayo et al. 2012). These factors are however context specific and should be explored in 
different settings. More importantly, in light of such influences, there is a need to explore effective ways 
of promoting empowerment among stakeholders in different contexts.  
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Fifth, research should also explore the effect of the level of hospital autonomy on hospital priority setting. 
This is especially so in a context where hospital governance in Kenya is in transition with the likelihood 
that hospitals will either be more or less autonomous.  
 
10. 4: CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter is the last of ten chapters of this thesis. The thesis presents a study of priority setting at the 
meso level in public hospitals in Kenya, based on a critical examination and evaluation of two case 
hospitals. This, to my knowledge, is only the second study of hospital level priority setting in an African 
public hospital, the other one having been conducted in Uganda (Kapiriri & Martin 2006). Given that the 
Ugandan study was conducted in a national referral hospital, this becomes the first study that offers 
insight on hospital level priority setting practices in local public hospitals in an African country. Given 
the dearth of literature on hospital level priority setting practices in hospitals and especially in developing 
country hospitals, it is anticipated that the findings of this study will add significantly to this body of 
knowledge (Barasa et al. 2014).  
 
The critical role that public hospitals play in the Kenyan health system has become even more 
pronounced recently, with the transitioning of the Kenyan system of governance from a unitary (and 
highly centralized) system of government, to a devolved (and in theory a highly decentralized) system of 
government (GOK 2010) (1.4). Public hospitals, previously referred to as district hospitals are now 
county hospitals and are the focal point of county health systems, offering referral care to the population.  
As county governments set up governance structures for the county health systems, evidence on how 
hospitals use resources available to them and the factors that influence their resource allocation decisions 
and processes will be of high utility. For example, county governments will need to determine the degree 
of autonomy that hospitals will enjoy, financing mechanisms, human resource policies, procurement 
policies for essential supplies and accountability mechanisms. From the empirical findings of this thesis, 
these decisions have a significant impact on priority setting processes in hospitals. Findings from this 
thesis would therefore contribute to the evidence base for the policy formulations.  
 
This thesis was broadly guided by the ―describe-evaluate-improve‖ approach proposed by Martin and 
Singer (2003) on improving priority setting in healthcare organizations (1.2). In contrast with documented 
case studies of priority setting in hospitals, this thesis went deeper into identifying and critically 
examining the role and influence of contextual factors in shaping priority setting practices in the case 
study hospitals. It has also provided an in-depth analysis of the role of actors and power relationships in 
shaping priority setting practices in hospitals. As noted by Gibson and colleagues, the issue of power 
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differences among actors have hitherto not been addressed in case studies of healthcare priority setting  
(Gibson et al. 2005). This is despite observations that priority setting processes are highly political (Ham 
1997; Klein 1998). While these factors have not been given much attention in priority setting literature, 
the empirical findings of this thesis reveal that they do indeed exert significant influence on priority 
setting practices.  
 
Further, in seeking to evaluate priority setting, this thesis has gone beyond the recommendation for using 
an ethical framework, most commonly the accountability for reasonableness framework. I developed and 
applied an integrated evaluative framework that draws from a range of priority setting schools of thought, 
most notably consequentialist and proceduralist frameworks. This is in line with the recognition of the 
importance of proposals from these paradigms and calls for integrated approaches (Ham 1997; Norheim 
et al. 2007). It is therefore also anticipated that this thesis will contribute to the body of knowledge on 
evaluation of priority setting.  
 
Most significantly, given the generally accepted observation that priority setting is a highly complex and 
context specific process, this study is the first, to my knowledge, to apply complex adaptive system 
(CAS) theory to explain findings of priority setting processes in hospitals. This is an important point in 
the sense that not only are phenomena explained using CAS theory, but also that policy makers interested 
in improving priority setting processes in hospitals will need to adopt complexity theory approaches. The 
policy makers and hospital leaders‘ role is therefore not seen as that of fixing isolated components of the 
hospital system, but rather as creating conditions necessary to trigger desired emergent properties of the 
hospital system. Employing systems theory has also enabled the unpacking of the hospital system into 
hardware and software components and has especially highlighted the critical role that intangible software 
plays in hospital functioning. Overall therefore it is hoped that this thesis has not only contributed to the 
body of knowledge on hospital priority setting practices but has also offered an evidence base for policy 
formulations that will improve how public hospitals allocate and manage resources in Kenya.  
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 APPENDICES 
Appendix I: General Characteristics of the 24 Empirical Hospital Priority Setting Studies included in Review 1 (3.2) 
 
Study Country Study design Study Setting Priority setting activity Study objectives 
Reeleeder et 
al 2006 
Canada Qualitative cross 
sectional study 
Forty six hospital in Ontario 
Canada 
Allocation of hospital resources (and 
budgets) between departments and service 
areas 
To describe the role of leadership in health services 
priority setting from the perspective of hospital leaders, 
and provide a set of lessons for effective priority setting 
practices in health care facilities. 
Gibson et al 
2005 
Canada Qualitative case 
study 
A tertiary-care teaching hospital 
with 612 acute-care beds, 543 
long-term care beds, 74 nursery 
beds and 22 rehabilitation beds 
Allocation of hospital resources (and 
budgets) between departments and service 
areas –hospital strategic planning process 
To examine power differences associated with 
institutional roles in the context of management 
decision-making about organizational priorities 
Bochner et al 
1994 
Australia Qualitative case 
study 
A tertiary referral hospital with 
about 900 beds 
Health technology acquisition-Medicines 
formulary management 
To report experiences and initial responses from the 
hospital staff to a method to assign ranking priorities by 
means of a formal scoring system used for previously 
unfunded initiatives to allow their serial and orderly 
introduction into the hospital formulary 
Vissers 1995 Denmark Mixed methods 
case study 
A hospital in Denmark Health technology acquisition To develop a model for resource allocation based on 
patient flow and to test this model on the allocation of 
hospital resources 
Durand-
Zaleski 1996 
France Interventional 
case study 
A hospital in France Health technology acquisition To describe the testing of a tool to help decision makers 
establish priorities among medical projects by scoring 
and ranking projects 
Madden et al 
2005 
Canada Qualitative case 
study 
A network of three teaching 
hospitals in Toronto, Canada 
Allocation of hospital resources (and 
budgets) between departments and service 
areas -Clinical activity target setting 
(CATS) process 
To describe priority setting in a hospital and evaluate it 
using ‗accountability for reasonableness‘, with particular 
attention to the appeal process 
Martin et al 
2003b 
Canada Qualitative case 
study 
A tertiary-care teaching hospital 
with 612 acute-care beds, 543 
long-term care beds, 74 nursery 
beds and 22 rehabilitation beds 
Allocation of hospital resources (and 
budgets) between departments and service 
areas –hospital strategic planning process 
To describe priority setting in the context of a hospital 
strategic planning initiative and to evaluate using 
‗accountability for reasonableness‘ 
Martin et al 
2003 
Canada Qualitative case 
study 
a network of three teaching 
hospitals in Toronto, Canada 
Health technology acquisition-Medicines 
formulary management 
To describe priority setting for new drugs in a hospital, 
and to evaluate this process using ‗accountability for 
reasonableness‘ 
Rosenstein et 
al 2003 
United 
states of 
America 
Quantitative 
Survey 
19 Hospitals in the United States 
of America 
Health technology acquisition To describe the structure and processes used by VHA 
west coast hospitals to performs new technology 
assessments 
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Study Country Study design Study Setting Priority setting activity Study objectives 
Bell et al 
2004 
Canada Qualitative case 
study 
A large tertiary hospital in 
Toronto, Canada 
Allocation of hospital resources (and 
budgets) between departments and service 
areas–Priority setting during a disease 
outbreak (SARS) 
To describe and evaluate priority setting in a hospital in 
response to SARS 
Reeleeder et 
al 2005 
Canada Quantitative 
Survey 
Forty six hospital in Ontario 
Canada 
Allocation of hospital resources (and 
budgets) between departments and service 
areas 
To elicit hospital decision makers' self-report of the 
fairness of priority setting in their hospitals using 
'accountability for reasonableness' 
Greenberg et 
al 2005 
Israel Quantitative 
Survey 
Twenty-six acute care hospitals 
in Israel 
Health technology acquisition To explore the decision making process in adopting new 
technologies at the hospital level 
Kapiriri et al 
2006 
Uganda Qualitative case 
study 
A referral hospital with 1,500 
patient beds 
Allocation of hospital resources (and 
budgets) between departments and service 
areas 
To describe priority setting in a Ugandan hospital and 
evaluate the description using the ethical framework, 
accountability for reasonableness 
Sharma et al 
2006 
Canada Qualitative case 
study 
A community hospital with 425 
patient beds 
Health technology acquisition - adoption of 
advanced laparoscopic surgery  
To describe the current decision-making processes for 
the adoption of advanced laparoscopic surgery at a 
community hospital in Toronto, Canada and to analyze 
the decision-making process using the ethical framework 
accountability for reasonableness  
Ehlers et al 
2006 
Denmark  Quantitative 
Survey 
33 hospitals in Denmark Health technology acquisition To evaluate local decision support tools used in the 
Danish hospital sector from a theoretical and an 
empirical point of view 
Kapiriri et al 
2007 
Uganda, 
Canada, 
Norway 
Qualitative case 
study 
Three hospitals, one in Uganda, 
one is Canada and the other in 
Norway 
Allocation of hospital resources (and 
budgets) between departments and service 
areas 
To describe the process of healthcare priority setting in 
Ontario- Canada, Norway and Uganda at the macro-, 
meso and micro-levels and to evaluate the description 
using accountability for reasonableness and to identify 
lessons of good practice 
Danjoux et al 
2007 
Canada Qualitative case 
study 
An urban university academic 
health sciences centre with 
approximately 500 patient beds  
Health technology acquisition- 
endovascular aneurysm repair 
To describe and evaluate the decision-making process 
for the adoption of a new technology for repair of 
abdominal aortic aneurysms-endovascular aneurysm 
repair (EVAR) 
Gallego et al 
2007 
Australia Qualitative case 
study 
A 300-bed university-affiliated, 
tertiary acute care hospital 
Health technology acquisition-Medicines 
formulary management 
To describe the operations of the first reported High Cost 
Drug Sub-Committee (HCD-SC) in a public hospital in 
Australia and to evaluate the decision-making process 
using the ethical framework of accountability for 
reasonableness 
Haselkorn et 
al 2007 
United 
States of 
America 
Quantitative 
Survey 
27 hospitals in the United States 
of America 
Health technology acquisition To assess the structure, processes, and cultural support 
behind hospital committees for new technology planning 
and approval 
Gordon et al 
2009 
Argentina Qualitative case 
study 
An acute care tertiary level 
hospital with 350 beds 
Allocation of hospital resources (and 
budgets) between departments and service 
areas 
To describe priority setting in an acute care public 
hospital in Buenos Aires and to evaluate the priority 
setting process using an ethical framework 
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Study Country Study design Study Setting Priority setting activity Study objectives 
Valdebenito 
2009 
Chile Qualitative case 
study 
A 600 bed referral and teaching 
hospital in Chile 
Allocation of hospital resources (and 
budgets) between departments and service 
areas –resource allocation do departments 
and services in the hospital 
To describe, using qualitative case study methods, and 
evaluate, using the ethical framework ‗accountability for 
reasonableness‘, priority setting in a hospital in Chile 
Mitchell et al 
2010 
United 
States of 
America 
Qualitative case 
study 
Four hospitals in the United 
States of America 
Health technology acquisition To describe two evidence reports from the  hospital-
based HTA center which required the integration of local 
data 
Govender et 
al 2011 
South 
Africa 
Quantitative 
Survey 
21 hospital managers in South 
Africa, number of hospitals not 
specified 
Health technology acquisition To adapt and use the DACEHTA mini-HTA tool to 
assess past decisions made by South African hospital 
managers, as applied to selected medical devices 
Astley et al 
2001 
Australia Qualitative case 
study 
A division of women and 
Children‘s hospital in Adelaide 
Australia 
Allocation of hospital resources (and 
budgets) between departments and service 
areas -Reallocate hospital resources to 
maximize health outcomes by developing a 
new hospital service profile  
To describe priority setting and resource allocation 
undertaken by a division of the women‘s & children‘s 
hospital, in Adelaide 
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Appendix II: Characteristics of Selected Papers for Literature Review 2 (3.3) 
Paper Type of 
Paper 
Country Study Setting Priority Setting 
Activity 
Study Objective 
Mori et al 
2012 
Empirical Tanzania Respondents from the Tanzanian 
health sector 
Health technology 
acquisition—
medicines formulary 
management 
To report on the evaluation of the priority setting decision for 
the implementation of artemisinin based combination therapy 
policy against the four conditions of the Accountability for 
Reasonableness framework 
Maluka et al 
2010 
Empirical Tanzania A district in Tanzania Allocation of 
healthcare resources 
within the 
district/region 
To strengthen fairness and accountability in health systems‘ 
priority setting at the district level and to evaluate subsequent 
changes in the quality, equity and trust in the delivery of health 
services and interventions 
Gibson et al 
2006 
Empirical Canada A health region in Canada Allocation of 
healthcare resources 
within the 
district/region 
To use the Accountability for Reasonableness framework to 
evaluate the fairness of using Programme Budgeting and 
Marginal Analysis (PBMA) for priority setting and to assess 
how Accountability for Reasonableness might make 
Programme Budgeting and Marginal Analysis (PBMA) fairer 
Martin et al 
2002 
Empirical Canada The Cancer Care Ontario Policy 
Advisory Committee for the New 
Drug Funding Program and the 
Cardiac Care Network of Ontario 
Expert Panel on Intracoronary 
Stents and Abciximab 
Health technology 
assessment for cancer 
and cardiac care 
To report the elements of fairness described by decision-
makers engaged in priority setting in health technology 
assessment for cancer and cardiac care in Canada, and compare 
them to the four conditions of accountability for reasonableness 
Kapiriri and 
Martin 2006  
Empirical Uganda A referral hospital with 1500 
patient beds 
Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
 
 
 
 
To describe priority setting in a Ugandan hospital and to 
evaluate the description using the ethical framework, 
Accountability for Reasonableness 
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Paper Type of 
Paper 
Country Study Setting Priority Setting 
Activity 
Study Objective 
Reeleder et al 
2005 
Empirical Canada Forty-six hospital in Ontario, 
Canada 
Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
To elicit hospital decision makers‘ self-report of the fairness of 
priority setting in their hospitals using ‗accountability for 
reasonableness‘. 
Madden et al 
2005 
Empirical Canada A network of three teaching 
hospitals in Toronto, Canada 
Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
To describe priority setting in a hospital and evaluate it using 
‗accountability for reasonableness‘, with particular attention to 
the appeal process 
Martin et al 
2003b 
Empirical Canada A tertiary-care teaching hospital 
with 612 acute-care beds, 543 
long-term care beds, 74 nursery 
beds and 22 rehabilitation beds 
Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
To describe priority setting in the context of a hospital strategic 
planning initiative and to evaluate using ‗accountability for 
reasonableness‘ 
Bell et al 
2005 
Empirical Canada A large tertiary hospital in 
Toronto, Canada 
Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
To describe and evaluate priority setting in a hospital in 
response to SARS 
Valdebenito 
et al 2009 
Empirical Chile A 600 bed referral and teaching 
hospital in Chile 
Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
To describe, using qualitative case study methods, and 
evaluate, using the ethical framework ‗accountability for 
reasonableness‘, priority setting in a hospital in Chile 
Gibson et al 
2005 
Empirical Canada Urban academic health center Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
To examine power differences associated with institutional 
roles in the context of management decision-making about 
organizational priorities 
Gordon et al 
2009 
Empirical Argentina An acute care tertiary level 
hospital with 350 beds Allocation 
of hospital resources (and budgets) 
between departments and service 
areas 
Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
To describe priority setting in an acute care municipal level 
public hospital in Buenos Aires and to evaluate the priority 
setting process using an ethical framework for fair processes. 
Baeroe K 
2009 
Conceptual - - Allocation of 
resources among 
patient groups 
 
 
 
To develop a framework for clinical decision making 
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Paper Type of 
Paper 
Country Study Setting Priority Setting 
Activity 
Study Objective 
Bruni et al 
2007 
Empirical Canada The Ontario Wait Times Strategy 
(OWTS) 
Allocation of 
resources among 
patient groups 
To describe priority setting in the Ontario Wait Time Strategy 
(Ontario, Canada) and evaluate  it with particular attention to 
public involvement 
Sharma et al 
2007 
Empirical Canada A community hospital with 425 
patient beds 
Health technology 
acquisition— 
adoption of advanced 
laparoscopic surgery 
To describe the current decision-making processes for the 
adoption of advanced laparoscopic surgery at a community 
hospital in Toronto, Canada and to analyze the decision making 
process using the ethical framework Accountability for 
Reasonableness 
Danjuox et al 
2007 
Empirical Canada An urban university academic 
health sciences centre with 500 
patient beds 
Health technology 
acquisition— 
endovascular 
aneurysm repair 
To describe and evaluate the decision-making process for the 
adoption of a new technology for repair of abdominal aortic 
aneurysms-endovascular aneurysm repair 
Martin et al 
2003 
Empirical Canada A network of three teaching 
hospitals in Toronto, Canada 
Health technology 
acquisition— 
medicines formulary 
management 
To describe priority setting for new drugs in a hospital and to 
evaluate this process using ‗accountability for reasonableness‘ 
Gallego 2007 Empirical Australia A 300-bed university-affiliated, 
tertiary acute care hospital 
Health technology 
acquisition—
medicines formulary 
management 
To describe the operations of the first reported High Cost Drug 
Sub-Committee in a public hospital in Australia and to evaluate 
the decision-making process using the ethical framework of 
Accountability for Reasonableness 
Friendman 
2008 
Conceptual   - No specific priority 
setting activity 
A critique of Accountability for reasonableness 
Greenberg et 
al 2009 
Empirical Israel National health insurer Health technology 
acquisition-
medicines formulary 
management 
 
 
 
 
To examine the legitimacy and fairness of the process of 
updating the NLHS in Israel 
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Paper Type of 
Paper 
Country Study Setting Priority Setting 
Activity 
Study Objective 
Kapiriri et al 
2007 
Empirical Uganda Three hospitals, one in Uganda, 
one in Canada and the other in 
Norway 
Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
To describe the process of healthcare priority setting in 
Ontario, Canada, Norway and Uganda at the macro, meso and 
micro levels and to evaluate the description using 
Accountability for Reasonableness and to identify lessons of 
good practice 
Peacock et al 
2006 
Conceptual - - Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
We describe two checklists to aid managers and doctors in 
implementing local frameworks for resource management 
based on this approach. 
Kapiriri et al 
2010 
Empirical Low and 
middle 
income 
countries 
Low and middle income countries Allocation of 
resources at all levels 
of the healthcare 
system 
The purpose of this paper is to describe a framework for 
evaluating success in 
priority setting in LMIC 
Gibson et al 
2004 
Empirical Canada Canadian academic health science 
centers 
Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
To assist decision-makers in developing fair priority setting 
processes, we conducted one-day workshops for Board 
members and senior administrators at three Canadian academic 
health science centers (Saskatoon Health Region, Kingston 
General Hospital and The Ottawa Hospital), who were seeking 
ethics advice on how to improve priority setting in their 
organizations 
Sibbald 2010 Empirical Canada A mid-sized acute care urban 
community hospital 
Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
To describe the development and piloting of a process to 
evaluate priority setting in health institutions. 
Sibbald 2009 Empirical Canada International, national and local 
respondents in the Canadian health 
system 
Allocation of 
resources at all levels 
of the healthcare 
system 
To present a synthesized definition of successful priority 
setting brought together from the findings of three empirical 
studies describing successful priority setting from the 
viewpoint of stakeholders (decision makers, patients, and 
priority setting scholars). 
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Paper Type of 
Paper 
Country Study Setting Priority Setting 
Activity 
Study Objective 
Mitton and 
Donaldson 
2003 
Empirical Canada Three Canadian health regions Allocation of 
healthcare resources 
within the 
district/region 
To report on numerous lessons learned from a comprehensive 
evaluation of Programme Budgeting and Marginal Analysis 
(PBMA), based in Alberta 
Mitton et al 
2003 
Empirical Canada The surgical department of a rural 
hospital in Canada 
Allocation of hospital 
resources between 
departments and 
service areas 
The objective of this study was to determine how resources 
within a surgical program in a Canadian rural hospital might be 
reallocated to better meet the needs of the local community 
Wailoo et al 
2005 
Empirical United 
Kingdom 
The public in a district in the 
United Kingdom 
Allocation of 
resources at all levels 
of the healthcare 
system 
To explore the potential for applications of procedural 
preferences to health specifically by focusing on the analysis of 
procedural issues in the context of health-care rationing 
decisions 
Shayo et al 
2012 
Empirical Tanzania District health system Allocation of 
healthcare resources 
within the 
district/region 
To explore challenges to fair decision-making processes in 
health care services with a special focus on the potential 
influence of gender, wealth, ethnicity and education 
Dolan et al 
2007 
Conceptual - - Allocation of 
resources at all levels 
of the healthcare 
system 
To consider whether the same set of procedural characteristics 
that have been identified as important in the fields of social 
psychology and legal studies are also important in a social 
choice context and to provide tentative evidence on the relative 
importance attached to the different characteristics. The third 
aim of this paper is to consider the reasons why some 
procedural characteristics matter 
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Appendix III: Characteristics of Frameworks used to evaluate Priority Setting Practices in selected Papers for Literature Review 2 (3.3) 
Paper Evaluative Framework Employed Process Measures of Priority Setting Outcome Measures of Priority Setting 
Mori et al 2012 Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Maluka et al 
2010 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Gibson et al 
2006 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Martin et al 
2002 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Kapiriri and 
Martin 2006 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Reeleder et al 
2005 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
-
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Madden et al 
2005 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Martin et al 
2003b 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Bell et al 2005 Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Valdebenito et 
al 2009 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Gibson et al 
2005 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Gordon et al 
2009 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Baeroe K 2009 Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
-
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Paper Evaluative Framework Employed Process Measures of Priority Setting Outcome Measures of Priority Setting 
Bruni et al 2007 Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Sharma et al 
2007 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Danjuox et al 
2007 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity 
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Martin et al 
2003 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Gallego 2007 Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Friendman 2008 Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
- 
Greenberg et al 
2009 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance 
Publicity   
Appeals and revisions 
Enforcement 
-
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Paper Evaluative Framework Employed Process Measures of Priority Setting Outcome Measures of Priority Setting 
Kapiriri et al 
2007 
Accountability for Reasonableness Relevance                                                                
Publicity                                                                        
Appeals and revisions                                
Enforcement 
- 
Peacock et al 
2006 
An evaluative framework that employs a 
combination of procedural conditions and 
outcome measures to evaluate priority 
setting  
Publicity                                                                      
Appeals                                                                               
Establish organizational objectives                                                                                                                              
Ensure implementation 
Kapiriri et al 
2010 
An evaluative framework that employs a 
combination of procedural conditions and 
outcome measures to evaluate priority 
setting  
Wide stakeholder involvement                                   
Decisions based on relevant and appropriate 
criteria/reasons                                                     
Publicity                                                                    
Availability of appeals mechanisms 
Increased efficiency                                                                                                                                                
Improved quality of decisions                                                                                                                                    
More appropriate resource allocation                                                                                                                   
Increased use of evidence                                                                                                                                        
Reflection of public values                                                                                                                                       
Increased public awareness of the priority setting process                                                                                               
Increased stakeholder awareness of and articulation of public 
values for priority setting Increased public confidence and 
acceptance of the decisions                                                                      
Increased stakeholder satisfaction                                                                                                                       
Understanding and compliance with the process                                                                                             
Reduced dissensions                                                                                                                                                       
Reduced wastage of resources                                                                                                                                
Increased internal accountability                                                                                                                      
Achievement of institutional objectives and goals                                                                                         
Improved internal accountability/reduced corruption                                                                                                     
Increased capacity for priority setting                                                                                                                           
Strengthened institutions and impact on institutional goals 
and objectives                                               Impact on health 
policy and practice                                                                                                                                        
Achievement of the health system goals                                                                                                         
Increased public accountability                                                                                                                              
Increased investment in health 
 
 
 
 
 
E.  W.  Ba r a s a  /  No v  201 4  
233  
 
Paper Evaluative Framework Employed Process Measures of Priority Setting Outcome Measures of Priority Setting 
Gibson et al 
2004 
An evaluative framework that employs a 
combination of procedural conditions and 
outcome measures to evaluate priority 
setting  
Efficiency of priority setting process    
Increased ease in allocating resources 
Improved capacity for making priority 
setting decisions                                                          
Perceived return on time invested           
Fairness                                                                  
Stakeholder understanding of the process 
Stakeholders feel engaged                               
Priorities are justified and seen to be 
reasonable                                                            
Process is perceived to be consistent and 
fair Winners, losers issues well managed    
Relevance                                                                  
Publicity                                                                      
Appeals and revisions                                      
Enforcement  
Priorities change/resources shift                                                                                                                            
Strategic plan supported                                                                                                                                          
Conditions for growth created                                                                                                                                      
Budget balanced                                                                                                                                                                    
Staff satisfaction neutral or positive                                                                                                                             
Staff retention neutral or positive                                                                                                                       
Organizational understanding improved                                                                                                                
Public media recognition neutral or positive                                                                                                     
Public acceptance or community support improved                                                                                             
Public perception of institutional accountability improved                                                                    
Healthcare integration through partnerships increased                                                              
Education/research peer recognition enhanced                                                                                            
Emulated by other organizations 
Sibbald 2010 An evaluative framework that employs a 
combination of procedural conditions and 
outcome measures to evaluate priority 
setting  
Stakeholder engagement                                         
Explicit process                                                     
Information management                              
Consideration of context and values             
Revisions and appeals mechanisms 
Stakeholder understanding                                                                                                                                           
Shifted priorities/reallocation of resources                                                                                                       
Improved decision making quality                                                                                                                   
Stakeholder acceptance and satisfaction                                                                                                            
Positive externalities 
Sibbald 2009 An evaluative framework that employs a 
combination of procedural conditions and 
outcome measures to evaluate priority 
setting  
Stakeholder engagement                                      
Explicit process                                                 
Information management                          
Consideration of context and values               
Revisions and appeals mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
Stakeholder understanding                                                                                                                                                
Shifted priorities/reallocation of resources                                                                                                    
Improved decision making quality                                                                                                                  
Stakeholder acceptance and satisfaction                                                                                                                                        
Positive externalities 
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Paper Evaluative Framework Employed Process Measures of Priority Setting Outcome Measures of Priority Setting 
Mitton and 
Donaldson 2003 
An evaluative framework that employs a 
combination of procedural conditions and 
outcome measures to evaluate priority 
setting  
One on one meetings                                                     
Data not to be used as a crutch                              
Decision making group should choose own 
criteria                                                                      
Critical review of literature                     
Representative panel 
Self rated usefulness by participants                                                                                                                     
Further use of PBMA recommended                                                                                                                   
Improved knowledge of service area                                                                                                                 
Evaluation of historical service                                                                                                                              
Options for re-design proposed                                                                                                                                     
Re-allocation of resources                                                                                                                                         
Improved patient outcomes 
Mitton et al 
2003 
An evaluative framework that employs 
outcome measures 
- Usefulness re-allocation                                                                                                                                       
Improved patient outcomes 
Wailoo et al 
2005 
An evaluative framework that employs 
procedural conditions 
Voice                                                           
Transparency                                                     
Revisions                                                      
Consistency                                                        
Absence of vested interests 6) Accuracy of 
information 
- 
Shayo et al 2012 An evaluative framework that employs 
procedural conditions 
Stakeholder involvement                                      
Shared decision making 
-
Dolan et al 2007 An evaluative framework that employs 
procedural conditions 
Voice                                                                     
Consistency                                                                
Accuracy                                                             
Reversibility                                                   
Transparency                                                             
Neutrality 
- 
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Appendix IV: Informed Consent Forms for In-depth Interviews 
 
Title: Examining priority setting and resource allocation in County hospitals in Kenya 
 
 
Edwine Barasa   KEMRI /Wellcome Trust Research Programme/ University of 
Cape Town  
 
My name is _______________. I work for KEMRI, which is a government organization under the 
Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation and the Ministry of Medical Services. KEMRI conducts 
research activities to learn more about health and illnesses in Kenya, including health systems 
research.  
 
What is KEMRI and what is this research about?  
 
 KEMRI is a government organization that carries out medical research to find better ways of 
preventing and treating illness in the future for everybody‘s benefit. Sometimes research involves 
only asking questions to health providers and district health team members, about what they know, 
feel or do.   
 All research at KEMRI has to be approved before it begins by several national [and international] 
committees who look carefully at planned work. They must agree that the research is important, 
relevant to Kenya and follows nationally and internationally agreed research guidelines. This 
includes ensuring that all participants‘ safety and rights are respected. 
 In this research, we want to learn more about how decision makers in hospitals plan for the 
delivery of health services within the organizations they work for. We are particularly interested in 
how decisions are made to allocate or manage resources in this hospital. We would like to discuss 
these issues with national level decision makers, DHMT members, senior hospital managers, a 
selected group of departmental managers and front line health workers from this hospital. We 
would like to talk to people within the hospital grounds in a quiet and private room/office of 
convenience to you. This is a personal discussion and other than the interviewer and a note taker, 
no-one else but the interviewer will be present unless you would like someone else there. If you do 
not want to answer any of the questions you may say so and the interviewer will move on to the 
next question.  If you agree, the discussion will be tape-recorded to assist later in fully writing up 
the information. No-one will be identified by name on the tape or in the transcriptions.  
 
 
Voluntary Participation  
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you agree to help with this research and later change your 
mind you are free to withdraw at any time. The interview should take approximately 30 minutes to one 
hour. Refusing to participate will not in any way affect your current or future job prospects. 
 
Potential Risks and Benefits of the Study 
Given that the study is non-experimental it is unlikely to cause any physical or psychological harm to 
you.  While the study has no direct benefits to you, the results will form a useful basis for potential 
policy interventions that will improve the way the hospital plan and manager its resources and hence 
improve its performance in delivering care and meeting the needs of the community it serves. There 
will be no form of remuneration to participate in the study. 
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Confidentiality and Anonymity 
We would like to clarify that we are not here to inspect or audit the facility. The information obtained 
by interviews will be used for research purposes only. Apart from members of the research team, no 
one else will have access the data collected from these interviews and your identity or name will not 
be used in any reports of this work. For protection of the hospital and your confidentiality, data 
collected will remain anonymous by ensuring that your name and that of the hospital are not recorded, 
rather codes will be used and interviews will always be conducted by an investigator and assistant who 
are both part of the research team. All data that are provided will be confidential. The knowledge 
gained from this research will be shared in summary form, without revealing individuals‘ identities.  
 
The study has been approved by the ethics committee of KEMRI and by national and county health 
managers.  
 
What if I have any questions? In case you have any questions please contact the principal 
researcher using the contacts below: 
 
Dr Edwine W. Barasa, KEMRI Wellcome Trust Research Programme, P.O. Box 43640 – 00100 
Nairobi, Kenya 
Telephone: 0722 129 757 
If you want to ask someone independent anything about this research please contact: 
Community Liaison Manager, KEMRI – Wellcome Trust, P.O Box 230, Kilifi.  Telephone: 0723 342 
780/0738 472 281 or 041 7522 063 
Or 
The Secretary - KEMRI/National Ethics Review Committee, P. O. BOX 54840-00200, Nairobi, Tel 
number: 020 272 2541 Mobile: 0722 205 901 or 0733 400 003 
I have had the study explained to me. I have understood all that has been read/explained and had my 
questions answered satisfactorily  
  Yes  please tick  I agree to be interviewed 
  Yes  please tick  I agree for the interview to be recorded  
I understand that I can change my mind at any stage and it will not affect me in any way. 
Signature:  
 
Date
: 
 
  
Participant Name:  Time:  
 (please print name)  
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Appendix V: Topic Guide for Preliminary Interviews to Explore Priority Setting Context in County 
Hospitals in Kenya 
Interviewer’s remarks about session and issues from debrief 
Date of discussion: Interviewer: 
Venue: Note taker:  
Time start:  Hospital: 
Time stop: Interviewee’s 
code: 
Interview completed Yes 
No 
Reason for Incomplete interview 
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DOMAINS      SAMPLE QUESTIONS 
 Introduction  
I am conducting research on how hospitals set their priorities and make 
decisions about how to distribute (allocate) the resources available to them to 
different departments, services and patient groups (give an example). I am 
going to discuss with you about this hospitals priority setting activities. 
 
Context  
I would like to begin by exploring wider contextual issues…… 
Economic and financial factors  
1. Would you tell me the different sources of financing/funds for this 
hospital? 
Probe 
-What is the proportion of funding from the different sources? 
-Who, in your opinion is the most important source of funds and why? 
2.  Could you explain to me how the hospital requests for the funds and how 
the funds are transferred from the source to the hospital? 
Probe 
-What do you think about this request and transfer procedure? 
-How long does the process take? What do you think about the length of 
the process? 
-Are there intermediaries? Who are they? What is their role? What do you 
think about their role?  
3. Are there conditions associated with these funding sources? 
Probe 
-For each of the funding sources, do you know of any conditions or 
requirements to be met for funding? 
-Do the funders (financing source) have a say on how the funds are used? 
How do they achieve this? 
-What is your opinion about this? Do you think the conditions are fair and 
appropriate? 
                   Socio-political and organizational factors 
4. Could please explain to me organizational structure of the hospital? 
Probe 
-Is this the official structure? 
-If yes, is there an informal structure? Please describe this? How is it 
different from the formal structure and why? 
-Does this organizational structure work in practice? 
5. Could you please tell me what autonomy this hospital is expected to have 
over resource allocation decisions?  Are there different levels and types of 
autonomy for different departments in resource allocation decisions within 
the hospital 
Probe 
-What resource allocation decisions is the hospital officially allowed to make? 
-What resource allocation decisions is the hospital officially not allowed to make? 
- Are there times when unofficial decisions are made – and if so why? 
  
6. In your opinion, what autonomy does this hospital actually have over 
resource allocation decisions? 
Probe 
-What resource allocation decisions does the hospital actually make? 
 
7. In your opinion, what factors influence the hospitals exercise of their 
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autonomy over resource allocation decisions?  
 
8. In your opinion, what other contextual issues could impact priority setting 
activities in these hospitals? 
 
Content Priority setting refers to the distribution of resources among competing programmes 
and patients or patient groups 
9. What are the current health service priorities in this hospital? 
Probe 
-Is there a document where hospital priorities are outlined? 
-Is there another way (other than documents) in which hospital priorities are 
represented? 
10. Could you tell me the different types of priority setting/resource allocation 
decisions or activities that are carried out in the hospital? Please explain 
Probe 
-What hospital resources are allocated in each of the activities? 
-Where do these resources come from? 
-How does the hospital acquire these resources? 
-Are there rules of guidelines that guide each of these activities? 
-Where do the rule and guidelines come from? 
-Are they used? If not, why not? 
11. Does the hospital have a vision, mission and goal? 
Probe 
-How where these developed? 
-Who was involved in developing these? 
-How does the vision, mission and goals of the hospital affect the 
activities of the hospital? 
-What is your opinion on the vision, mission and goal? 
12. Can you tell me about any major capital investment decisions (or project 
initiated) that have been made in the hospital in the past 2 years? (e.g. 
purchasing an equipment, building a ward) 
Probe 
-What investment decision 
-When was the decision made 
-Has the project been completed 
-What is the source of funding for the project 
-Do you agree with the decision? If not why not? 
 
Process Lets now talk about how these processes are actually carried out… 
13. For each of the priority setting activities you have outlined, could you 
please explain how the activities are conducted? 
Probe 
-What is the procedure for making these allocation decisions? 
-How formal/informal is the process? 
-Are there committees responsible for these activities? Composition? Committee 
guidelines? 
-Are there meetings? What meetings? When do they meet?  
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Appendix VI:  Topic Guide for In-depth Interviews to describe and evaluate the Hospital-wide 
Planning Processes in County Hospitals 
 
Interviewer‘s remarks about session and issues from debrief  
1. 
2. 
3. 
Date of discussion:  Interviewer:  
Venue:  Note taker:   
Time start:   District:  
Time stop:  Interviewee’s  
code: 
Interview completed Yes   
No  
Reason for Incomplete interview  
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DOMAINS      SAMPLE QUESTIONS 
 
Context  
Financial factors  
1) (Explore how the financing gap affects priority setting) –> according to the 
2011-2012 records the financing gap was 45%, in your opinion how do you 
think the gap between available resources and resource needs affects the way 
the hospital plans/sets priorities, and resources are allocated/budgets are 
allocated?  
Socio-political and organizational factors 
Decision space 
1. Could you please explain what autonomy the hospital has to decide on the health 
care priorities they select in the annual work plan (what can they decide, and 
what cant they decide?)? 
2. What about the autonomy the hospital has to decide how to allocate the hospital 
budget? (FIF? Money from MOH, Development partners? NHIF?) 
3. In your opinion, what factors influence this autonomy  
4. In your opinion, what role does the central ministry of health have in 
determining health priorities selected in the AWP? 
5. What about in determining how the hospital budget is allocated?  
6. In your opinion, what role do the donors of health have in determining health 
priorities selected in the AWP? 
7. What about in determining how the hospital budget is allocated?  
      Decision making Capacity 
8. How does the training and skills of the people involved in hospital budget and 
development of AWP affect these processes? 
9. Has any member in the hospital attended any management training? What 
training? Who organized the training? Which members of the hospital attended 
the training? 
10. In your opinion, do the people involved in the process of hospital budgeting and 
development of AWP have the necessary training and skills? 
Leadership 
11. Would you describe the leadership style in the hospital?  
12. In your opinion, how does the fact that the hospital superintendent is also a 
clinician with clinical duties affect leadership in general and hospital planning 
specifically (budgeting and AWP) 
Actors 13. In your opinion, who influences in the budgeting process in the hospital? How 
do they influence this? 
14. In your opinion, who influences in the AWP process in the hospital? How do 
they influence this? 
15. In your opinion who should be involved in the budgeting process in the hospital? 
why? Who should not be involved?why? 
16. In your opinion who should be involved in the AWP process in the hospital? 
Why? Who should not be involved?why? 
17. Who is actually involved? why? 
18. At what stage of the budgeting/AWP process is each of the actors involved? 
19. What is role of each or the actors/participants in the decision making process? 
20. What is the relationship between the actors you have mentioned? 
21. In your opinion why is it that clinicians/doctors don‘t seem to participate in 
hospital budgeting and/or AWP process? 
Community 
values 
22. Is there any effort by the hospital to obtain community views on how to allocate 
the budget or set priorities in the AWP? (ask about community participation, 
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community values) 
23. In what ways, if it happens, are community views incorporated in the hospital 
planning process? 
 
Process 
 
Procedure 
24. What is the official procedure for hospital budgeting? (who are the members of 
EEC? HMT? HMC? what sorts of decisions do they make) 
25. What is the official procedure for development of AWP? (What role does the 
members of EEC? HMT? HMC? what sorts of decisions do they make) 
26. What procedure is actually followed? Why? 
27. If the procedure followed is different from official procedure, what are the 
reasons for this difference? 
28. How is the hospital budgeting and AWP process related? 
29. In your opinion, why do these processes appear not to be coordinated/related? 
Relevant criteria 
30. In your opinion what criteria should be used to allocate budgets to departments 
in the hospital? Why? 
31. In your opinion, what criteria should be used to select health priorities in the 
AWP process? Why? 
32. What criteria are actually used to allocate hospital budgets? Why? 
33. How do the hospitals determine whether these criteria have been met by the 
departments? 
34. What criteria are actually used to select health priorities in the AWP process? 
Why? 
35. How do the hospitals determine whether these criteria have been met by the 
health priorities? 
36. In your opinion how does the revenue generation potential of the 
department/project affect decisions about planning/budgeting? Why? Can you 
give examples? 
Transparency and publicity 
37. In your opinion, is the budgeting process in the hospital transparent? Why? 
38. Are decisions about budget allocation communicated to others? To who? How? 
Do you feel this communication is adequate? Why? 
39. Is the AWP communicated to others? To who? How?  
40. Are reasons/criteria for budgeting/AWP transparent or accessible to everyone 
involved or affected by the decisions 
Appeals and revisions 
41. Is there a mechanism to appeal decisions about budget allocation? If so please 
describe it 
42.  Is there a mechanism to appeal decisions about health priorities in the AWP? If 
so please describe it 
43. In your opinion, do successful appeals lead to revisions of decisions? 
Enforcement 
44. Are budget allocation decisions implemented according to plan? 
45. If not why? 
46. Are AWP plans implemented according to plan? Do you know of instances 
where some plans are not implemented? Is this always the case? Why are they 
not implemented? 
47. In your opinion what factors affect the implementation of hospital budgets? 
What about AWP? 
48. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that budget allocation decisions are 
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implemented? What about AWP? 
Information/Evidence Use 
49. What information/tools do decision makers use to budget allocation decisions? Is
this information available? Where from?
50. What about to set health priorities in AWP? Is this information available? Where
from?
51. What factors affect access/availability of these information/tools?
52. What is the quality and reliability of this information and tools?
53. In your opinion, is the information used in the planning process accurate and
reliable?
Content 54. 51. Are there official guidelines for hospital budget allocation? Where are they?
55. 52. Are there official guidelines for AWP process? Where are they?
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Appendix VII: Topic Guide for In-depth Interviews to describe and evaluate Medicine selection 
processes in County Hospitals 
Interviewer‘s remarks about session and issues from debrief 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Date of discussion: Interviewer: 
Venue: Note taker:  
Time start:  District: 
Time stop: Interviewee’s 
code: 
Interview completed Yes 
No 
Reason for Incomplete interview 
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DOMAINS      SAMPLE QUESTIONS 
 
Context  
Financial factors  
1. Could you please describe the sources of medicines in this hospital? 
2. For each source of medicines, who pays (finances) for the medicines? 
3. Can you explain the process, by which the hospital procures these 
medicines from the mentioned sources? 
4. Could you please explain the process by which the hospital pays for (or 
ensures third parties pay) for the medicines) 
5. What conditions are associated with these sources of medicines? 
6. What conditions are associated with these funding sources? 
Socio-political and organizational factors 
7. Could you please explain what autonomy the hospital has to decide on 
what types and quantities of medicines to procure? 
8. In your opinion, what role does the central ministry of health (and or 
KEMSA) have in determining what types of quantities  
9. In your opinion, what factors influence this autonomy (what to procure 
and how much to procure)? 
Actors 10. In your opinion, who influences the selection of medicines to be 
procured in the hospital and who influences the quantities to be 
procured? How do they influence this? 
11. In your opinion who should be involved in making decisions about the 
medicines to be procured in the hospital? why? 
12. Who is actually involved? why? 
13. How are these people selected, or how do they become part of the 
decision making process? 
14. At what stage of the medicines selection process is each of the actors 
involved? 
15. What is role of each or the actors/participants in the decision making 
process 
16. In your opinion, how does each of these actors affect the decision 
making process and why? 
17. In your opinion, how does each of these actors relate with each other 
and why? 
Community 
values 
18. In what ways, if it happens, are community views incorporated in the 
medicines selection process? 
 
Process 
 
Procedure 
19. What is the official procedure for making decisions about what 
medicines to procure? (is there a Drugs and therapeutic committee, who 
are the members, is it functional, how often do they meet, what sorts of 
decisions do they make) 
20. What is the procedure for making decisions about how much of each 
medicine to procure? 
21. What procedure is actually followed? 
22. If the procedure followed is different from official procedure, what are 
the reasons for this difference? 
Relevant criteria 
23. In your opinion what criteria should be used to decide which medicines 
to procure and what quantities? 
24. What are actually used criteria are used to decide which medicines to 
procure and what quantities to procure? 
25. How do the hospitals determine whether these criteria have been met by 
the medicines they select? 
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26. Why are some criteria (the ones you feel should be used and are not 
used) not used to select medicines and to determine quantities to be 
procured? 
Transparency and publicity 
27. In your opinion, is the process of determining what medicines to be 
procured by the hospital transparent? 
28. How the decisions about what medicines can be procured by the 
hospital communicated? 
29. Are reasons/criteria for selection of medicines transparent or accessible 
to everyone involved or affected by the decisions? 
30. Which stakeholders have access to information about which medicines 
can be procured and in what form do they access this information 
Appeals and revisions 
31. Is there a mechanism to appeal decisions about medicines selection? If 
so please describe it 
32. In your opinion, do successful appeals lead to revisions of decisions? 
Enforcement 
33. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that medicines selection 
decisions are implemented? 
34. Are there instances where medicines not officially approved for 
procurement are procured? What are the mechanisms in place to prevent 
this and what are the factors that lead to this violation of formulary 
decisions? 
Information/Evidence Use 
35. What information/tools do decision makers use to make medicine 
selection decisions 
36. What factors affect access/availability of these information/tools? 
37. What is the quality and reliability of this information and tools? 
Content 
 
38. What are the official Guidelines/rules for medicine selection in this 
hospital?  
39. Is there a hospital formulary to outlines selected medicines? 
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Appendix VIII: Topic Guide for In-depth Interviews to describe and evaluate Nursing Allocation 
Processes in County Hospitals  
 
Interviewer‘s remarks about session and issues from debrief  
 
1. 
 
2. 
3. 
Date of discussion:  Interviewer:  
Venue:  Note taker:   
Time start:   District:  
Time stop:  Interviewee’s  
code: 
Interview completed Yes   
No  
Reason for Incomplete interview  
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DOMAINS      SAMPLE QUESTIONS 
 
Context  
Financial factors  
1. Could you please describe the situation of nursing staff shortage 
in the hospital? 
2. What is the source of funding for nursing training opportunities in 
the hospital 
Socio-political and organizational factors 
3. Could you please explain the role of the health ministry in the 
allocation of nurses in the hospital (number, cadre, specialization) 
what about its role in transferring? What role does the hospital 
play? 
 
Actors 4. In your opinion, who influences the allocation of nurses to the 
different wards and clinics in the hospital? How do they influence 
these process?  
 
 
Process 
 
Procedure 
5. What is the official procedure for nurses allocation to the 
different wards and clinics? (is there a committee, who are the 
members, is it functional, how often do they meet, what sorts of 
decisions do they make) 
6. What procedure is actually followed? (if different from official) 
why? 
7. What is the official procedure for making nurses training 
allocation to the different wards and clinics? (is there a 
committee, who are the members, is it functional, how often do 
they meet, what sorts of decisions do they make) 
8. What procedure is actually followed? (if different from official) 
why? 
Relevant criteria 
9. What are the official criteria is used to decide the number of 
nurses to be allocated to different wards? Why? 
10. What criteria are actually used? Why? 
11. What are the official criteria used to decide which nurses and 
what departments receive nursing training? 
12. What criteria are actually used? Why? 
13. How do the hospitals determine whether these criteria have been 
met by the departments/nurses they select? 
Transparency and publicity 
14. Are decisions about nursing allocation and training allocation 
communicated to the departments? If so how are they 
communicated? 
15. How are nursing training opportunities communicated to 
departments/nurses? Do you feel that training opportunities are 
adequately communicated to nurses/departments? Why? 
16. Are reasons/criteria for nursing allocation and training allocation 
communicated or accessible to everyone involved or affected by 
the decisions? 
Appeals and revisions 
17. Is there a mechanism to appeal decisions about nursing allocation 
and training allocation? If so please describe it 
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Enforcement 
18. Are the official decisions about nursing allocation and training
implemented in practice?
19. What factors affect the effective implementation of nursing
allocation and training allocation decisions?
Information/Evidence Use 
20. What information/tools do decision makers use to make nursing
allocation and training allocation decisions?
21. What are the sources of this information?
22. Do you feel that the information used is accurate and reliable?
Why?
Content 23. Are there official guidelines/rules for nursing allocation and
training allocation in this hospital?
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 Appendix IX: Topic Guide for In-depth Interviews with National Level Policy Makers 
 
Interviewer‘s remarks about session and issues from debrief  
1. 
2. 
3. 
Date of discussion:  Interviewer:  
Venue:  Note taker:   
Time start:   District:  
Time stop:  Interviewee’s  
code: 
Interview completed Yes   
No  
Reason for Incomplete interview  
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Hospital budgeting and planning process 
Financing 
1. What is the formula used to allocate recurrent and development funds to district hospitals 
2. Is there a guideline for the use of FIF by hospitals?  
3. What are the intended use of cost-sharing funds according to the policy if present 
4. Does the expansion of the scope of expenses financed by cost sharing funds in hospitals mean 
that the policy has officially been revised? 
5. What does the cost-sharing policy 
Planning process 
6. What are the structures/systems/arrangements for monitoring the implementation of AWP 
processes? 
7. What are the structures/systems/arrangements for monitoring the implementation of 
performance contracting?  
8. What is the role of performance contracting in setting hospital priorities? 
9. Do you give hospitals any directions on how to spend their resources? How does the vote 
system work? 
10. How does the authority to incur expenditure system work? 
11. Are there structural decision making guidelines for hospitals? Is there an official organogram 
for hospitals? 
12. Are there guidelines for the various committees? HMT, HMC, EEC 
13. Are there official guidelines for membership in these committees? 
14. How are amounts of funds allocated to hospitals for recurrent and development funds 
determined  
Medicines selection 
15. How are decisions about the selection of medicines to the essential medicines list made? 
-Who makes these decisions 
-What is the decision making process? – a standing committee? An ad hoc committee? Etc 
-What criteria is used to select medicines for inclusion 
-How often is the EML reviewed? 
16. What is the link between the EML and the official clinical guidelines in the ministry? 
(pediatrics, malaria, HIV/AIDS, TB, etc) and the benefit package offered by NHIF? 
17. What is the objective of the KEMSA privatization plan? 
-Under this plan is there a difference between the range of medicines that will be available under the 
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private and the public arms of KEMSA? Was considerations justified these differences if any? 
-Are there any guidelines/restrictions that hospitals have when choosing the range of medicines to 
procure locally from funds generated through cost-sharing? 
a. What plans/structures are there to monitor the functioning of Medicines and 
therapeutic committees in hospitals? 
b. What plans/structures are there to monitor the selection and use of medicines in 
hospitals? 
Nursing Allocation 
18. There is a nursing shortage in hospitals and yet the ministry apparently stopped hiring nurses, 
what plans are there to remedy the nursing shortage? 
19. Are there guideline/standards (from the ministry, department of nursing) on nursing allocation 
to different clinical areas in hospitals? 
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 Appendix X:  Topic Guide and Checklist for Document Reviews to describe and evaluate the Priority 
Setting Processes in County Hospitals 
 
Reviewers remarks about session  
1. 
2. 
3. 
Date of Document reviewer :  District: Document reviewer: 
Documents reviewed:  
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
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DOMAINS     GUIDING QUESTIONS POTENTIAL SOURCE 
DOCUMENTS 
 
Context  
Economic-financial factors 
What is the annual hospital funding gap?  
1. What is the annual hospital budget?  
2. How much revenues/finances did the 
hospital raise during that year? 
3. What is the contribution (proportion) of 
each of the financing source to the total 
hospital resource envelope?  
4. What is the level and nature of health care 
demand faced by hospitals 
 
Decision space 
5. What planning and guiding templates are 
available 
6. What decisions are hospitals allowed to 
make 
7. What is contained in the templates are 
guided by templates 
 
1. Hospital budgets 
2. Hospital annual operation plans 
3. Hospital income and 
expenditure reports 
4. Hospital utilization reports – 
from health management 
information system 
 
Process 
 
5. What are the official criteria for priority 
setting? 
6. Do successful appeals lead to revisions of 
decisions and what influences this? 
7. Are priority setting decisions actually 
implemented in practice? 
8. How frequently do meetings take place 
1. Annual operation plans 
2. Hospital planning guidelines 
3. Minutes of meetings 
4. Hospital expenditure and 
investment reports 
Content 
 
9. What are the official Guidelines/rules for 
priority setting and resource allocation in 
this hospital?  
10. What are the actual health service priorities 
in this hospital? 
1. Annual operation plans 
2. Hospital planning guidelines 
3. Hospital expenditure and 
investment reports 
Actors 11. Who calls for meetings 
12. Who attends meetings 
13. Who contributes during meetings 
14. What is the relationship 
4. Meeting memo‘s 
5. Minutes of meetings 
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 Appendix XI:  Topic Guide and Checklist for Observations to describe and evaluate the Priority 
Setting Processes in County Hospitals 
Observers‘ remarks about session 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Date of Observation: Observer: 
Venue: Note taker:  
Time start:  District: 
Time stop: Observed meeting: 
Observation completed Yes 
No 
Reason for incomplete observation 
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DOMAINS      SAMPLE QUESTIONS 
Context 
Socio-political and organizational factors 
1. What are the characteristics of the hospital leadership?
2. How does the hospital leadership relate to other staff
3. How does the hospital leadership handle their roles including
priority setting roles
4. What decisions to hospitals actually make (despite there being
restrictions)
Process 5. What procedure is actually followed?
6. What criteria are actually used to set priorities?
7. Do relevant stakeholders participate in decision making?
8. What information is used to make decisions, how is this
information used?
Content 9. What are the actual health service priorities in this hospital?
Actors 10. Which people or groups of people take part in the priority setting
process?
11. What are the roles of each of the actors?
12. What are the interests of each of the actors?
13. Which actors participate in decision making?
14. How do actors relate during meetings and also out of meetings
15. Whose voice is heard most in meetings, whose isn‘t
16. Who seems to influence decisions more than others
17. What is the relative influence of different actors in the decision
making process?
18. Who has the final decision making power?
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Appendix XII: Excerpt from Research Diary 
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Appendix XIII: Data Analysis Coding Tree 
CONTEXT 
Themes Sub-Themes 
Management Capacity Planning skills 
Budgeting skills 
Resource mobilization skills 
Managers training in planning and budgeting 
Manager‘s experience 
Sufficient number of managers 
Availability of managers for planning and budgeting 
activities 
  
Resource Gap The degree of resource scarcity 
The factors affecting resource scarcity 
The consequences of resource scarcity 
The effect of resource scarcity on budgeting and planning 
What decision makers feel about how this affects hospital 
planning 
  
Financing Arrangements Sources of funding 
The different form of each source of funding 
Relative importance of the sources of funding 
Flow of the different sources of funding 
Challenges associated with the different sources of 
funding 
Determinants of the level of each source of funding 
What decision makers feel about how this affects hospital 
planning 
  
Decision Space Range of decisions hospitals are allowed to make 
Range of decisions hospitals actually make 
Types of decisions  hospitals are allowed to make 
Types of decisions hospitals actually make 
Range of decisions are made at the central or county level 
Type of decisions are made at the central or county level 
 Ways in which control from the central or county 
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government is effected 
What decision makers feel about how this affects hospital 
planning 
  
Organizational Culture Orientation towards to the use of evidence 
Orientation towards deliberative processes 
Orientation towards innovation 
Orientation towards Internal or external focus 
Orientation towards communication 
Orientation towards task or outcome 
Orientation towards team work or individual 
Orientation towards change 
  
Leadership Availability and accessibility of hospital leadership 
Fostering a vision and mission of the organization 
Leadership role in developing hospital plans 
Leadership role in monitoring performance 
Leadership role in developing capacity of staff for 
effective decision making 
Leadership role in promoting deliberation and democracy 
in decision making 
Leadership role in empowering other decision makers 
Leadership role in managing stakeholder relationships 
  
PROCESS  
  
Priority Setting Procedure Types of priority setting activities 
Schedule of priority setting activities 
Procedure of priority setting activities 
Relationship  and alignment between priority setting 
activities 
Managers feeling about how the procedure affects hospital 
priority setting 
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Communitarian Orientation Community involvement 
Incorporation of community values 
Forms of community involvement 
Stakeholder‘s feelings about community involvement 
  
Deliberative and Fair Stakeholder engagement 
Stakeholder empowerment 
Transparency 
Revisions 
  
Desired Outcomes Implementation  
Stakeholder satisfaction 
Stakeholder Understanding 
Shifted priorities 
  
Use of Information Source of information 
Forms of information 
Quality of information 
Use of information 
Factors affecting use of information 
Effect of information use on budgeting and planning 
  
ACTORS, THEIR POWER AND 
INTEREST 
 
Range of Actors Who are the actors 
What is their role 
Actor participation in planning and budgeting activities 
How do the actors exercise their role 
  
Actor Power Levels of power 
Spaces of power 
Sources and forms of power 
 Exercise of power 
Effect of power to priority setting 
Effect of power to actor relations 
Effect of power to planning and budgeting activities 
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Actor Interest Actor values 
What is important to each actor 
How do actor values interact with priority setting 
CONTENT 
Priority Setting Rules and 
Guidelines 
Range of priority setting guidelines available 
Source of priority setting guidelines 
Presence of the guidelines in the hospital 
Adherence to guidelines 
Reasons for non-adherence to guidelines 
Operationalization of the guidelines 
Priority Setting Criteria Formal criteria 
Informal criteria 
Operationalizing of criteria 
Managers feeling about how criteria affects priority setting 
Instruments of Priority Setting Forms in which priority setting is captured 
Development of these forms 
Presence in the hospital 
Operationalization of these forms 
Relationship/alignment between these forms 
Decision Making Structure Hospital chain of command (organogram) 
Decision making committees, teams 
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Appendix XIV: Example of the Coding Process 
ACTORS, THEIR POWER AND INTEREST 
Step 3- Axial coding - aggregation of 
sub-themes into overarching themes  
(axial codes informed by literature, 
conceptual framework, sub themes) 
Step 2 – refinement of open 
codes to sub themes  
(Sub-themes informed by 
open codes and literature) 
Step 1 – Open Coding Process -lines, sentences, paragraph 
coding 
Range of Actors Who are the actors The two managers seem to have more power than the med 
sup 
The disproportionate power that the HOA and accountants 
has led to demotivation of other staff 
The disproportionate power that the HAO and accountant 
have resulted in a lack of trust 
Sources of power 
The HAO and accountants power are in part as a result of 
the med sup being too busy 
Provincial office rubberstamps decisions 
Priorities from clinical departments overlooked because 
clinicians don‘t participate in planning 
Power used to favor departments 
Power plays due to position and professional identity 
Power differences demotivates other managers from 
participating in planning meetings 
Only two individuals make decisions 
Mistrust is impeding the working together among decision 
What is their role 
Actor participation in planning 
and budgeting activities 
How do the actors exercise their 
role 
Actor Power Levels of power 
Spaces of power 
Sources and forms of power 
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 Exercise of power makers 
Med sup favors his department-surgery 
Managers think planning meetings are a waste of time 
Managers skip planning and budgeting meetings because 
they don‘t get allocations and are hence frustrated 
Managers skip planning and budgeting meetings because 
their input is overlooked 
Managers don‘t participate in planning meetings because 
they are used as avenues to advance personal interests and 
fights 
Managers don‘t participate in planning meetings because of 
negligence 
HMT members are not empowered to question what 
happens in the hospital 
HMT members are demoralized because of the decisions of 
the EEC 
HAO and the accountant misuse their powers 
HAO and the accountant have disproportionate power 
when compared to other managers 
Feeling that EEC should be disbanded 
Feeling that Accountant and HAO are involved in 
corruption 
Feeling by medics that while admin has power they don‘t 
understand clinical needs 
EEC members favor their own departments over others 
Donors not involved in planning and budgeting meetings 
Discontent over the power of the accountant 
Coz the accountant has power their priorities take 
precedence over others 
Composition of the HMC finance committee 
Clinicians skip planning meetings because they feel 
represented by the medical superintendent 
Clinicians lack understanding and knowledge of the 
hospital planning processes 
Effect of power to priority 
setting 
Effect of power to actor 
relations 
Effect of power relations to 
planning and budgeting 
activities 
  
Actor Interest Actor values 
What is important to each actor 
How do actor values interact 
with priority setting 
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Clinicians identify with the hospital medical superintendent 
because he is a clinician too 
Clinicians have not received management training 
Clinicians have delegated management roles to the nurses 
Clinicians feel they need to be part of the hospital planning 
process 
Clinicians feel they are blamed by patients for lack of 
essential supplies 
Clinicians feel frustrated by lack of implementation of their 
proposals 
Clinicians feel frustrated by lack of essential supplies 
Clinicians don‘t participate 
Clinicians don‘t attend planning meetings due to frustration 
because their input is overlooked 
Clinicians don‘t attend planning meetings because they are 
not invited to meetings 
Clinicians don‘t attend planning meetings because they are 
few and busy 
Clinicians don‘t attend planning meetings because of 
negligence 
Clinicians don‘t attend planning meetings because it is part 
of hospital culture 
Clinicians do not participate in hospital planning and 
budgeting 
Clinicians bear the responsibility of explaining to patients 
the lack of essential supplies 
Actors and their power 
Account and HAO make decisions without communication 
to the rest of the team 
HMT members are disempowered 
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Appendix XV: Sample Coding Chart 
Respondent 
Category 
Who are the 
Actors 
What is their Role Actor Participation How does Actor participation 
affect Priority Setting 
Senior 
managers 
EEC, HMT, 
HMC, Donors, 
frontline 
workers, the 
community 
The role of the HMC is to 
oversee the activities of the 
hospital, as part of their 
oversight they are expected to 
review and approve hospital 
budgets before they are 
forwarded to the provincial 
office for approval and 
transmission to the national 
government. The role of the 
EEC is to make senior level 
budgeting decisions; they 
allocate and compile the final 
budget. The role of the HMT is 
to deliberate and make 
management decisions; they 
make budget proposals and 
deliberate on these proposals. 
The role of donors is to 
contribute to decision making 
about ways of supporting the 
hospital and to support hospital 
activities. Frontline workers 
and public appear to have no 
role in budgeting in this 
hospital 
Senior managers report that all 
the decision making actors, 
The EEC, HMT, HMC were 
sufficiently involved in the 
planning and budgeting 
activities. They however 
reported that the community 
and frontline practitioners 
were not involved. They felt 
that the reason clinicians don‘t 
participate is their busy 
clinical schedules so they tend 
to focus on that "most of the 
time you find that there is only 
one clinician per department, 
so they are very very busy 
with their clinical duties" 
Lack of clinician participation leads 
to under-represented clinician 
priorities. "You will find that we will 
do a budget and after that clinicians 
come and complain that there is 
something missing or has not be 
provided for in the budget….." 
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Appendix XVI:  University of Cape Town Ethics Review Approval Letter 
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Appendix XVII: KEMRI Ethical Review Approval Letter 
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Appendix XVIII: Media Snapshots of Devolution in the Health Sector 
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Appendix XIX: Media snapshot of health worker strikes 
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 Appendix XX: Media Snapshot of Resource Scarcity in the Kenyan Health Sector 
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Appendix XXI: Media Snapshots of Public Engagement Activities for County Budgeting Processes 
